The economy in Pakistan is sluggish. The more astute observers believe that it will not perk up until public order and tranquillity are restored. They are currently in a state of disruption. Not a day passes without 10 or so persons getting killed in Karachi, the country’s industrial and commercial capital. Most of these killings do not result from conflicts of personal interest. They are motivated by ethnic, doctrinal, and ideological differences and lack of tolerance for the dissident. Some of them are engineered by foreign and domestic forces who want to destabilise this country. It is axiomatic that investors will not put their money in a place where their lives and possessions are not secure. Resort to terror is one of the principal instrumentalities of the destructionists. It would facilitate further discussion to understand the meaning and import of terrorism and what its practitioners do. It may be said in the first place that it consists of acts of violence against non-combatant bystanders to scare them into believing that the existing system of governance and social order cannot protect and preserve them. Englishmen and the Irish fought for a century or more until they concluded that violence would not enable either side to achieve its objectives, and that they would be better served by negotiations. The table would not be the place from where one side could demand the other’s unconditional surrender. It was understood that neither side would get all of its original demands met. The exercise would be one of give and take. Eventually they made a deal. Some political observers in Pakistan contend that resort to force is not necessary to eliminate terrorism. They call for negotiations with its practitioners. This advocacy needs to be scrutinised. This may be as good a place as any to ask who the major terrorist groups in this country are. There are first and foremast the Taliban who have lately been joined by other groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba and other lashkars, including anti-Shia organisations. The Taliban were originally active in Afghanistan for some 20 years and since more recently they have been active in Pakistan. Their objective in Afghanistan was to force the US to withdraw its presence and interest from that country. This President Obama’s administration has agreed to do by the end of 2014 and the process has already begun. The Americans have been willing to discuss the nitty-gritty of their withdrawal with the Taliban. Observers in Pakistan ask why its government is not willing to discuss issues with the Taliban if the lone superpower in the world is ready to do so. It seems to me that their proposal is easier stated than implemented. Negotiations are predicated on the assumption that the parties concerned are willing to live and interact with one another under certain conditions and that neither is determined to bring about the other’s demise. This is not the case with the Taliban. They want to undo the state of Pakistan and enforce upon its territory their own exclusive version of Islam. They maintain that versions other than their own are heresies that need to be abolished. Let us speculate on how negotiations between the government of Pakistan and the Taliban will proceed if they are held. Zayd, a government spokesman, and Bakar, the Taliban agent, meet. Zayd opens the meeting with the observation that these conversations are based on the assumption that both sides accept the statehood of Pakistan, its constitution and institutions. Bakar counters that his side repudiates all of these conditions. It wants to demolish Pakistan and all of its institutional and other infrastructure. Pretending that none of this had been said, Zayd asks what it will take to persuade the Taliban to give up their campaigns of pillage and murder of uninvolved and innocent people. Bakar says it will stop when the ruling authorities surrender power to the Taliban who will then rearrange this country’s political and social order according to their own version of Islam, which they believe is the only correct one while all others are false, deserving to be abolished. That brings the negotiations to an end. The Taliban want to destroy all that we stand for. In responding to them the least we can do is to offer them reciprocity. Imran Khan has recently proposed a meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief at which the three of them may devise a strategy for combating terrorism. That is a good idea. But even if such a meeting does not transpire, it is the prime minister’s responsibility to tell the nation what his government plans to do to suppress terrorism. Dealing with terrorism is a complicated undertaking. We may remain unconcerned if we have no attachment with the parties engaged in it. We may not denounce it if we are unfriendly towards its victim and friendly towards its perpetrator. We may even give it a different name if our own side is practising it. These approaches will not mitigate this pernicious mode of conduct. We must learn and adopt procedures of civility to interact with both friends and foes. It may be recalled that the various political parties maintain militant wings within their respective organisations. They are the instrumentalities their principals use in fighting their rivals. Some observers contend that we cannot effectively deal with terrorism until we know precisely what it is, and that we must have a law that spells it out and prescribe penalties for those who practice it. That seems to make good sense. Scrutiny will tell us that this plea is superfluous. The existing law forbids the actions that terrorists usually mount. Killing other persons, resorting to extortion, kidnapping for ransom and similar other felonies are already forbidden. The mission before us is to implement the existing law. This calls for an unequivocal will on the part of the ruling authorities to curb it. The writer is professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts and can be reached at anwarsyed@cox.net