The other day Moeed Yusuf argued in Dawn that it is time Pakistan conveyed its strategic concerns to the US in a frank manner. The crux of his argument, which is realistic in nature, is the US past and present administration lacks trust in the security establishment of Pakistan due to the latter’s preoccupation with India which, by extension, determines Rawalpindi’s relations with Afghanistan and, onwards, Iran. Subset of Pakistan’s India policy necessitated, from the perspective of the security establishment, a jihadi approach in especially Kashmir where the Indian army is belligerent to the extent of using Kashmiris as a human shield. The recent statement of India army chief, Rawat, outlines Indian army’s onwards tactical approach to counter the Kashmiri resistance for self-determination. A recent report of the US congress, too, talked of Pakistan employing militant organizations for strategic purposes in Afghanistan where peace has been a distant dream despite over decade-and-a-half military and political efforts on the part of the United States and its NATO allies. The recent attacks in and around Kabul expose inherent weaknesses of the Afghan state which is struggling to establish its writ over a territory which is home to multiple local land barons with competing interests in addition to many proxies backed by different powers from within and outside the South Asian region. In such a troubled regional context, will the US and Pakistan work together to counter extremism and terrorism from Pakistan and Afghanistan? To begin with, the US-Pakistan relations have a long history dating back to the early days of the Cold War. Contrary to what many in Pakistan believe, the nature and character of the bilateral relations was determined by the Cold War requirements: the US needed allies across the world to contain and combat communism. Whenever the US decided to contain its ideological “other” in South Asia, it looked up to Pakistan as a given choice and, importantly, Pakistan never disappointed its patron. Hence, be that the Ayub, Zia and Musharraf regime, Pakistan acted as a crucial client. Interestingly, as Christiane Fair argues, whenever the US withdrew from South Asia, it put Pakistan under sanctions for the former did not like to contradict its principal position on, for example, nuclear proliferation in a post-Cold War “New World Order”. This also explains the temporary transactional nature of US-Pak relations which, in turn, explicates past and contemporary fractures in the bilateral relations. From the American perspective, it makes sense to blame Pakistan to have taken undesired advantage of its relations with Washington by going to war with India in 1965 or keeping up jihadi organizations in the 1990s and 2000s onwards. The US approach is predicated on realism and reflects a superpower mentality that engages with peripheral puppets for short-term goals and disengages at will. On the other hand, Pakistan has internalized such a policy posture as a tested case of distrust, deceitfulness and derogation. From a neo-Marxist perspective, a Pakistani may argue the US exploited Pakistan through (post) Cold War alliances, sale of expensive weapons, indebtedness to US-controlled financial institutions and non-settlement of Kashmir issue. However, a US official may counter it by arguing that Pakistan survives today because the US gave an ultimatum to India in 1971 and 1999. Though a passionate Pakistani, on the other hand, may counter it by referring to the Chinese warning to India in 1965 and 1971, if not 1999. The fact of the matter, however, is neither the US nor China supported Pakistan militarily in its wars with India. That essentially is the reason, in the post-1971 period, Pakistan’s civil and military leadership sought panacea of its Indian problem in going nuclear. China did help Pakistan in this respect as argues Andres Small. “China does understand Pakistan’s predicament vis-à-vis India while the US never did”, argue our ex-servicemen on TV channels. This is the reason Pakistan has strategically shifted to China with which it has maintained long-term transactional relations. CPEC is, thus, an outcome of this structured relationship. In this context, it will be hard for the US, as the past suggests, to convince Pakistan over its Afghanistan policy while ignoring Rawalpindi’s reservation over India’s role in Kashmir and Kabul. This means Pakistani security establishment will not abandon the use of force multipliers for dividends in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In such a scenario, the US is left with one choice: sanction and bomb Pakistan. The latter, in my view, is ready for both. If there is a war between US and Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are likely to side with the US. However, Pakistan is most likely to use its jihadi assets in both of these neighbours, thus, expanding the zone of conflict to more than half of South Asia where many global corporations do businesses According to surveys, Pakistanis are, by and large, anti-American and, any extreme step, will add fuel to fire. Plus, in case of applying military means against Pakistan, the US will invade another Muslim country, thus, generating further hatred and breeding ground for future jihadists. Moreover, in the US-Pakistan war scenario, China is likely to support Pakistan diplomatically, if not militarily. In addition, if there is a war between US and Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are likely to side with the US. However, Pakistan is most likely to use its jihadi assets in both of these neighbours, thus, expanding the zone of conflict to more than half of South Asia where many global corporations do businesses. Alarmingly, then, the fate of nukes will be unpredictable. If attacked massively by the US (or India etc), it is very likely (tactical) nukes could be used as per Pakistan’s first-strike doctrine for the country has very limited conventional capability and Pakistani state is ideological in nature. This is my prediction which maybe proven wrong as it is hard to take account of situational variables. Hence, in view of the foregoing, it is rational for Pakistan and the US to avoid a war scenario and instead engage each other in cordial terms and work together to stabilise Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the US, along with China, can convince India and Pakistan to settle Kashmir amicably, this will deprive Pakistan o fraison d’être to keep and use jihadi proxies. Such a policy will also carry positive implications for peace and stability not only in Afghanistan but also the entire region. This obviously sounds ideal but not impossible. Therefore, the US-Pakistan relations can have a future that starts with interacting each other in non-temporary manner and with the aim to resolve conflicts in the region. This is time the US engages Pakistan above and beyond Afghanistan for its own sake and Pakistan, for its national interests, does the same regardless of China. The writer is Head, Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright Fellow. He tweets @ejazbhatty