More than 10 years ago, the US came to Afghanistan in search of the perpetrators of 9/11. The Taliban stubbornly refused the demand to handover al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. The US and NATO forces backed by the United Nations Security Council thus embarked on the journey to hunt the al Qaeda leader down. The allied offensive ousted the Taliban from power despite stern resistance (it may be regarded as a strategic retreat as the military capacity of the Taliban offered no match for the sophisticated technology used by the aggressors) and forced the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan to be on the run. However, most of the Taliban leadership is still at large. During these years, they adopted traditional Afghan warfare tactics characterised by hit and run operations and suicide attacks on foreign forces.
After a decade of chasing, the US at last was able to get hold of Osama bin Laden (though in the most unlikely of places). During this period, most of the outfit’s top cadre has been eliminated or captured. The primary objective has been achieved but the adventure has given birth to more grievous problems in the region. Not only that the Taliban are still relevant in the post-Afghan war scenario, a number of outfits adhering to an even stricter interpretation of religion have extended their ambit of operations. On the other hand, Afghan governance structures, marred by corruption and incapacity, are as fragile as ever. Scepticism prevails regarding the post-withdrawal scenario.
It was widely believed that the war on terror would come to its logical conclusion once Osama bin Laden (who is believed to be the architect of 9/11) was captured. However, the circumstances under which bin Laden was found tell a different story. The initial images released by the US defied the common perception of the al Qaeda leader and portrayed him as weak and frail, spending his days in hiding. However, revelations in the documents believed to have been retrieved from his hideout, released by a US think-tank, are startling to say the least. Coming out a whole year after the Abbottabad operation gives impetus to speculations about their authenticity and validity.
However, barring that, the documents form an amusing read and provide insights into the life of the al Qaeda leader, definitely in stark contrast to common perception.
The released letters reveal that bin Laden was worried about the activities of al Qaeda affiliates (which include al Qaeda in Iraq, in the Arabian peninsula, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al Shahab in Somalia) causing unnecessary human casualties. Bin Laden’s worry about the activities of these organisations seemed to stem from his concern for the image of jihad. According to the documents, there seems to be a difference of opinion regarding the nature of the relationship with these organisations within the ranks of al Qaeda. While some of its top cadre wanted to dissociate from these organisations, others wanted to have close ties. On the other hand, bin Laden wanted to engage with them and persuade them to reform. On several occasions, he expressed displeasure with the activities of the TTP. Letters disclose that he was not aware of the plan to attack Times Square with Faisal Shahzad as a conduit. He was disappointed by Shahzad’s performance during his trial and demanded from the TTP that it modify its methods in a message said to be delivered by his fellows ‘Atiyya’ and ‘al Libi’ in explicit terms.
Over the years, bin Laden has been portrayed as the symbol of terror. The general impression has been that all the above-mentioned organisations operate in close cooperation with al Qaeda. The attacks at public places are justified (by some quarters) as a reaction to the government’s cooperation with the US against the Taliban and al Qaeda. On the other hand, the al Qaeda leader appears to be reminding his affiliates that they need to show restraint and concentrate their efforts against the US rather than killing innocent Muslims. According to the report, bin Laden had little control over the day-to-day operations of these organisations. If this is considered to be true, it can be said that the relentless quest for bin Laden has paved the way for more violent forms of extremism to surface. After all, these organisations had rallied under the banner of al Qaeda against the ‘aggressors’ on Afghan soil. It is incontestable that Islam forbids the killing of innocents no matter what the circumstances may be. Even in war, those who are not participating should be spared. The interpretation of jihad claiming the innocent as fodder, is indeed a flawed one. However, catching Osama bin Laden now only seems a prelude to the far more momentous task of tackling violent extremism in the years to come. Wars started in haste seldom bear intended consequences.
The writer is the Executive Editor of an Urdu national daily. He can be reached at [email protected] and at @umshami on Twitter