So finally Trump has dropped the other shoe. A young journalist had booked me for my views on Trump’s announcement many days before it actually came. When it came, he asked me to point out what was new. Here is the gist of my thoughts. After a rambling introduction, Trump claims to have reached three conclusions on “America’s core interests”. In my view, the second and third “conclusions” merely complement the first. In effect, Trump acknowledges that pulling out will be an acceptance of defeat; an acknowledgement which is unacceptable to him. This is the first ‘First’ of his speech. The second first of his speech is that, there is no longer a time limit on this war, nor any limit on the forces that will be deployed. And, even as he has acknowledged that Afghanistan’s future should be an Afghan decision but, that will come “ultimately”. For the present and the unspecified future, the course for the ultimate decision on an Afghan-led Afghanistan will be in US hands. And, therefore, it will be only after a decisive military victory that, at some future date, some sort of negotiated settlement maybe considered. Apparently, the decisive victory is defined by him as, “We must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America, and we must prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists and being used against us, or anywhere in the world for that matter”. As open ended a definition as is possible. Third, in no uncertain terms, Trump has put Pakistan on notice. With a mild acknowledgement of Pakistani sacrifices, he has cited the billions that US gave Pakistan which, according to Trump were US sacrifices and not a small portion of recompense for what we had spent. And, followed it up with an unambiguous warning. Four, unconcerned by Pakistan’s security concerns, Trump not only called on India to increase its ‘partnership’ with US in Afghanistan. And put icing on Delhi’s cake with the acknowledgement of India’s status as a strategic ally. This has never been so bluntly stated before by any US president. Finally, and most troublingly, he had this to say about the conduct of the war: “I have already lifted restrictions the previous administration placed on our warfighters that prevented the Secretary of Defence and our commanders in the field from fully and swiftly waging battle against the enemy. Micromanagement from Washington, DC does not win battles. They are won in the field drawing upon the judgment and expertise of wartime commanders and frontline soldiers acting in real time, with real authority, and with a clear mission to defeat the enemy (my italics). That’s why we will also expand authority for American armed forces to target the terrorist and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan. These killers need to know they have nowhere to hide; that no place is beyond the reach of American might and arms. Retribution will be fast and powerful (my italics).” Coupled with his promise of providing all means, with no limits on forces or time, this is the most worrying part of Trump’s speech. The biggest problem here is that victory, according to Trump, is open-ended. With no limit on time, the quality, quantity, or type of forces to be employed and a victory defined as loosely as this one, by no less a person than the Commander in Chief of the US, it is entirely a ‘judgment call’ for any field commander No one could be a stronger advocate for greatest possible liberty of action in the battle field, particularly in this kind of war, than I. The German concept, which is now a preferred one in all militaries, of Auftragstaktik meant ‘mission oriented tactics’. This is intended to give even tactical commanders their mission and let them decide how to achieve it. It’s the best for the type of warfare currently underway. But, conscious of the fact that the US’ war methodology of total dependence on the concentration of firepower, armed with weapons like the ‘mother-of-all-bombs’, this is the ultimate ‘license to kill’ that he could offer. With no limit on time, the quality, quantity, or type of forces to be employed and a victory defined as loosely as this one, by no less a person than the Commander in Chief of the US, it is entirely a ‘judgment call’ for any field commander. And, since the lowest level for which the term ‘Field Commander’ is applicable unspecified, I assume that the Chairman Joint Chiefs will specify it. Whichever level he chooses to end it at, it will be up to the local formation commander to decide. And since “retribution will be fast and powerful”, without warning, which act deserves what level of retribution will also be the discretion of the field commander. This means that repetitions of Salala and the Abbottabad attack may be frequent. In my view this means that then level of threat to Pakistan, in particular, and the region, less India, in general, has increased incrementally. Pakistan, already under constant threat of a two-front war which includes domestic and the eastern borders, now has the sole super power threatening the western borders as well. I see dangerous times ahead. The writer is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) Published in Daily Times, August 23rd 2017.