Pakistan’s very powerful and well-trained professional army that defeated the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan and fought three wars with India has now declared war on its own people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. The army is in a state of deep crisis as it fights on different fronts against the Taliban and sectarian forces unwillingly. War on terror and army’s reluctant participation in it created ethnic slots in its ranks and file. Officers of various corps are suffering frustration, and tired they do not want to fight this useless war in which they kill their own brothers. The army was equipped for conventional war against India, not to fight insurgency, therefore, at present, the way military commanders fight insurgency with non-professional way has alienated the people of two provinces from the state. Journalist Shuja Nawaz has pinpointed some weaknesses of the armed forces in his recent report: “The Pakistan army currently, though large and ubiquitous, is ill-equipped and untrained for low intensity conflict and has suffered heavily at the hands of well-trained guerrillas that melt into the population. And increasingly, its association with the American superpower that is driving the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan pits the army against its own population…The army is not yet fully equipped for that war. Many army officers recognise the situation clearly. But the change will take time and will be affected by the composition of the army itself.” Research scholar Dhruv C Katoch (2011) has described the role of armed forces in state politics during the last 65 years, and says that Pakistan has remained consistently dependent on its armed forces to create a nation state from an entity divided by ethnic, religious and social fault lines. Renowned scholar Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy (2013) has warned that the army is getting weaker and its moral is diminishing: “Why is the army getting weaker? The problem is not the lack of material — guns, bombs and money. These have relatively easy fixes. Instead, it is the military’s diminished moral power and authority, absence of charismatic leadership and visible evident accumulation of property and wealth…Recent revelations have brought this contradiction into stark relief. More than anything else, the Army has sought to please both the Americans as well as their enemies.” The smell of ethnic and sectarian politics within the army command structure is now felt outside the GHQ. Sectarian role of some brigades have also affected the professional and counterinsurgency capabilities of the armed forces. This unending war entered a crucial point when terrorists attacked the GHQ and killed high ranking officers. An army broken within its inner fabric, according to military observers, is unable to defend itself from an outside enemy. Of much greater consequence the army is being asked to attack its own citizens. The tribesmen they are currently at war with inside the FATA are the same heroes that they supported throughout their history. More important thing is the crisis of confidence and army’s continuing inability to defend its own leaders, troops and assets from its trained jihadi terrorists. Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani recently announced a new doctrine to review its war strategy and sternly deal with sectarian terrorists across the country. The Green Book, consisted of 200 pages, defines the new counterinsurgency strategy of the armed forces. Some analysts understand that the Pakistan Security Forces now believe that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups are a bigger security threat than India. However, it is not clear that General Kayani wants to fight the TTP and sectarian militants within the army ranks and file or outside military barracks. Operations in Swat, Balochistan and Waziristan suggest that the military establishment remain largely unwilling to hold itself accountable to the public. Army is reluctant to be more transparent to civilian authorities. Army is not in full control of the Balochistan province. Conditions in Balochistan have worsened and the exploited people are feeling insecure and frightened. The Baloch are fighting against their own country’s armed forces. Operations in Swat, Bajour, Mohmand, Tirah Valley and Waziristan have done nothing to raise the credibility of the armed forces. The issue of extra-judicial killing still needs to be settled as world’s human rights groups, the HRCP and newspapers reported human rights violations in Swat. On January 16, 2013, BBC reported that hundreds of protesters in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa displayed the bodies of at least 14 people who they said were victims of extra-judicial killings outside government office in Peshawar. Military leaders should think that the present attacks on military convoys are revenge attacks of Pashtuns whose houses are being targeted by army gunship helicopters. In Balochistan, the army used helicopter gunships, bombarded villages and destroyed the houses of the poor Baloch. The Asian Human Rights Commission in its recent report (2013) recorded army’s atrocities in Balochistan: “The main military sweep took place in Awaran, Panjur and Makran districts of Baluchistan. Hundred of villagers were rounded up and interrogated. Many since have disappeared. Some were later found dead, with their mutilated bodies showing signs of torture.” This way of tackling insurgency in Balochistan and forceful disappearances affected the credibility of the armed forces in the eyes of the public. The disease of corruption has spread in its body. Army has the biggest share in stock exchange; operates banks, airlines; run factories, petroleum and energy institutions; receive huge profit from their own schools, colleges and hospitals. A Pakistani newspaper in 2011 reported the country’s defence ministry unearthed an alleged involvement of almost 100 armed forces official in billions’ dollar corruption. Moreover, in 2011, the Lahore High Court faced a legal and practical dilemma when a charge sheet about the corruption of armed forces was filed in the court by a lawyer. The Pakistan army ruled the country for a quite long time since 1947. Finally, the Pakistani armed forces must adopt principles of counterinsurgency and relinquish the present way of alienating their own people. The writer is author of Policing in Multicultural Britain and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com