Do we remember the first “mission accomplished” in Afghanistan in 1989? After the Soviets left, the US and other Western countries also packed and left without rehabilitating the country or the fighters – the “mujahideen.” This was ten years after propping them as heroes. What a striking contrast from how the US deals with its soldiers coming back. Even after one six-month tour of duty in Afghanistan or Iraq, they have to undergo all kinds of physical and psychological (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder) evaluations and rehabilitation so they can assimilate normally back in the civil society. On the other hand, the US and others had propped up mujahedeen by training and arming them with the most advanced weapons to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan for over a decade and then abandoned them after the war. In most cases, they grew up knowing nothing but to kill those who don’t fall in line with their thinking, even Muslim Afghanis who supported Soviets. I vividly remember meeting a few 14 to 16-years-old boys in 1986 in Islamabad When talking to them about their experience in Afghanistan, all they talked about was using Kalashnikov, killing people and the eagerness to go back to fight again. By not pursuing the rehabilitation of mujahideen, the US largely contributed to the Afghan civil war The US had cut all its funding to Afghanistan immediately after the Soviets left and reduced its assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This angered even Senator Wilson, the architect of the first Afghan war, who wanted to spend money to reconstruct the country. He was, however, turned down by the appropriations committee when he sought only $1 million for school reconstruction. He famously said, “We could have done it for a half a billion dollars—which is nothing compared to how much the war on terror has [eventually] cost us.” The senator hoped that the US had learned from its earlier mistakes and would help rebuild Afghanistan this time around. When National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was asked if he regretted supporting [propping] Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet Union, he replied, “What is more important in world history? … Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?” By not pursuing the rehabilitation/training of mujahideen to live a normal life in civil society, as done for US’s military forces, and leaving the country without assisting with governance, the US largely contributed to the civil war. The civil war to gain power after the removal of Najibullah in 1992 pitted former allies against each other resulted in more deaths and chaos than during the ten years of war against the Soviets. The instability from infighting spilt over to bordering countries, especially Pakistan, with frequent kidnappings, murders, rapes, and robberies. In this backdrop of distress and the chaos afflicting the country, the Taliban movement was formed, probably in 1994, by former mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan along with Afghan refugees studying in madaris in Pakistan to restore peace. The creation of the movement was facilitated by Pakistan, likely at the behest (at least with a nod) of the US to protect the interests of both countries, especially the security of the proposed gas pipeline to carry 33 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Turkmenistan to India along the Arabian Sea. Proposed by the American Unocal Corporation and backed by the US, the pipeline is to pass through five southern Afghan provinces. Within a very short period, the Taliban reached Kabul, controlling most of the country by the end of 1996, bringing relative peace. They ruled the country with an extremely harsh interpretation of Islam and even banned poppy farming; resulting in the most profound impact on opium and heroin supply in modern history. Many non-Afghan mujahideen, who had joined the jihad against the Soviets and dreamt of building an exemplary Islamic state, were disheartened by the infighting. They had no reason to stay in Afghanistan. And with no restrictions on their movement, they started leaving for the countries of their origin. Without any post-war guidance or training, coupled with huge pride in defeating a superpower, they started looking for jihad in their native lands. They were against anything, especially government policies, which did not concur with their brainwashed reasoning. The consequence was the rise of extremism and terrorism in most Muslim majority and many non-Muslim majority countries around the globe. This blowback was so profound that it not only affected many non-Muslim majority countries in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia, who encouraged their Muslim youth to join mujahideen but also affected countries that had sided with the Soviet Union, like Russia (Chechnya) and China (Xinjiang). “Some agitated Moslems” eventually cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives and trillions of dollars. It took over thirty years to tame these “agitated Moslems” to any appreciable level. Pakistan was the worst-hit country with the menace of losing over 70,000 innocent lives. The economic loss was over $125 billion in the last twenty years alone. The same scenario may repeat if the US leaves Afghanistan prematurely; without helping the new administration with governance and abandoning developmental projects. This will likely have a much-limited impact than when the Soviets left the country in 1989. However, Pakistan would again be affected the most by the surge in violence and high unemployment. Many Afghans will flock to the border again to take refuge in Pakistan; adding to over three million Afghan refugees already present. This would bear heavily on the economy of Pakistan; washing away little gains it has made over the past few years. Additionally, some refugees will bring guns, drugs, crime, and violence, just like what happened in the 1980s. It will further worsen the law-and-order situation in large cities like Karachi. Therefore, it is prudent for the involved parties to weigh all the pros and cons, especially the US, and avoid abandoning Afghanistan again—over thirty years after the first mistake that had cost the world dearly. Pakistan should not be a party to it in any way, especially by providing bases to the US for future drone attacks in Afghanistan. Never forget that the US has been pimping and later dumping Pakistan for decades by the US and dumped once the interests are served. From funding to fight Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 and placing unilateral military embargoes in 1990 for the development of nuclear capabilities; waiving the sanctions in 1994 after Pakistan agreed to participate in Somalian and Bosnian wars; imposing them again in 1998, it lifted them, later in 2001, for the current Afghan war. If Pakistan were to help the US, the retaliatory terror attacks would take the country back to the days of high terrorist attacks. It is up to the Pakistani politicians to choose the path forward. They should keep in mind the integrity of their country and prosperity for future generations before selling the country for a few bucks. It would be worth remembering that a majority of Pakistanis believe that supporting the US again would be very counterproductive. The writer is a senior toxicologist and a visiting professor at Aga Khan University