Courtesy and courage, a sense of occasion, gratefulness and ability to instantly say sorry are some of the major character traits of noble minded men and honourable societies. Of these, being grateful, if removed, can bring down the whole tent as it has directly to do with the burden and duty of obligation towards others. It is hard to imagine how a society would be if the element of nobility were to be removed from one’s thought and actions. It is not realistic nor is it intended to look for a nation where each member is a lighthouse of character. But it is fair to expect that a particular society, nation or country is blessed with varying degrees of working decency and a living sense of obligation in their particular moral chemistry.
A sound moral architecture is of utmost significance between the interlocutors at any level, official or private. The whole business of life is run on the worth of one’s word, personal credibility and the quality of thinking. Documents and treaties, seals and signatures, and instruments and stamps come later that too for reference and directions to be taken, not to question the first and the foremost intent. This can be called a moral anchor, which can only be installed in the minds of men if the person or state under reference has shown to possess a cognisable character, certain nobility in conduct and residual credibility. Reliability and self-respect are the brick and mortar of this most important construct upon which communities and nations are raised.
Men may acquire these commendable traits by birth, grooming or through self-improvement. But countries and nations are a different matter and much more complicated. Countries are a function of their geography, history and evolution of social values spread over hundreds of thousands of years in many cases. Those on the receiving end of the invasions, both military and demographic, normally develop reactive responses, a genetically baked version of having been wronged and a psychological defensive mechanism to retain sanity under duress and want, which includes an illusion of submission and cooperation. On the other hand, successful campaigners and immigrants develop the hubris of superiority and patronising endowment towards races they ravaged as their historically habitual practice.
Historic heritage makes a great difference in the personality make up and habitual responses of men and nations. Sierra Leone cannot be expected to possess as highly evolved a value system as that of China, Egypt or Greece being the bastions of great ancient civilisations. Sierra Leone had no such privilege. Similarly, Afghanistan cannot be favourably compared with Iran, Pakistan or Iraq as it has had no history of civilisational evolution or being home to one. Iran has a splendid history, Pakistan has been home to the great Indus civilisation for 10,000 years and Iraq belongs to the magnificent Mesopotamian.
Afghanistan’s geo-historic dilemma is understandable, stemming from the accident of its strategically awkward location. Its present landmass is placed between the bastion of powerful military campaigners from the north, which stretches up to Anatolia, and the prized Indian subcontinent whose riches have always proved irresistible. Therefore, well before Alexander the Great’s invasion till the Mughals, the intervening space where Afghanistan is now located, had to be conquered, subdued or simply occupied as a marshalling area and a forward base. Similarly, a few powerful dynasties in the subcontinent had used the same space as a jump off pad for their conquests westwards and farther afield.
The Afghans’ natural volatility and preoccupation with warfare was helpful to the extent that they were mostly inducted as auxiliary troops on the wings of the invaders, who would, off and on, wheel sideways for opportunity plunder and also happily partake of the war booty. However, dangers and deprivations of constant warfare, and attendant scarcity of resources create their own peculiar behaviour patterns among the troops, which is always a curious mix of the sublime and the ridiculous. Afghans practiced this art quite admirably but could not transform it into noblesse oblige like Mughal or Turk campaigners. That must have been because of the strong and well-established home territories that those distant races had, supported by vast fertile spaces and relative security.
In that highly fluid and unstable medieval world no notion of a nation state existed in the inhospitable fringe of Asia Minor called Afghanistan till the 15th century AD. Until then Afghanistan was a war zone between various empires and for internecine warfare between local tribes. It was incipient anarchy in empires around them and ambitions of more powerful Afghan chieftains that encouraged them to set up a kingdom of their own. It was strategically a flawed political decision not supported by their unfavourable geography and continues to have ramifications for the region.
To begin with it became a formal staging zone for invaders of the subcontinent, which was one of the major reasons behind the birth of the infamous ‘great game’. It emerged as a strategic buffer between rival empires, essential to be either physically secured or be a friendly state. Thus, Afghanistan learnt to walk the tight rope quite early on. But this was an unenviable situation to be in. The Indian British Empire’s invasions of Afghanistan during the early 19th century and subsequent Soviet and US invasions were an unfortunate upshot of the same strategic error. Internally, a military-political culture of savage opportunism and a preference for short-term gains vis-à-vis regional countries evolved. In this kind of deliberate distancing and deterring environment, Pakistan found itself as an unwelcome intermediate state ab initio between India and Afghanistan.
For Afghanistan, the creation of Pakistan meant the frustration of their claim with a tinge of finality, to regain territories that they had lost to the Sikh Empire followed by the successor British Indian Empire. Resultantly, they refused to accept their border with Pakistan (Durand Line). Then came the Soviet invasion and, in an ironic twist of history, Pakistan emerged as the saviour and mentor of Afghanistan’s freedom struggle and host to over three million war displaced Afghans. This was a gigantic role reversal very difficult for the proud Afghans to reconcile with. It also created a dilemma for the Pakistani people and administration at the same time. Our administration failed to appreciate that the reversal of roles was a temporary phenomenon that was traditionally and psychologically untenable. This demanded a formal and discreetly non-patronising interaction but quite indelicately we tried to play both the mentor and the tutor. This irked the Afghans immeasurably and continues to do so in many ways. After the Afghan war we wrongly insisted to play the gratitude and brotherhood cards. Both are futile as, according to the Afghans, gratitude and brotherhood is among equals, which they do not find anywhere east of the Hindu Kush right down to the Bay of Bengal.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan army and can be reached at [email protected]