Gone are the days when even a child in India, if asked about India’s best friend, would have blurted out, “Russia.” The old ties between New Delhi and Moscow have become the geopolitical equivalent of a square peg trying to fit into a round hole. Today, Modi has drawn India more closely than ever to the US; locked in an expanding conflict with China and managing a complex relationship with Russia. The collapse of Ashraf Ghani’s government may further widen the rift between New Delhi and Moscow, hastening a fundamental realignment. Unlike Russia that could not hide its epicaricacy about the humiliating US retreat from Afghanistan, India has been deeply worried about the security challenges arising from the withdrawal of US forces. Two decades of the US military’s presence enabled India to significantly expand its economic and political profile in Afghanistan. However, it now has no choice, but to wind down its activity following the return of the Taliban with Pakistan’s backing. Apprehensive about the dangers of the unipolar world power-play, India began to engage more consequentially with the US in the early 1990s. By the turn of the 21st century, George W Bush and Barack Obama steadily began to transform the US’s relationship with India by overcoming earlier differences over the Kashmir issue and resolving the dispute on Indian nuclear concerns. While New Delhi’s ongoing conflict with Beijing and its growing closeness to Washington have attracted much attention, its third great power relationship with Moscow is undergoing a more complex yet less noted shift. That shift has accelerated amid an increasing political divergence over Afghanistan. In the past, New Delhi tended to be respectful of Russian sensitivities. India was among the few countries in the region that were unwilling to publicly criticise the Soviet Union for invading Afghanistan in 1979. Today, Modi and his foreign policy advisers are no longer uncomfortable with airing differences with Russia on critical issues. This strategy is not about non-alignment or multi-alignment, as many would be tempted to conclude, but rather an unapologetic pursuit of an interest-based foreign policy, no longer defensive about a growing partnership with the US. Pakistan has always kept its options open with Moscow and Beijing. Over the last few years, Russia had stepped up its engagement with the Taliban and coordinated with Pakistan on issues related to Afghanistan. While Moscow believes that Islamabad and the Taliban will help it better manage future security challenges to its southern flanks in Central Asia, New Delhi is convinced that a Taliban-led Afghanistan will once again become home for anti-Indian groups, backed and encouraged by Pakistan. Russia has also sought to keep India out of the Afghanistan transition process by claiming that New Delhi had little influence with the Taliban government. It is no surprise that New Delhi has taken a harder line than anyone in the region against the Taliban, even as Russia was trying to befriend them. A love-hate relationship between the US and Pakistan, the mounting confrontation between Moscow and Washington and the growing US-India strategic partnership have given Pakistan and Russia a Machiavellian common cause to reassess their bilateral ties. Pak-Russian ties remained strained due to Pakistan’s proactive pursuit of the US’s strategic objectives in the region vis-a-vis Russia’s continuing strong ties with India. However, both have reached the understanding that a political settlement in Afghanistan is necessary for regional peace and stability. They are making concerted efforts to establish the foundation for a mutually beneficial relationship amid dramatically shifting geopolitical competitions and deteriorating regional security. The underlying motivation for Pakistan and Russia to come together lies in their shared motivation that the only viable solution for regional peace and stability is a political settlement in Afghanistan. Under Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s mandate, Russia and Pakistan have pledged to jointly tackle growing threats such as the Islamic State post-US withdrawal. With the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, regional stakeholders are apprehensive that a civil war in Afghanistan would have spillover effects for neighbouring countries and instability in Afghanistan had always increased homegrown militancy in Pakistan. Pakistan has always kept its options open with Moscow and Beijing. On the other hand, Russia is finding new opportunities under changing geopolitical circumstances in South Asia as the Americans withdraw from Afghanistan. Although India remains a bigger market for Russia, Pakistan’s increasing geo-economic significance, courtesy China featuring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, influence over Afghan Taliban, and the market it provides for Russia’s defence industry underscore the fact that Moscow’s interests in South Asia are not exclusive to India anymore. Pakistan has preserved relations with major powers like China, the US and Russia, and avoided a lineup with any side maintaining the position as a regional stakeholder. The widening gulf between India and Russia serves China, as does the rift between Moscow and Washington. However, now is not the time to write the obituary of India-Russia ties. The writer is a retired Pakistan Army officer and can be reached at nawazish30@hotmail.com