The recent border skirmishes in eastern Ladakh’s Galwan Valley between China and India, though resulting in a serious loss of lives, are predicted to stay localised and short-lived. The conflict does not hold the capacity and capability to explode or expand further. China and India have gradually developed deep-rooted shared economic interests. The bilateral trade between the two countries is the case in point. The two states are not proxy to another “superpower” and don’t take dictation on respective national issues from any third country. Economy and development are the primary national objectives and goals for both nations. India is myopic and prejudiced but China is crystal-clear on respective national objectives i.e. economy and eradication of poverty. China wishes to defeat “West” and others in a prolonged economic war. Nevertheless, both are unbending from respective military positions in the conflict zone but are avoiding further escalation of the conflict.
China-India competition and cooperation with each other and with the US is preordained and inevitable to shape the future of Asia. China and, to a lesser extent, India are recognised as Asia’s rising economic powers, probably destined to emerge later as peer competitors to the US. Whereas China previously dismissed India as an economic and military competitor, today, it is beginning to look more closely and favourably at India through a different lens. China’s prevailing perception of India and vice-versa is a suitable indication of the future relationship between the two countries.
India, on the other hand, continues to perceive China as a threat and feels as being able to stand up against China. These vacillating perceptions will impact upon the emerging relationship between China and India and will accordingly influence the future of the South Asian region, including Pakistan. A triangular relationship of China-India-Pakistan appears most likely to come into play when key national security interests of the three individual states collide.
The rising threat of extremism in South Asia heightened China’s concerns about the risks of instability across Asia and had planted some doubts over the reliability of its closest friend, Pakistan. This has been triggered in particular by the deterioration of Pakistan’s economic and internal security situation closer to Durand Line and anxieties about the implications of the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, after many years, China had seen the threat as containable and navigable or at least one that can be managed by the Pakistan Army. China increasingly believes that China needs to take an active role in addressing it. Besides its security relationship with Pakistan, China’s main tools in the region are still diplomatic and economic rather than military. The scale of its economic resources and the nature of the investments that it can undertake are consequential to South Asia’s stability if China chooses to deploy them more actively with strategic goals in mind.
India combines the features of a federal government and the structure of a unitary administration, which may be termed as the nonfederal attributes of a political state. Because of this, India is regarded as a semi-federal state. India is characterised by more ethnic and religious groups than most other countries of the world. Apart from the much-noted 2000 odd castes and 25000 sub-castes, there are eight major religions and more than 15 languages spoken in numerous dialects. Large-scale religious violence and communal riots periodically occur in India since its independence in 1947.
All is not well for the Indian Army, which is primarily preoccupied on her western borders (Pakistan) with prolonged counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir
Religious and ethnic hostilities are common practices by the majority Hindu community; bulldozing the way against minorities. The minority religious communities have always been maltreated and deprived of respective religious practices with requisite freedom.
India faces numerous territorial issues with many of her neighbours. The un-demarcated boundaries with China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal have often flared up into serious conflicts; generating bilateral military tensions. Over the past 70 years, India has succeeded to resolve its boundary issues only with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. All is not well for the Indian Army, which is primarily preoccupied on her western borders (Pakistan) with prolonged counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir.
Aksai-Chin is one of the two disputed border areas between India and China. India claims Aksai-Chin as the easternmost part of the union territory of Ladakh. China claims that Aksai-Chin is part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 1951, the Tibetans signed a seventeen-point agreement reaffirming China’s sovereignty over Tibet and providing an autonomous administration led by Dalai Lama. In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to northern India undercover where he established the Central Tibetan Administration. On October 20, 1962, with the world’s terrifying gaze fixed firmly on the US-Soviet nuclear standoff in Cuba, China attacked India provoked by a territorial dispute and tensions over Tibet. The war was brief and China emerged victoriously.
The centuries-old dispute of territory between India and China will continue lingering on. However, there are nil chances of any kind of a major conflict or showdown of forces in the Ladakh-Tibet region in the foreseeable future. The disputed boundary between India and China, also known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is divided into three sectors: western, middle and eastern. The countries disagree on the exact location of the LAC in various areas, so much so that India claims that the LAC is 3,488 kilometres while the Chinese believe it to be around 2,000 kilometres long. The two armies try and dominate the areas according to respective perceptions of the LAC in Aksai China, often bringing them into conflict. The recent issue is of construction of roads leading to general areas to Karakorum Pass. The Indian government was taken by surprise when on May 5, 2020, Chinese Army (PLA) carried out well-planned and deftly-executed multi-pronged deep incursions (three to five kilometres) across north Sikkim and east Ladakh and not only occupied Indian territory but also audaciously built concrete defences on it.
There appears to have been a strategic shift in Chinese thinking after India abrogated Sections of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution last year and created the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is too big to fail as China has already staked its prestige in the enterprise which has been showcased as the flagship of the Beijing led Belt and Road Initiative. China’s genuine concerns over Aksai-Chin and the CPEC, which is routed in part through Gilgit-Baltistan, may have set the backdrop for the recent stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh. India has always claimed Aksai-Chin, but the issue appears to have been re-interpreted in China after the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was revoked.
China’s strategic pathway to the Indian Ocean, which passes through Gilgit- Baltistan, has emerged as an entirely new factor; reinforcing and clubbing the already strong security relationship between China and Pakistan. Pakistan has become exceptionally important to China as a part of the CPEC, which gives access to Gwadar Port and helps Beijing reduce its vulnerability to the Americans who dominate Malacca Strait the gateway to China’s international trade. Overriding Indian position, the Chinese have insisted that Aksai-Chin belongs to China; citing geo-strategic considerations. Aksai-Chin is the essential link between Xinjiang and Tibet, and China’s national highway 219 passes through this passage. Aksai-Chin is, therefore, central to China’s territorial unity and the one-China principle.
A mindset for looking at international and regional environments with a binocular specifically designed for political and military objectives in Kashmir for the last 70 years is contrary to the prevailing world order. Kashmir dispute does not figure out in Chinese strategic outlook, subsuming psychosocial environments, economic goals and military strategy, as that of to Pakistan. Kashmir has undoubtedly specific relevance for China but from a different perspective. Pakistan has endeavoured many times to put a particular perception into Chinese beliefs but was of no use. Kargil conflict of 1999 is the case in point. The prevailing international environment is not indicative of any kind of military conflict in the South Asian region in the estimative future. The conflict in Aksai Chin-Ladakh will gradually cool down with India as “giving in” for lack of economic and military potentials, and China managing it diplomatically. We suffered in Kargil in 1999, where we miscalculated the regional environment, especially of the Chinese response(s). Let us not pin much hope at the Aksai-Chin conflict, linking it with the Kashmir dispute.
The writer is a retired Pakistan Army Officer