Following the division of British India in August 1947, Pakistan was created along Afghanistan’s eastern border. Since then, relations between the two states have been abhorrent; The only country to vote against Pakistan’s membership to the UN following that country’s independence was Afghanistan. A substantial part of Pakistan’s heartland in contemporary Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Pakistan’s Baluchistan, which complete what was once the homeland of “Pashtunistan” for the Pashto-speaking people, have been the subject of irredentist claims by various Afghan invaders and Afghan nationalists cum extremist. Displeasure over the Durand Line’s permanence that was demarcated in 1893 and Kabul de facto regime claims to territory in Pakistani territory with a Pashtun majority coexisted, to have it encouraged eastward towards the Indus Waterway, for which Kabul clergy administration desired a settlement.
By the middle of the 20th century, territorial disputes and conflicting claims prevented cordial relations between the two nations from stabilizing. However, on a few issues, like the War in Afghanistan and Afghan expatriates in Pakistan, liberties over water division, and a developing friendship between New Delhi’s foreign policy decision-makers and nationalist cum radicals in Afghanistan, new tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have surfaced. Afghanistan has consistently been a challenge for Islamabad policy pundits, notwithstanding, whoever reigned Kabul, whatever the rulers were. The latter’s strategists may have believed that the issue would be handled once the Afghan Taliban regained control. It has turned out to be worse. The rise of the Taliban has been a reflection of Afghanistan’s overall failure, which has several causes. Although Pakistan’s involvement in the disaster may be debatable, its Afghanistan policy is not. Since the 1990s, when the Afghans’ acrimonious disputes over the way forward of the Peshawar and Makkah accords, agreements secured by Pakistan’s arduous diplomatic efforts, set the groundwork for an endless conflict in the nation, the policy has been a disaster.
A procedure led by the Foreign Office with backing from the security establishment should be used to develop the Afghan policy.
Despite not being involved in the conflict, Pakistan played a role in it by helping the Taliban succeed, for which we are now paying the price. Truthfully, if there had not been Afghan Taliban, there would not have been TTP. They merely represent the two sides of one coin. Afghanistan produced difficulties that had an impact on the stability of the area as well as Pakistan’s security and economic destiny. However, Islamabad simply perceived it as a security risk. We were unable to recognize that the Taliban’s ascent, demise, and comeback were the result of a protracted process that started with the collapse of the Afghan monarchy in 1973. Additionally, the power struggles brought on by the incident came together and came into contact with the Soviet intervention in 1979, America’s two wars in Afghanistan, and the war on terrorism, affecting the political and social contexts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly among the Pashtun a population near the border. However, it made it possible for jihadist and sectarian currents in Pakistan and its interaction with similar extremist and militant groups in the area as well as global structures like Al Qaeda. When the Taliban controlled the nation, Afghanistan became the flagship for everyone, the hinterland for some, and the home for others. When they lost control, the Taliban’s conflict grew to include them as well. Although the Taliban are back in power, they lack credibility and military dominance. They may encounter Afghani resistance and challenges from new parties, such as the IS-K, and it may be argued that their victory was obtained through a political agreement rather than on the battlefield. They may never be able to stabilize Afghanistan. And Pakistan would suffer as a result.
Both the Americans and the Afghans failed in their policies towards Afghanistan, as did Pakistan. The reasons for American failure can be summed up as follows: poor war aims, frequent changes in approach and commanding generals, ineffective Afghan shareholders and the dual authority of the Kabul de facto regime and the US, whose objectives did not always align, and, last but not least, the electoral process in Washington. America eventually became tired of failing and decided to leave. The ruling elite in Kabul was, arguably, a total failure. The Afghan people and country are wonderful. They should not be under Taliban rule. However, they have received poor treatment from their ruling class, which must shoulder most of the blame for what has taken place on their helpless nation. Afghanistan features fault lines along racial, linguistic, religious, and tribal lines. In the past, a Pashtun-dominated elite led by Kabul and local strongmen has challenged its horizontal power structure, resulting in ongoing rivalries for power and hostilities within conflicts. Its neighbours have had opportunities to act to their advantage due to the geopolitical environment’s competitiveness and propensity for conflict. The difficulties facing Afghanistan were not resolved by the American war or the Taliban. To cooperatively resolve the Taliban issue, Kabul could have turned into Pakistan. This was only possible in the complex framework of Pak-Afghan ties. Instead, it attempted to compel Pakistan to resolve the Taliban issue on its behalf by using America and India. That could never have succeeded.
Building close cooperation relationships with the Kabul regime has been a top priority for Islamabad’s diplomatic pundit and a vital element of our vision of a “peaceful neighbourhood.” Islamabad policymakers maintain its challenges to build a friendly and cooperative relationship with Kabul’s de facto regime based on mutual reverence for sovereignty and international integrity. What is the next step for us? Afghanistan is a democratic problem with a military component, not a political problem with a military component. A procedure led by the Foreign Office with backing from the security establishment should be used to develop the Afghan policy. A declaration of policy by a single organization and an operational strategy by another, each unaware of the other’s activities, was a recipe for disaster. It led to issues with credibility that had an impact on all facets of foreign policy. Making the most of a terrible position, we must now assist Kabul’s de facto extremist by encouraging its international involvement that aims to neither strengthen nor weaken the Taliban nor to bring about a system of change, all of those being undesirable choices.
The writer is a freelance columnist.