The recent cancellation of the National Security Advisor (NSA)-level talks between India and Pakistan is yet another reminder and indication of the fragile nature of relations between the two nuclear rivals. This on-again-off-again sort of relationship and failure to discuss core issues are contrary to the idea of crisis stability, an essential prerequisite for a ‘stable’ relationship between nuclear weapons’ states. The dynamics of India-Pakistan relations are changing since Modi’s government was sworn in. One should not be surprised by its actions given the fact that the BJP’s entire election campaign was replete with anti-Pakistan slogans. It is not displaying unpredictable behaviour’ it is only delivering on its election promises. Since assuming office, Mr Modi has repeatedly expressed his resolve on changing the Kashmir policy and on breaking the ‘status quo’. The coming events cast their shadows when the Modi government indicated a prospective change in the Indian Constitution’s Article 370 about Jammu and Kashmir’s status, not realising that it would exacerbate the dispute and would make Indian Held Kashmiris more vulnerable. Earlier this year, India upped the ante once foreign secretary level talks were called off on the pretext of the Pakistan high commissioner’s traditional meeting with the Hurriyat leaders, a practice that has continued for decades. These developments suggest that, on one hand, India has reduced its patience level by labelling erstwhile, benign actions as irritants while, on the other, it has led to the expansion of the spectrum of potential crises between two nuclear rivals. The recent events are just a next step in an already fast moving chain of events. However, the most important yet oft-ignored question in the whole debate is: who will benefit from any future crisis? Pakistan would not have any advantage in flaring up the tension either through direct actions or low intensity warfare against India as it is already busy putting its own house in order. However, playing ‘the victim’ and projecting Pakistan in a bad light by making Kashmir’s freedom struggle synonymous to terrorism has better dividends for India. That would shift focus from Kashmir and Indian intransigence to Pakistan. It is not unlikely that malicious elements in both countries might actually initiate a crisis through staged terrorist activities or some spoilers to cause a complete breakdown in talks such as the Samjotha Express case in the past. Such spoilers perpetuate India-Pakistan rivalry and have the dangerous potential of escalating the spectre of nuclear use. With this context, one would easily understand the two countries’ insistence on a strategic restraint regime. Why then is there Indian hesitancy to move forward? The recent turn of events is alarming as it is accompanied by constant border violations and provocations allegedly by India. Even before and after overt nuclearisation, Pakistan has brought up various options to maintain deterrence stability that were summed up in the idea of establishing a strategic restraint regime in the region but received no reciprocity from India. Pakistan has further outlined its three dimensional approach that talks about preservation of peace, indivisibility of peace and security and dialogue process as a key to peace. Pakistan has time and again emphasised that dynamics for India-Pakistan are different and it would be erroneous to completely see it through the prism of Cold War experiences. For South Asia, there is nothing tactical about nuclear weapons, hence there is a need to establish a different lexicon according to the ground realities of South Asia. If stability is the goal between India and Pakistan, emphasis should be laid on the resolution of the long-standing issues of Kashmir and water rather than stabilising deterrence. If the geopolitical realities suggest a tense scenario, mere norms and treaties will not be suffice to de-escalate nuclear tensions. There should be a concerted effort to resolve all outstanding issues or stability, strategic or otherwise, will continue to be a fragile and elusive dream. The writer is a former visiting fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey California. She can be reached at sitaranoor@hotmail.com