As the Jaffar Express made its way through the rugged terrain of Balochistan, an explosion derailed its carriages-another grim entry in Pakistan’s long history of insurgency-related violence. This was not an isolated incident but a symptom of a deeper, unresolved conflict that has plagued the region for decades. The persistence of insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa underscores a fundamental reality: Pakistan’s internal security crisis is not merely a question of law enforcement but of historical grievances, governance failures, and a flawed approach to counterinsurgency.
The Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranks Pakistan as the second-most terrorism-affected country, behind Burkina Faso, with attacks nearly doubling from 517 in 2023 to 1,099 in 2024. The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 emboldened Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, who have escalated cross-border attacks, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Meanwhile, in Balochistan, the insurgency-rooted in political disenfranchisement and resource inequity-has continued to fester, with armed groups targeting security forces and state infrastructure. These conflicts reveal not just the weaknesses of Pakistan’s security apparatus but also the long-term consequences of failing to address structural inequities in the country’s governance model.
Pakistan’s response has remained largely reactive, with successive military operations yielding only temporary stability rather than long-term peace. Despite multiple counterinsurgency campaigns, the TTP carried out 482 attacks in 2024, resulting in 558 deaths-a staggering 91% increase from the previous year. This alarming escalation underscores the limitations of a force-centric approach, raising critical questions about the efficacy of Pakistan’s security policies, which have historically suppressed insurgencies rather than dismantled their ideological and structural foundations. As C. Christine Fair argues in Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, the military’s strategic culture prioritizes external threats over internal stability, fostering a perpetual state of controlled instability where insurgencies are contained rather than eradicated at their roots. This cycle of suppression and resurgence highlights the need for a fundamental rethinking of counterterrorism strategies, moving beyond tactical crackdowns to address the political, economic, and ideological dimensions of insurgency.
Sri Lanka’s war against the Tamil Tigers and Colombia’s peace negotiations with the FARC illustrate that lasting stability comes from addressing the root causes of conflict, not just eliminating insurgents.
The Baloch insurgency is not a recent phenomenon; it dates back to 1948, when the princely state of Kalat was annexed by Pakistan, triggering resistance movements that have resurfaced repeatedly over the decades. The 1973 insurgency, though militarily suppressed, left a lasting legacy of resentment, as successive governments failed to meaningfully integrate Balochistan into the national mainstream. The continued suppression of Baloch demands for autonomy has only deepened the province’s sense of alienation, underscoring that federalism in Pakistan remains largely symbolic, with the central government retaining disproportionate control over natural resources and provincial governance.
Similarly, the rise of militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is deeply rooted in the state’s strategic policies during the Afghan War. The weaponization of religious extremism, initially promoted as a geopolitical tool during the Cold War, ultimately backfired, plunging Pakistan into a prolonged security crisis. The TTP has sustained its insurgency by capitalizing on governance failures and deep-seated local grievances, particularly in the former tribal areas. Despite the 2018 merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the region continues to suffer from administrative neglect, a weak judicial framework, and economic marginalization-conditions that provide fertile ground for militancy and allow extremist groups to entrench themselves further.
At the heart of Pakistan’s insurgency problem lies a structural imbalance between the center and the provinces. Despite constitutional provisions for federalism, Pakistan functions as a highly centralized state, where key policy decisions remain concentrated in the hands of the military, bureaucracy, and civilian elite, reinforcing the elitist nature of governance. The state’s reluctance to devolve power meaningfully has fueled insurgent narratives in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where demands for greater autonomy are frequently met with military crackdowns rather than political engagement. This centralization is most evident in resource distribution: although Balochistan is rich in gas, minerals, and other natural resources, the economic benefits largely flow to the federal government and Punjab, deepening long-standing grievances and reinforcing perceptions of exploitation and marginalization.
Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy requires a fundamental shift. While military operations may suppress violence in the short term, they cannot substitute political reconciliation and economic integration. The examples of Sri Lanka’s war against the Tamil Tigers and Colombia’s peace negotiations with the FARC illustrate that lasting stability comes from addressing the root causes of conflict, not just eliminating insurgents. A successful counterinsurgency strategy must integrate political dialogue, economic incentives, and governance reforms.
The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at [email protected]