Following the execution of Shia cleric Nimr Al-Nimr, tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia has heightened once again. The event led to demonstrations in Iran and other parts of the world against Saudi Arabia and the high point came when the Saudi embassy in Tehran was burnt down by angry protestors. Just when Tehran has officially vowed to bring the perpetrators to task, the tacit approval of Iran’s Shia theocratic regime behind the demonstrations was obvious. The embassy incident led to Saudi Arabia severing diplomatic ties with Tehran. That was followed by the severing of ties with Iran by many Saudi allies including Bahrain and the UAE, which opted to downgrade their diplomatic relations with Iran. Just when the Saudis and Iranians have been fighting for regional power from Yemen to Syria and Lebanon, the recent clashes have a more profound sectarian dimension to them for they were triggered by the execution of a Shia cleric. And that has serious repercussions for countries like Pakistan with diverse sectarian demographics.
So, the question is: what precipitated the Saudis to carry out the act? One explanation is that the Saudis did not think through the sectarian flare the incident would unfurl. But then, keeping in view how Saudis have been playing the sectarian gambit for decades, it is hard to assume that they were not mindful of what they would unleash. Another explanation is that it was critical for the Saudis to give a strong message that any dissent against the regime would be dealt with an iron fist. And so, on the same day the Saudis executed Nimr Al-Nimr, they also executed a key cleric who was ideologically aligned to al Qaeda and has served as an ideological inspiration for them. Then there is the point of view that Saudis deliberately want to heighten escalation and turn it into an all-out conflict between Iran and themselves, and ultimately between Sunnis and Shias. By this, they plan to achieve several objectives. The first is to force Americans to pick sides when the US is trying for a balancing act in the Middle East through rapprochement with Iran. With Russia openly siding with Iranian interests in the Syrian war, they hope that a heightened conflict will force the US to reconsider its options in the Middle East and rely more on its old allies.
Secondly, any such escalation will heighten tensions in already fragile Iraq, rallying Sunnis towards Saudi Arabia, giving it leverage over Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda. Thirdly, it will rally the domestic Sunni powerbase, including the extremist Wahhabi elements, against who the regime feels squeezed with the rising IS tide. The last bit seems more plausible because only last week the Saudis announced a Sunni military coalition to fight IS, which also seems to be a direct threat to Iranian influence in the region. Among the members of the alliance are Pakistan and Turkey, probably the only two potent military powers in the region.
And so, like always, behind a sectarian conflict lie real politics at the root. The question is: will the Saudi gambit pay off? Interestingly, just when the Middle East is the region with the highest Shia population ratio in the world — by some accounts even a Shia majority region — the power politics of the region have always been dominated by Sunnis. With society being highly tribal, this indicates the power of relative tribal lineups. The Saudis hope that in a sectarian conflict, they will be able to rally the Sunni power base behind them, which in the event of US rapprochement with Iran might be considering turning neutral, thus leading to ultimate increase in Iranian influence.
Also, traditionally, the Turks have fought the Iranians for regional power and so an alignment against Iran, in a more hostile world, will drag the Turks to the side of Arab regimes (Sunnis) in a Shia-Sunni conflict. Not only that but because of the hostile legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Arab world, it may be easier to sell a Turk-Arab alliance as a Sunni alliance to local populations. So, all said and done, Saudi success depends on three factors. First, how much sway will the sectarian element have in rallying the Arab Sunni power centres? Second, how much authority can they have in a coalition that will have Turks in it and will the Turks opt for a power arrangement with Iranians and Russians behind the Saudis’ back? And, above all, to which side does Pakistan turn? For because of its proximity with Iran and because of its military muscle, Pakistan can be a decider in the Gulf region, the most critical piece in the Middle East power puzzle.
So what should Pakistan do? Ideally, it should stay neutral. However, Pakistan has three of its closest allies in the region involved in the conflict, named the UAE, Turkey and, despite its dubious record vis-à-vis extremism, Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Iran is an important regional player and neighbour with whom Pakistan shares more culturally and commercially for centuries. Turkey under Erdogan is a dicey proposition. Saudis, we have become apprehensive of for their role in militancy and sectarian strife. The UAE remains a critical player for our commercial and political influence in the region, and so a country with whom we should move in most coordination with to defuse or control the situation. Another critical entity to look at for cues is China. Our role, if any, should be to defuse tensions and ensure that conflict does not turn sectarian. We need good relations with both the Saudis and Iran, eventually ensuring a win-win for them and regional security. However, bigger than the question of what Pakistan should do is what Pakistan will do. Pakistan, a country run by the Sharifs.
The author can be reached on twitter at @aalimalik