The claim that “Pakistan has been the most bullied ally of the US” is based on a fallacious premise and only partly valid. The US did bully Pakistan the most and bullied it most ruthlessly, but it is a misnomer to describe Pakistan as its ally. Alliances are always between equals, needing one another equally. A Third World country, living from hand to mouth and crisis to crisis, can at best be described and treated as a camp-follower of a Super Power. So was Pakistan, despite occasional pampering, showered on it during the US’ hours of need. If naïve Pakistanis considered themselves as allies of the US, which most did most of the time, and felt let down mostly, they have none but themselves to blame. British India was partitioned at a time when Cold War had “solidified” and lines between the two rival Super Powers had been drawn clearly. India inherited its original membership in the UN. Pakistan was unanimously recognized at the UN, except by Afghanistan, and admitted to the world body on September 30, 1947. The Soviet Union viewed the partition of India as the “divide and rule” policy of British imperialism. It had “used frequent vetoes to debar many countries from UN membership”. But given Pakistan’s strategic location and numerical strength as the largest Muslim country in the world after Indonesia, as also Stalin’s disdain for Gandhism, it recognized Pakistan readily. Pakistan made its relationship with Russia an “either-or” affair and ended up “neither” here “nor” there. While India inherited everything from institutions to infrastructure, to resources, Pakistan had to start everything from scratch. The war in Kashmir and India’s decision to withhold Rs 55 crore out of Rs 75 crore of Pakistan’s share of assets till the resolution of the Kashmir dispute unnerved Pakistan. According to a source, Pakistan’s Foreign Office started with only one type-writer. There were 16 ordnance factories in pre-partitioned India but none of these fell in Pakistan. Thus Pakistan badly needed political, financial, diplomatic, and security support. In desperation, it decided to join the Western bloc. Within two weeks of independence, it selected a building in Washington to open its Embassy there. It established diplomatic relations with the US on October 20, 1947; and with the Soviet Union over two years later, in December 1949. On the other hand, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was keen on establishing a close relationship with Moscow, despite Joseph Stalin’s pronounced contempt for Gandhism, India, and him. He sent his sister, Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, as India’s first Ambassador to Moscow. She was invited to present credentials on August 13, 1947. She “pleaded with Bhai (brother) to be allowed to remain in India to celebrate (the independence day) at home as (she) had (always) longed to do”. But she “was told that Moscow was important and that August 15 be celebrated there”. She lamented in her autobiography that “Stalin did not receive or meet her during her (over two years) stay in Moscow”. “Stalin was against Nehru”. He saw Gandhism as a “reactionary movement”, directed against communism. He did not support India on Kashmir or Goa. He publicly snubbed Nehru as a “running dog of imperialism”. He did not invite him to visit the Soviet Union “though efforts were made by the Indian embassy in Moscow.” Capitalizing on Nehru’s frustration, President Harry Truman, in early May 1949, invited him to visit the US. The news “caused a flutter in Karachi, because (Prime Minister) Liaquat Ali Khan had received no such invitation, and in Moscow, where it was read as further proof of India’s proclivity towards the West.” Khan, who was on a foreign trip at that time, felt “offended” at “being ignored.” He said, “Pakistan cannot afford to wait. She must take her friends where she finds them”. On arrival at Tehran from Cairo on May 16, 1949, he asked Pakistan’s Ambassador there to arrange an invitation for him to visit the Soviet Union. The request was conveyed to Moscow through the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The verbal invitation was received on June 2, followed by “the formal letter of invitation, signed by Joseph Stalin”, which was delivered to the Pakistan Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office in Karachi on June 4. Four days later, Pakistan announced that Prime Minister Khan and his wife would visit Moscow soon. The Western media highlighted it as the “first (visit of a) Commonwealth Head of Government to the Soviet Union” and speculated that it would coincide with Nehru’s visit to the US in October. But, while Nehru’s visit did materialize as scheduled, Khan never made it to Moscow. Instead, he paid a 24-day state visit to Washington in May 1950. That the visit, frantically proposed by Pakistan and instantly approved by the Soviet Union, didn’t materialize begs askance. Political analysts differ on the motives behind the unannounced cancellation of the visit that would have “changed the course of Pakistan’s relations with the outside world” and saved it from being “totally dependent on the US.” It is widely believed that the move was “a flirt with Moscow” to “extract” an invitation from Washington. But Jamshed Marker, Pakistan’s illustrious diplomat for 42 years, claims that no written invitation was ever received from Moscow. Dr Samiullah Koreshi, yet another diplomat from Pakistan, endorsed Marker’s claim when he wrote that “in the foreign office archives and files, no written invitation to Liaquat was found. It was all a verbal invitation of Soviet Charge’d Affaires at Tehran; and when Liaquat accepted, (they) proposed different dates on which he was busy and finally on the last date suggested by Liaquat, they stopped replying.” Abdul Sattar, who served as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister after retiring as Foreign Secretary, discreetly disagreeing with both, refers to the visit as “an episode (that) involved the invitation … which was accepted but not honoured.” Independent observers insist that a written invitation was received by Pakistan. They, inter alia, refer to Khan’s address at Boston on May 25, 1950, in which he stated that “he would be going to Russia; no (date) has been fixed but the invitation IS THERE, and I have ACCEPTED it”. On the other hand, Pakistan’s knowledgeable sources are divided on this point. Given this and Stalin’s pronounced aversion to Gandhism, India, and Nehru, it looks highly unlikely that the instant verbal invitation was not followed by a formal letter. Liaquat Ali Khan was a moderate democrat, committed to Pakistan’s independence. Just three days after independence, he told an interviewer that Pakistan would follow “a policy of non-alignment”. But he was confronted by formidable detractors. Foremost amongst them was Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, a staunch supporter of the US, who saw communism as a “menace”. A former bureaucrat, he enjoyed solid support of the bureaucracy, born and bred in British India and, like present-day bureaucracy, fascinated by Western values and lifestyle. He was thus in a “position to pressurize (Prime Minister Khan) and defied him on occasions”. He “strongly opposed (Khan’s) visit to Moscow” and told him to “either govern or get out”. Khan had no constituency in Pakistan. He could not afford to offend bureaucracy. Khan also needed the support of Islamists inside and outside the Constituent Assembly. He “possibly perceived that his visit to (godless) Moscow would breed resistance from” the far-right, which was in the process of Islamizing Jinnah’s secular Pakistan. Besides, the US and the UK opposed this visit. The “British High Commissioner in Karachi, Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith, warned Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan that the upcoming visit to Moscow would be seen with mistrust by American and British populations”. Liaquat Ali Khan succumbed to these pressures. The invitation was a god-send but was squandered. It came from a neighbour, a Super Power, and an enemy of Pakistan’s sworn enemy. The visit would have given Pakistan a significant edge over India. It would have strengthened Pakistan’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. However, Pakistan made it an “either-or” affair and ended up “neither” here “nor” there. On the contrary, Nehru went for “both”, despite Stalin’s contempt and achieved “the best of both the worlds”. Ironically, Pakistan not only wasted the opportunity but also offended Moscow. It “sorely wounded the pride” of a Super Power and, eventually, paid dearly for an indiscreet “political snub”. In Mushtaq Ahmad’s words, it “was a great diplomatic blunder”. In short, Pakistan burnt its boats and joined the US camp, which proved to be a blind alley it couldn’t exit, mainly for two reasons. (To be concluded) The writer is a former diplomat, based in Canberra, and can be reached at khizar_niazi@hotmail.com