The modern state came into being for the welfare of the people. Any state overlooking this fundamental principle is destined to be a headache for the world, and ultimately, to failure.
The basic problem with the Pakistani state is that its security establishment spends its resources on keeping the state together rather than on public welfare. States do not survive on the numbers of guns and bombs in their repository alone. Only a literate, prosperous and empowered populace can guarantee the integrity and success of a state.
The security establishment’s obsession with the threat from India and Afghanistan has led to a multitude of disastrous policies and outcomes. These include the high rate of defence expenditures at the cost of provision of basic services to the people, the use of religious jihadis as a tool of foreign policy, focus on defence-centric relations with the outside world, brainwashing of youngsters to inculcate in them anti-Indianism and religious bigotry, and over-centralisation of state powers.
The security establishment followed a very dangerous path from the very beginning by using religious bigotry to defeat Pashtun nationalism in its northwest. It could have well followed a more constructive policy by allowing the different nationalities their due political, cultural and economic rights. Pashtun leadership — secular by its very nature — could have proved an asset for the state with their secular and progressive politics. The state chose to jail them and offset their influence through support to religious fundamentalists including the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami.
It should be very natural for the security establishment to acknowledge that its oppressive behaviour, the use of religious bigotry as a tool of internal and external politics, and the denial of rights to the different nationalities inhabiting Pakistan over the last more than 60 years has proved disastrous, and needs to be changed. Once such acknowledgement comes about, efforts can then be made towards making the country a normal state, one that aims at the welfare of the people.
Although nothing can be said with certainty about the response of the Baloch leadership to conciliatory overtures from the state — for many believe that Balochistan is a lost cause — the Pashtun leaders seem to be open to negotiations on a new constitution, one which reflects the desires of all the nationalities. Pasthuns are likely to accept being part of a state in which they are granted maximum political, social, cultural and economic autonomy.
Based on a scrutiny of the party manifestos and media interactions of Pashtun nationalist leaders, it is abundantly clear that they resent the Pakistan security establishment’s interference in Afghanistan, which they consider as their historical homeland. Such interference causes immense hardship to their Pashtun relatives across the Durand Line. They consider the current foreign policy of the country as serving the interests of and catering to the aspirations of Punjabis alone, in which the state is pitted against India over the Kashmir issue, which is strategically important for the mainland Punjab. Therefore, in order to strengthen the state and ensure its integrity, its foreign policy will need to be modelled according to the aspirations of all the peoples inhabiting Pakistan. That will necessarily lead to the country seeking friendly and brotherly relations with both India and Afghanistan.
Another step towards normal statehood will be the central government devolving all financial powers, except printing of currency, to the provinces. Control of the centre over the bulk of revenues and resources emanating in different provinces has weakened the state. The Baloch, Pashtuns and Sindhis deeply resent the exploitation of their resources by a Punjabi-dominated establishment in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Separatist tendencies among these nationalities are at an all-time high. Therefore, in order to strengthen the federation, the central government needs to amend the constitution, which allows for the devolution of all financial powers, including tax collection of all kinds, to the federating units.
Governmental structures in Pakistan do not reflect the make-up of the population of the country. The current quasi-federal constitution allows for the imposition of governors and senior bureaucrats over the provinces by the central government, in which the smaller nationalities have little say. That set-up has to be changed. The administrative and judicial machinery in all the provinces must be in the hands of local people, appointed by elected provincial governments.
Cultural rights is another area where much needs to be done in order to address the resentment of the different nationalities, and thus to strengthen and normalise the state. To begin with, people everywhere give utmost importance to their mother tongue. Language represents them as a distinct group. In Pakistan, a language of a small minority is imposed on the Baloch, Punjabis, Pashtuns and Sindhis, which they (with the exception of the Punjabis) resent deeply and which triggers their separatist tendencies. Therefore, these languages need to be made the languages of government at the centre, and each language the language of government and education in their respective provinces. The Rawalpindi/Islamabad-based establishment should refrain from creating roadblocks in that path.
Once the security and civilian establishment takes the above measures, it will not need to pursue deadly policies such as the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan, confrontational relations with India, brainwashing of youth in religious militancy, and the use of religious bigotry as a counterweight to Pashtun nationalism. Withdrawal of state patronage shall eventually lead to the defeat of religious bigotry, and thus, to the emergence of a normal state.
The writer is from North Waziristan and can be reached at [email protected]