In Muslim history, politics and religion have always been interlinked conceptually and practically. Pakistan’s Identity has, therefore, raised tensions within its political system as the need for religious expression and diversity of governance are competing burdens on political philosophy. At the sociocultural level, Islam is an important factor in everyday life, but there are variations in the way Pakistanis like to interpret and practice their belief system. As a result, Pakistan continues to grapple with what kind of Islamic country it should be and how to correlate Islam with the requirements of a modern-day state.
The concept of Pakistan, as envisioned by the Sufis embed in the rural populace, was basically the formation of a religious state ruled by the conventional leaders of the society. The role these Sufis (pirs, sajjada nashins) played in the Muslim League’s election victory in 1945 was a pointer to the nature of Pakistan state when it came into being. Pakistan for them represented a plea for a new religious definition but of the same old order, and not a new configuration of politics as conceptualised by the reformist Ulema. Nonetheless, Sufis never stopped living without myths, local political economy, narrow definition of political ideology and the government patronage.
The nature of Pakistani religious life proved to be regional though, with allegiances rarely extending beyond a particular saint or a tribe. Sufi shrines and their sajjada nashins were frequently found at the centre of local political hierarchies. Their authority did not extend too far, which inhibited wider political activity. Despite governmental efforts, the political influence of the pirs never went away. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto presented himself, among other things, as a divinely inspired ideal, and his mausoleum along with his daughter’s is reminiscent of a saint’s shrine. A number of current politicians, including ex. Prime Minster, Yusuf Raza Gilani and current Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, are from pir lineages. Some of them may mimic the rituals and traditions centred on the shrines. At political rallies, many party faithful can be seen shaking their heads side to side in the manner of devotees at shrines.
Sufism has had an overwhelming influence on the organization in terms of its structure, philosophy, rituals, initiation, collecting donations from disciples, casting leaders a Pirs, and acting as a channel for divine intervention
The majority of Pakistanis recognise themselves as Barelvi. This Sufi-inspired identity, however, has never been a strong foundation for overt political engagement. By 2008, over $100 million annually was making its way to Islamist clerics in Pakistan from sources in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 2002, there were over 7,000 Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan, up from 1,778 in 1988; a growth of 294 percent. In comparison, Barelvi madrassas only saw by 121%, going from 717 to 1,585 in the same period. However, Pakistani Sufism has remained aligned with the local and regional political hierarchies. Nonetheless, while other religious organisations enriched themselves through religious traditions, Sufism lent itself to a quiet political presence. However, Barelvis had started showing civic organization and activism in the last few decades.
Barelvi movement actually stems from a theological school founded by Ahmed Reza Khan Barelvi (1856-1921)as a traditionalist reaction to reformist movements including Deobandi and Ahle Hadith. The Barelvis support Sufi shrines with whim and vigour. From the 1980’s, Barelvi leaders have tried to initiate a revival of their theological school by shaking off their traditional posture of political submission in response to increased hostility from the militant organizations. The two organizations to successfully launch themselves following this undertaking have been the Minhaj-ul Quran founded by Tahirul Qadri in 1981 (Lahore) and the Dawat-e Islami founded in 1984 (Karachi) by Mohammad Ilyas Qadri.
Since the rise of Taleban, Barelvi organizations like Sunni Tehreek and the Sunni Ittehad Council have appeared at the vanguard of an unprecedented wave of Barelvi activism. Sunni Tehreek has embraced force and violence in order to secure its goals since its birth two decades ago. Minhaj-ul Quran made two attempts to bring down two successive governments but failed and has receded since. It also fought the Punjab government when they tried to dismantle barricades leading up to their establishment in Lahore. This resulted in 14 deaths of their workers and the courts are still trying to deal with its aftermath. Tehreek-e-Lubbaik has also made two similar attempts against two successive governments but failed when it overreached itself, and is left licking its wounds while their leaders have been incarcerated.
Tablighi Jama’at, inspired by Sufism, was founded by Muhammad Ilyas who felt that the Muslims had drifted too far from Islam. He shunned fancy practises, technology, and the organizational systems in favour of the power of human interaction. The Jama’at is considered to be one of the largest Muslim organizations in the world today, and is present in more than 150 countries. Precise estimates of its numbers are difficult to make, but they range between 12 and 80 million. Sufism has had an overwhelming influence on the organization in terms of its structure, philosophy, rituals, initiation, collecting donations from disciples, casting leaders a Pirs, and acting as a channel for divine intervention. But they downplay the connection, and its leaders are extremely reluctant to admit it publically but the organisation is actually a true and modern manifestation of Sufism.
to be continued
The writer is Political Psychiatrist based in London