In India the middle class is the byproduct of colonialism, where the initiation of the modernisation process through communication and institutions resulted in the genesis of a new nobility that was privileged and was loyal to the British. The replacement of Persian with English was a stepping stone towards modernity, which resulted in unintended consequences. Hindus’ willingness to learn it and Muslims’ reluctance escalated the communal competition. Modern institutions and a new mode of communication were set up. An effective mechanism of railways was established. Colonialism with its constraints of structure rendered a very ambivalent status to this newly emerged group, on which somewhere rests the points of access, and the incentives and privileges, but it restricts its access to economic manipulation and political power. In the Weberian context, the theoretical definition of middle class is a stratum in a hierarchical society that is below the upper class but is slightly above the lower class. The middle class is a very broad term that involves culture along with social and political practices. The definition of middle class in a socioeconomic perspective can be regarded as an offshoot of modernity, where it talks of changing the pattern of pedagogy, reverting traditional trends and altering the mode of subsistence. The middle class is the most assertive hierarchy of any society, which runs from pillar to post to ensure its status and survival. It works on a short-term agenda with minimal calculated risks, and a clear vision and standard of life that it yearns for. The transformation in the attitude of people started with those who strove to update themselves with the changing compulsions of the time. This nobility was the middle class of those times. The War of Independence 1857 was the aggravated sense of non-representation among the middle class of that time, and to avoid such a watershed again, the Raj decided to accommodate the middle class where the local bodies law was introduced in 1861. The construction of Hindu-Muslim identities in the Indian subcontinent owes itself to these processes; these identities were through the census, and later institutionalised. The 1909, 1919s reforms and Act of 1935 were, in fact, the acceptance and acknowledgment of the middle class. Most of the leadership from both the sides in the freedom movement was the representation of the middle class of that time. In the post-independence phase, there was slow involvement of people in the political setup because the frame of rules was dominated by those who led the freedom movement. But in another way, that was the representation of the middle class, which later assumed the role of the political elite. In its early phase, the middle class in India was dependent more on the state, where the Nehruvian era was marked with the state’s interventionist policies vis-à-vis the economy. The growth of the middle class in the post-independence phase has strong linkages with the existing middle class through the colonially inherited elite and institutions. India’s policy of a uniform education caused a surge in employment opportunities and raised education at the local level. Thus, this was the state-dependent, emerging middle class. The system of licence-Raj, initiated by Indira Gandhi, made for participation of those people in the system who had direct stakes. The unionisation process commenced. The white-collar union is the best elucidation of the middle class’s political mobilisation. The economy of a country, if it races ahead and undermines political demands, will not let the system persist long, even if politics monopolises, brushing economics aside. The economic system and the political system must coincide with one another to run the system in balance. The political order within transitional countries is typified by expectations from government, and demands and agitation from the public as an aftermath to non-deliverance. The system that does not respond to the genuine concerns of the masses in the long run loses its worth and significance and turns irrelevant and inappropriate. In India, there is still acute poverty; the human development index is still power, and there is a significant difference between the haves and the have-nots. In India, almost 300 million people live in a miserable situation. The number of debt-ridden farmers who committed suicide is 250,000, and 800 million earn less than 20 rupees a day. The access to modern means of communication, along with massive awareness, makes people cogitate whether democracy means deliverance or is it just holding of procedural ballots. Corruption is a shared paradox of the post-colonial state, and India is also facing the same predicament. Many embezzlements and scams have been reported in recent days, and corruption seems to be systematised. There are powerful individuals and groups who favour the status quo in India for their vested interests, like in many other countries where the state dominates over economics. The disparities among the masses propel them to assert themselves; the Jan Lokpal Bill in India has become a symbol of discontentment of the Indian middle class. Democracy in India has its own issues and drawbacks; even if there is immense participation, voters have been commoditized, and everything comes under the capitalistic interests. Democracy has been inextricably linked with the free market, and those who are not members of this chain do not matter too much or have been extricated from the system. The Indian political order is also facing many challenges. Most of the people who are not sponsored lose elections. The elite-dominated frame of rule has captured, rather tightly gripped, India, offering little to the middle class. On who gets the maximum share in power depends who dominates the system. It can be regarded as an elite-monopolised system. The dominance of a single party in a functional democracy is perplexing, and that is making Indian democracy a stagnant one. The incumbency factor is also playing its role. The hurdles in legislation, corruption at large and issues of non-governance are tarnishing the face of Congress, which might suffer a blow in the approaching elections. The writer is a lecturer in Defence and Diplomatic Studies at the Fatima Jinnah Women’s University, and writes with special emphasis on electoral politics and contemporary political processes in India and Pakistan. He can be reached at rajaqaiserahmed@gmail.com and tweets at @rajaqaiserahmed