Afghanistan and Pakistan have a long history of tense bilateral relations defined by five recurring drivers: sovereignty concerns, security interests, geopolitical dynamics, cross-border ties, and connectivity and trade. Together, these dynamics will shape prospects for stability in Afghanistan. The strengthening relationships between India and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan have caused astonishment among Pakistanis. Consequently, the bond between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan is evolving into a complicated and apprehensive dynamic, signaling trouble ahead for both sides. Given the rising assaults by militants in Pakistan, it becomes essential to safeguard against using Afghanistan as a launching base for TTP fighters. If the attacks continue, Islamabad might contemplate launching ‘chase and hunt missions’ deep inside Afghanistan’s territory; something that can be counterproductive and detrimental to regional peace. Pakistan remains the dominant external actor for the Taliban regime, and any sustained economic growth in Afghanistan will require close cooperation between the two. Both states thus need to tread carefully that is in sync with modern socio-political realities at the regional level. India sees its involvement in Afghanistan as a way to counterbalance Pakistan’s influence in the region. India’s significant footprint in Afghanistan disappeared almost overnight with the Taliban returning to power in 2021. The desperate economic and humanitarian needs tempted Kabul toward Delhi, and India has the capabilities to continuously provide the monetary support that the distressed Taliban regime needs. India, for its part, is concerned over anti-India trouble-maker groups operating from Afghan soil. On the other hand, a stronger relationship with India will provide Afghanistan with greater leverage in dealing with Pakistan. India’s involvement has largely been focused on development projects such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare. In recent years, India has also become involved in security assistance to the Afghan government, including the training of Afghan security forces. Russia has become more involved in Afghanistan, primarily for concern over the spread of Islamic extremism in Central Asia. The Government of Pakistan has been persistently demanding the relocation of the militant groups away from its border region with Afghanistan. There are an estimated 43,700 Pakistanis living in Afghanistan, mainly in eastern Paktia, Khost, Paktika, and Kunar provinces. These include various groups of the militants including prominent factions of the TTP. Furthermore, Taliban authorities intend to use TTP fighters as proxies against the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), particularly against the Ahmad Masood group. The NRF has vowed that it would ‘vehemently reject’ any such attempt by the Taliban government seeking the relocation of Pakistani Taliban to the country’s north. The proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia, rooted in the broader geopolitical rivalry, have been a main driver of instability in the Middle East as well as Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia groups and political parties, while Saudi Arabia supports the Sunni school of thought including the Taliban. This rivalry has deepened sectarian divisions in Afghanistan and its spillover fuels occasional violence and instability in Pakistan. Securing Afghanistan would create an arc of Chinese influence, from China’s western regions to the Euphrates, encompassing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The region would be linked with China via highways, railways, and pipelines, funneling their resource wealth into the Chinese industrial sector. Doing so would give China an advantage as it gears up for superpower rivalry with the United States. The CPEC is a game-changer for the whole region, including Afghanistan. It is a massive infrastructure initiative that aims to connect China’s western region to the warm waters through Gwadar Port. It has the potential to transform the economic landscape of Asia. The projects in Pakistan and Afghanistan are expected to create jobs, promote trade, and improve connectivity. The success of the initiative is crucial to China’s economic growth as a “rising superpower.” China’s involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to grow in the coming years with Pakistan and Afghanistan as key partners. In recent years, Russia has become more involved in Afghanistan, primarily for concern over the spread of Islamic extremism in Central Asia. The involvement is also part of its broader strategy to reassert itself as a major player in the region. With militants ratcheting up attacks in Pakistan, it is imperative to ensure that the TTP fighters do not use Afghanistan as a launching pad. If the attacks continue, Islamabad might contemplate launching airstrikes or hot pursuit missions inside Afghanistan’s territory: something that can be counterproductive and detrimental to regional peace. Meanwhile, for the Taliban regime, Pakistan is still the most important external actor. The absence of Islamabad’s support means ‘instability’ in Afghanistan. Any sustained economic growth in Afghanistan will also require close cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan’s relationship beyond 2023 is fraught with challenges. By working together and engaging in constructive dialogues, Pakistan and Afghanistan can lay the foundation for a better future. Achieving lasting peace and stability in the region is critical for economic development and prosperity. Both states thus need to tread carefully. A prosperous future demands inclusive peace and decision-making that is in sync with modern socio-political realities at the global level. The international community should also facilitate cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul insofar as both countries could be nudged away from their recent past. The writer is a retired Pakistan army officer