Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to get involved in the Syrian crisis and allowing his air force to launch massive air strikes against the opposition forces have dramatically altered the warfare trajectory. Though Moscow insisted that the airstrikes targeted Islamic State (IS) militants, the reports emanating from Syria belied this claim. The footage taken from satellites suggests that most of the strikes, if not all, hit the forces belonging to the rebels fighting to dislodge President Assad. The influx of thousands of refugees on the shores of the Mediterranean marks the exasperation of millions of Syrians displaced during the four-year-long civil war. Over 250,000 people were killed and a million were severely wounded. The US strategy was mired with hesitation and indecision. It decided to arm the rebels but felt constrained to screen the moderates from amongst the jihadists. The process impeded the recruitment and arming of the secular forces. The rebels got frustrated at the lack of leadership and caused desertion in their ranks and files. Washington wanted Assad to go but failed to seize the opportunity when he appeared most vulnerable. In the meantime, Islamic State (IS), the most brutal and radical outfit, appeared in the battlefield and made quick gains. It brought a huge chunk of Syrian and Iraqi territory under its control and established its own administration. The Sunnis hitherto marginalised in Iraq and Syria transformed IS-held territory into a safe zone to regroup and fight against emerging Shia domination in the region. The Syrians became disillusioned as they saw no light at the end of the tunnel. Russia kept the situation under close watch. It was not opposed to a diplomatic solution of the crisis but maintained that no peace plan would work without the participation of the Syrian government. Putin characterised the US-led coalition’s airstrikes on Syrian territory as a violation of international law. Iran, which is aligned with both Baghdad and Damascus, felt threatened at the emergence of IS and dispatched troops to fight at the behest of its beleaguered allies next doors. The US, at Baghdad’s request, mounted airstrikes against IS positions but, in the absence of ground troops, the effectiveness of airstrikes was called into question. IS does not seem to have been weakened much by year-long airstrikes. It still controls a vast territory and has championed itself as the rallying point of Sunnis in the region. The horrendous persecutions of the youth and political opponents in Egypt, lack of accountability in Saudi Arabia and in Gulf States have driven the youth to reinforce IS. Military observers estimate that IS has over 30,000 striking force soldiers under its command. The US policy of restraint and expectation that the rebels will dislodge a brutal dictator was misplaced. Assad had the support of the Syrian army that, during recent years, received $ 2.5 billion worth of military hardwire from Moscow. The ill-equipped rebels could hardly withstand the bombardments of the air force and retreated to the areas bordering Turkey. Nevertheless, Assad was losing control and desperately seeking support from Moscow. Putin was waiting for the right moment to intervene and intervened decisively on September 30. The Russian military, since August, has been engaged in expanding the helipads around Syrian military installations. Syrian high officials visited Moscow a few days after the visit of the chief of the Iranian militia al Quads, raised the spectre of strategic understanding reached amongst Iran, Syria and Russia. The Kremlin probably finalised its military intervention during these visits. Inaction on the part of the US caused disenchantment amongst its regional allies. Jordan’s King Abdullah’s visit to Moscow followed by the Saudi defence minister’s visit in summer signalled that the coalition was crumbling. Russia’s military assaults on rebel bases in Syria, inflicting severe damages, caught the US by surprise. Moscow, in recent months, dispatched several dozen war planes, battle tanks, artillery and hundreds of soldiers to Syria signalling that it is prepared for a long-term intervention and an indication that Russia is back in the Middle East. Last week, a Russian fleet from the Caspian Sea, launched cruise missiles against targets nearly 1,000 miles away — a potent display of its firepower. The missiles flew over the air spaces of Iran and Iraq before hitting targets in Syria. Backed by airstrikes, the Syrian army launched ground offensives against the rebels in the Hama area in the north. Encouraged by Russia’s supremacy of firepower, Iraq has formed a coalition with Russia, Iran and Syria to exterminate the militants from its soil. Washington has been flabbergasted. Following the Crimean annexation, Putin vowed that Russia would intervene anywhere within the former Soviet Union whenever ethnic Russian interests were threatened. He claimed that Russia was the legitimate descendant of the Soviet Union and would be prepared to intervene wherever required. His words were not empty threats. Earlier in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and secured the cessation of Abkhazia. Russian troops are still active in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Crimean annexation was a brazen rebuttal to the EU’s bid to get Ukraine in its fold. The Kremlin felt humiliated at the installation of “long range ballistic missiles” in Poland and the Czech Republic, and viewed the installation of sophisticated weaponry in its backyard as a hostile action. Putin will not allow NATO’s expansion into Russia’s neighbourhood. Russia’s military intervention reveals that US intelligence in the field was dysfunctional. It was unable to intercept Russian communication, failed to track the movement of Russian military and could not warn the Pentagon about imminent military assault against the Syrian rebels. Though Russia’s intervention will come as a temporary relief to Assad, observers believe that Moscow will try to strengthen its influence in the region, including a long-standing military base in Syria. The reaction from the US has been disconcerting. It will not admit the procrastination and unravelling that mired its policy in the Middle East but has accepted that its covert programme has not produced the desired outcome. It has now decided to significantly scale back its efforts to build a force to fight IS — a humiliating retreat. The majority of Russians opposed sending troops abroad. Once the rebels are regrouped and able to inflict casualties, Moscow will come under increasing pressure to find an exit door. The presence of foreign troops might very well serve as an incentive for jihadists to converge in IS-held territory and fight against ‘infidels’, as has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US and Russia suffered huge casualties in their ill-advised adventures in these countries. Nobody should lose sight that Russia has applied the scorched earth policy in Chechnya, and restoring Moscow’s writ over the area after losing 6,000 soldiers. But Syria is outside former Soviet territory. Russia’s military intervention might accelerate the quest for a political solution. Germany, France and the UK have softened their positions against Assad and have expressed willingness to talk to all parties, including the Syrian government. Given the exasperation of the Assad regime, Russia might encourage the EU and Damascus to actively pursue a peace plan that would bring the war to an end and stop the exodus of refugees. This would vindicate Russia as a peacemaker in the troubled region. Russian intervention in Syria underscores that Moscow has emerged as the legitimate descendent of the Soviet Union as Putin claimed a few years ago. Russia cannot be excluded in the settlement of any international disputes. It will no longer remain a bystander as it was during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in the 1990s and Iraq invasion in 2003. The writer is a former official of the United Nations