The Supreme Court started its own dam fund when the apex court of the country was hearing a suo motu notice of the State Bank of Pakistan, whereby a scheme to allow several companies to write off loans worth Rs54 billion was being discussed. The Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) remarked that two dams could be built from the money that was to be recovered from these bad debts. However, about four weeks ago, the CJP shied away from his previous position, remarking that it was not the job of judges to build dams in the country. The bench hearing the case has, however, since then shown renewed interest in the fund for dams, ordering the Sharif family’s lawyer in the Sugar Mill case to deposit Rs1 million in the fund if he required an extension for their hearing. Just a few days ago, during a public speech the CJP waved currency notes given to him by his granddaughter for the dam fund. This was after the top judge had previously revealed that an unknown person had approached him at a shrine and handed over a cheque of half a million rupees for the fund. He triumphantly pronounced that he was not doing the country a favour by building the dams, yet defiantly stated that the recent schools burnt in Diamer were a result of the Supreme Court’s attempts to build a dam in the region. Maybe the honourable CJP underestimated the effect that another case may have on the law and order situation in Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is, for all practical purposes, governed as a special region; a peculiar governing mechanism unheard of around the globe. Historically, the region’s association with the Pakistani federation goes back to their ascension in 1949, when under the Karachi agreement, the Pakistani federation took control of the affairs of the territory. Gilgit-Baltistan was, however, refused accession, as an astute policy move by the federation, and was instead lumped on to the same category as the disputed Kashmir region. This status quo remains 69 years later. To stand by this policy of special governance might make prima facie sense at the international level. Conservative British politician, Bob Blackman, tabled a resolution in the British Parliament last year, asking for condemnation against Pakistan’s move to integrate Gilgit-Baltistan as the country’s fifth province. However, the apprehensions that hold the policy so solidly in place are unfounded. The resolution practically failed when no other member of the British Parliament was willing to sponsor the motion. In fact, in the last decade many proposals have originated from different quarters on how the integration of Gilgit-Baltistan in the Pakistani polity should take place. Most of them have missed the mark. Gilgit-Baltistan is not a federating unit of Pakistan, and therefore they do not enjoy any representation in the Pakistani Parliament Under the Pakistani constitution, Gilgit-Baltistan is not a federating unit of Pakistan, and therefore they do not enjoy any representation in the Pakistani Parliament. Interestingly in sharp contrast, the Indian constitution reserves seats for Jammu and Kashmir in its Parliament. The governance mechanism as such is the sine quo non of the sectarian divide and the law and order situation in the region, which erupts periodically. Despite this lack of constitutional recognition, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government brought about major reforms in the governance of the region, with the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009. Before this, the region was known as the Northern Areas, which was changed to its current name, while a governor, chief minister, cabinet and a legislature were also appointed, providing the region with a quasi-province like status for all practical purposes. Yet the region was deprived of seats in Parliament or other federal forums, such as the Council of Economic Interests. In 2018, the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N) tried to bring its own reforms through the Gilgit Baltistan Order (GBO) 2018. This order did not fare well with the people of the area, since it effectively handed over all legislative and administrative powers to the prime minister of Pakistan, who was also given the power to make judicial appointments as well. Since it would erode the very conception of judicial independence in Gilgit-Baltistan, the new law was blocked by the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court. Despite this, in line with the policy of the PML-N to enter into conflicts with the judiciary, the law was still enforced. In a move that can be best described as judicial activism, the Supreme Appellate Court then struck down the 2018 order and restored the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (ESGO) 2009. The challenge with this system of governance can only be determined if the region’s indeterminate status is constitutionally resolved, and the population of Gilgit-Baltistan is bestowed with representation in the federal legislature. The population is still suffering from non-existent political representation at the federal level and sectarian conflict that has engulfed the region recently. It is believed by many that granting Gilgit-Baltistan such representation can evoke strong protests from India in the international community. Rather, such a move would only make Pakistan’s case stronger. India cannot attack our position, for then Pakistan can expose its dual face by drawing attention to the six seats that Indian legislature reserves for Jammu and Kashmir. It is time that the constitutional implications of denying Gilgit-Baltistan political representation are realised; the ball is now in the SC’s court. The writer is a barrister, who has an interest in Pakistani current affairs, economy, constitutional developments, foreign policy and international law Published in Daily Times, August 12th 2018.