I was told specifically by the Field Marshal that under no circumstances would we cross into the Indian airspace, even after the Chamb Operation had been launched on September 1. The fear was that India might launch a preemptive strike. We could only retaliate to Indian moves without either violating their air space or crossing into their territory. It is to be noted here that any cooperation that existed between the army, navy and the air force had been on the basis of mutual goodwill and convenience rather than according to any plan or system. From September 6 onwards we were on the defensive. Our first objective was to defend ourselves against the Indian invasion and each arm worked more or less on its own. During the first few days, government appeared to have no control of the events. However, once we gained relative control of the air, particularly over the battlefields and the army had held off the Indian attackers, government began to function and think of the next move. To sum up: (a) there had been no plan for a joint, overall, higher conduct of the war, (b) we blundered from a localised operation into a general war and let the initiative go to the Indians. In view of the lack of coordination and cohesiveness, it had been a remarkable achievement for the armed forces to end up in an honourable stalemate holding more of the Indian POWs and territory. I must make a special mention here of East Pakistan where our extremely small air force (one squadron only) kept the skies clear of the intruder aircraft throughout the conflict. We destroyed more of the enemy aircraft on the ground there than anywhere else. Question: Do you believe in the inevitability of the 1965 war as the decisive clash of arms between two warring ideologies — Islam and Hinduism? Answer: No, I do not believe that there were any ideological compulsion behind the war. Question: Do you think, as a soldier and a student of military history that we made the best use of our offensive weaponry — armour, artillery and combat aircraft in that war? Answer: I can only speak with any authority about the use and deployment of the aircrafts. PAF had been equipped and logistically supplied entirely by the US. There were some 120 combat aircraft (F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and B-57 bombers) only two fixed radar stations — one in north at Sakesar behind Sargodha, the other at Badin. There were only three operational airfields at Peshawar, Sargodha and Karachi. This deployment was hardly adequate for offensive action. On the contrary, it had a predominantly defensive orientation. However, an enormous amount of ingenuity and courage was shown by the PAF personnel in making full use of the ground facilities and the equipment they had. PAF attained its objective by inflicting heavy losses on a much larger force. It gained mastery of the air over Pakistan, which allowed the army to operate without any serious interference from the enemy, and at the same time, to call on the air force for the close support it required. Speaking of weapons, too much reliance on a single source of arms supplies — the US — made the task of replacement of weapons during the hostilities an almost impossible one. There appeared to have been no plan for the replenishment of the certain types of heavy equipment and ammunition whatsoever. Question: Do you agree that the1965 war had been a watershed not only in Pakistan’s military history but also in its political history? In fact, it turned out to be an important landmark in the history of the South Asian subcontinent. Would you like to comment? Answer: Yes, I agree, it was a very important event in that we exposed our weakness in the worst possible manner. We alerted the Indians even more than they had been after the failure of their Chinese adventure. They began re-arming themselves at a feverish pace. On the other hand, we lost our only source of arms supplies and our entire system of training and procurement was disrupted. Even though the PAF was able to induct more than 200 combat aircraft in the next two years (as compared to a total of about 150 throughout the past ten years), five more radar stations, additional forward airfields, we had to pay for every bit of hardware from our own budget. Different sources of supply and different types of aircraft posed fresh problems. From 1965 onward, our problems and ability to maintain our armed forces in top operational gear became increasingly difficult and the balance tilted in India’s favour. (Concluded) The writer is a retired brigadier and can be reached at brigsiddiqi@yahoo.co.uk