Since USSR’s invasion in Afghanistan security situation in FATA rapidly deteriorated however post 9/11 scenario fully exposed the weaknesses of colonial law enforcement apparatus. The colonial Criminal Justice System (CJS) meant for FATA was primarily tailored to serve the strategic interests of the imperialists’ hence public safety and public interests were compromised. After independence FATA served as a buffer between Pakistan and Afghanistan primarily governed by Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).
Since 1976 to reform FATA 15 commissions and committees have been constituted. Appointment of FATA reforms committee in 2016 once again rejuvenated the hopes. The recommendations of committee were recently reviewed and approved by the cabinet. The recommendations of the committee are in fact practical manifestation of point 12 of National Action Plan (NAP).
From 1947 to 1979 people of FATA were primarily subservient to colonial aspirations and customary practices (Riwaj) however in post 1979 scenario FATA emerged as a magnetic pole for the foreign extremists who brought their own recipe of CJS thus apart from colonial law and customary practices they also had to confront with extremism. After the failure of three peace accords made in-between 2004-06 the state was left with only option to employ hard approach consequently militants were either killed or flushed out by military operations. Though deliberations on 18th amendment raised expectations regarding abolishment of FCR and introduction of FATA reforms but the only outcome was renaming of NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Indisputably success of reforms will primarily be dependent on two important factors. One: drafting and execution of a well thought out transition programme. Secondly, how to integrate the existing law enforcement apparatus? Such initiative requires legislative, administrative, capacity building and operational interventions.
FATA reforms and its merger in KP gave birth to number of questions needs to be addressed. Since KP Police is a more trained force but on the contrary levies are less trained tribal forces so how to bring levies at par with police? In first phase how to integrate Khasadar force and Levies and in second phase how to transform these amalgamated forces as a modern police service? Apart from training, recruitment criteria and basic required standards are also different so how to bring those at par? Since on-going militancy badly affected the educational development in FATA therefore for recruitment what concessions may be granted? Reporting of crime in FATA is not a norm therefore the reformers are to formulate a strategy how to encourage crime reporting and improve the response system? Since population density in FATA is very low therefore police response may be much delayed. If police are entrusted with maintenance of law and order function but response is delayed that will obviously compromise police image and public trust. To improve response Police are not only to be trained but also equipped with quick mobility and latest communication facilities. FATA is a low crime incidence area but tribal feuds usually create law and order situations. Therefore FATA carries the potential where a formal Law enforcement mechanism may get public appreciation however public trust in informal traditional conflict resolution warrants its legal codification.
Success primarily requires a well thought out ‘doable transition plan’. The plan shall incorporate modalities regarding recruitment and training of man power. Issues related to assets and jurisdictions also require systematic approach. In recent past when Levies were merged in Balochistan Police such issues were not properly worked out eventually resulted into reversal. From conversion and reversal of ‘B’ into ‘A’ area in Balochistan we learned that both decisions were hasty where consultative process with community remained a missing link and finally the proponents of status quo prevailed.
The success of FATA reforms will depend on two factors. Firstly, that a well thoughtout transition programme is drafted and executed. Secondly, integration of all existing law enforcement apparatuses
Similarly on the eve of promulgation of Local Government Ordinance 2001 Malakand agency was notified a district where 24 departments were devolved but without a police department. It seems strange that how a district government without an efficient and modern law enforcement apparatus may maintain law and order and effectively function?
Stretched over 6,620 Sq Km area South Waziristan is the largest agency and extended over 1,290 Sq Km area Bajaur is the smallest agency. In KP with 14,850Sq km area Chitralis area wise the biggest district and extended over only 497Sqkm area Tor Ghar is the smallest district. Population-wise Bajaur is the most populated agency. With 2,019,118 souls Peshawar is biggest district however with only 185,000 population from demographic perspective Tor Ghar is the smallest district of KP. In KP population density is 238 and in FATA its 117 per Sq Km. Therefore, another issue is how to rationalise the size of a police district in FATA. Keeping in view such contrast it is imperative to think how to rationalize the administrative size of each agency.
Since FATA faced major burnt of on-going war against terror consequently its infrastructure has been badly damaged. Decision regarding locations of Police stations requires special attention of the planners. As no one knows the quantum of actual incidences of crime hence the only left criteria for the establishment of a police station is either on the basis of concentration of people in an area or public convenience.
Since reforms package proposed Jurisdiction of Supreme court and high court therefore in the absence of a modern police without professional investigation skills it may be a weak jurisdiction.
In certain parts of Balochistan and KP duality of legal system and law enforcement apparatus badly affected the peace indexation. Dual command structure of Levies and Police in Balochistan hindered the smooth functioning of criminal justice system therefore repetition of such mistake may further erode the writ of state in FATA.
Though Report of the Committee on FATA Reforms 2016 recommended additional 20,000 posts in the Levies force but report seems silent on their training and capacity building. Without establishment of a training facility for Levies mere increase in manpower may not yield the desired dividends.
Before implementation of reforms it is imperative to redefine the roles and responsibilities of Khasadars force, Levies, Frontier Constabulary and other forces.
From Operation Al-Mizan to Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad military carried out number of successful operations but now it is imperative upon the civilian administration to come up with a viable transition plan.
The writer tweets @alibabakhel