Gen. Zia, like Bhutto, was another enigma. On the surface he was a deeply religious figure. But lurking behind that disarming smile and humility lay an intelligent, cunning, machiavellian person. Perhaps the brightest of our 4 military dictators, he was also the most devious who could lie with the straightest of faces and the confidence of a con man. Yet, as is true of enigmas, also a great patriot to whom we owe our nuclear capability. He outfoxed everybody. Bhutto, his own generals, politicians, his opponents, religious leaders, India, USA, and other foreign leaders and heads of state, till nature outfoxed him on 17 Aug, 1988. But he did commit the unpardonable and unconstitutional act of overthrowing a legitimately elected government, subsequently reneging on his promises to hold elections, using religion as a political tool which fissured and divided Pakistan, from which we still haven’t recovered. But it was his unholy act of launching perhaps the most corrupt family into politics, who subsequently destroyed our public sector institutions and bled the country dry with their loot and plunder, which lead to our elite capture. It was in that act of Nawaz Sharif’s appointment as Punjab’s Finance Minister by Zia in 1981 when Pakistan’s Elite Capture began in earnest. Despite the positive economic indicators during his administration and his part in the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan, his legacy will forever be viewed through the prism of his unconstitutional act, his attempt at making religion the centrepiece of his administration, his sponsorship of corrupt politicians and his legacy of a highly militarized, drug-infested violent Pakistan divided by sect and religion. So how did the Zia years impact Pakistan? In my opinion it gave rise to extremist right wing religious obscurantism, mass scale sectarian violence, militancy, killings and religious schisms. It gave rise to violent militant organizations like the Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Lashkar-e-Jhangivi and the massacre of minority Muslim sects. All ultimately leading to the Lal Mosque crisis of 2007, followed by near civil war and the very existence of our state as terrorism and the TTP, spawned from his seeds and his promotion of a specific theological brand, actively supported by petro dollars and Saudi Arabia, which hit our very soul. It was the prime cause behind the rise of a corrupt coterie of kleptocrats and plutocrats like Nawaz Sharif, Benazir and Asif Zardari. It gave rise to the near complete destruction of our civilian public sector institutions, the politicization of our judiciary, the police and the bureaucracy. And because of Bhutto’s hanging, a highly polarized anti army sentiment which prevails to this day, despite the institution’s tremendous sacrifices since 2004 in the war against terrorism. It gave rise to the elimination of strong, honest and principled politicians like Air Marshal Asghar Khan. If ever one searches for a common still elusive concept of “Pakistaniat”, one finds it in the military, even more so now, as tens of thousands are now part of this institution from Sind and Baluchistan One does wonder what would have happened had Zia not taken over. While once again venturing into the risky minefield of hypotheticals, one can hazard possible scenarios. Looking at where circumstances stood on 4th July, 1977, the evidence does point to fresh elections under either a Bhutto administration or a caretaker and the likelihood of a win by a coalition headed by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the likely next Prime Minister and likely a new Army Chief replacing Gen. Zia. Under this scenario it’s unlikely that we would have entered the Afghan War in the manner that we did. Unlikely that the country would have been awash with Saudi Arabian petrodollars promoting their particular brand of Islam. And definitely unlikely that the House of Sharif would have acquired the kind of political power they eventually did. But, alas, this is all conjecture! We got what we got and for this the entire responsibility, in my opinion, lies with Gen. Zia. It’s certainly tempting for many commentators to use our Martial Law interventions and blame the institution of the Army for all ills that have befallen our country. This is a half-truth! We do and must blame our military dictators for much of the mess that we are in, as much as we must hold responsible Governor General Ghulam Mohammed for the unconstitutional act of sacking PM Khawaja Nazimuddin and Chief Justice Munir’s terrible “Doctrine of Necessity” Judgement, for appointing Gen. Ayub to his cabinet in 1954, for Iskandar Mirza’s declaration of Martial Law in 1958 and Gen.Ayub’s takeover. And for the legitimacy provided to our military dictators by our Supreme Court, including ex CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry plus the vast majority of our politicians. Yet, the military as an institution must not and is not responsible. And here’s why. In fact it is this institution’s code of discipline which has saved this nation from consequences far more horrendous than those we currently face. Picture the consequences of several generals and their troops revolting against the takeovers by Gen. Ayub, Gen. Yahya, Gen Zia and Gen. Musharraf. Picture army units, brigades, divisions, corps, air force squadrons, naval flotillas mutinying against the Army Chief. Picture them fighting against each other in a civil war in pitched battles across the length and breadth of Pakistani cities, towns and villages. Picture this Armageddon like scenario for Pakistan and thank the institution for remaining united. This is their strength when they fall behind an errant Chief as he takes over. And therefore the institution must be viewed independently of the 4 Chiefs who took over. Blame the Chiefs, certainly but not the institution. And ironically, it is this 33 years of military rule which helped them escape the rot, destruction and havoc of their counterparts in the civilian public sector, wrecked by Bhutto, Benazir, Nawaz Sharif and Zardari. But sadly, it is this which has also greatly increased their influence well beyond their constitutional mandate as all other public sector institutions today lie on life support, incapable of performing their roles, leaving the military as the proverbial “last man standing”. In many ways, the ever elusive models of what we want in Pakistan are manifested in the military. Meritocracy in joining and promotions. Outstanding training. Its best and brightest are instructors in their training institutions. A culture of strong institutional processes and accountability and most importantly their ability to execute effectively. But today there is much evidence of progressive decay as well. More on this in a later commentary. Yet the military still is our poster child on egalitarianism. Irrespective of religious, sectarian, social, economic and political backgrounds, the officer-son of an NCO or a Sepoy, or a lowly citizen, is forever called “Sir” by the son of a Nawab or a Sardar or a moneyed businessperson, who happens to join the Military Academy six months later then the former. If ever one searches for a common still elusive concept of “Pakistaniat”, one finds it in the military, even more so now, as tens of thousands are now part of this institution from Sind and Baluchistan. Even a rigidly ideological personality like Gen. Zia flatly refused the Saudi request to not send Shia officers and troops to Saudi Arabia. At a later date I will exclusively address the issue of our military’s influence and possible remedies. So, Insha Allah, till next week for Part 5 – The Elite Capture takes hold. Haider Mehdi is a Geo political commentator / blogger on National and International affairs