As Pakistan was recovering from the scars inflicted by sectarianism and other forms of religious violence, the onset of COVID-19 has highlighted that it is as vulnerable to the radicalization as it was two decades ago. This piece identifies three areas where Pakistanis are susceptible to the menace of radicalization.
Owing to the pandemic, a country wide lockdown was imposed that restricted all congregational activities including payers in the mosques. That earned the ire of religious community and ulema, however, twenty-point SOPs were reached between government and religious scholars for the conduct of prayers in the mosques. In many cases prayer leaders (almost all Sunnis) have been arrested for defying government restrictions.
Pakistan is a Sunni majority country where Shias make almost 20 percent of the population. Since Iranian revolution and resultant geo-sectarianism, Pakistan has witnessed bloody sectarian strife where militant sectarian groups were involved in tit-for-tat assassinations.
Recently, the footage of Youm-e-Ali processions, apparently defying compulsory social distancing and other SOPs, amid coronavirus crisis has enraged Sunnis who had been aggrieved over the arrests and perceived ban on holding Traweeh and Jumma congregations.
The ongoing affair between Shia and Sunni is a perfect recipe for the mutual radicalization, where groups drive each other to the radicalization. One radical move by one is reciprocated by the other, followed by a more extreme response from the first and so on. Members of both groups feel they are being treated unjustly. In search of alternatives one group starts to express its adherence with its belief system vocally and to have a sway over other, and second group does the same.
After Youm-e-Ali mourning procession, Sunnis feel they are being treated unjustly, and result of whom can be seen in the form of Sunni group mobilization in the public sphere, exactly the way Shias did when government announced a ban on youm-e-Ali in the last week of April. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ group mobilization used a demonizing discourse against each other.
At the second stage, group cohesion is intensified under the aggressive leadership that provokes people with ideologically charged statements creating a cognitive convergence around the sectarian ideology.
Finally, antagonist identities are invoked by opting extreme positions. A point where radical expression of identities push people to the irrational acts of violence, generally, made to appear in defense of ideology.
The recent outburst of Arabs against the Islamophobia in India is self-evident that the argument of mutual identity formation holds solid grounds
However, Pakistan will have to pay the price of Iranian victories in the Middle East, as this will embolden Shia population in Pakistan the way Iranian revolution did in the past.
The second area that can drive Pakistanis into the fold of radicalization is Islamophobia and Pakistan obsession in Modi’s India, an epitome of how external environment precipitates internal transformation within a country or community. After COVID-19, Muslims are accused of waging ‘corona jihad’ against the Hindus in India. They are demonized as ‘human bombs’ and ‘super spreader’ of the pandemic, like Nazis did against Jews in the past. This is unsurprisingly consistent with Modi’s Hindutva vision that informs him to persecute Kashmiris and punish Pakistan.
Against the backdrop of this injustice and deprivation at the hands of RSS-BJP’s Hindu India, Indian Muslims and Kashmiris will invoke Islam to mobilize group identity along with their ideological brothers in Pakistan against the Hindu India. After in-group cohesion, aggressive leadership would persuade the audience to act for the common cause of the Muslims. Being ‘norm entrepreneurs’, leadership is expected to take hostile position against the Islamic adversary- Hindus. Finally, when the citizens are reduced to their ‘Hindu-ness’ and ‘Muslim-ness’ on radical ideological grounds, its expression in a charged environment always ignites violence between the involved entities.
The recent outburst of Arabs against the Islamophobia in India is self-evident that the argument of mutual identity formation holds solid grounds.
The third area has something to do with pan-Islamism, an ideology, often interpreted as a tool for the revival of lost glory of Muslims and Islam’s political expression that Muslims experienced under Ottoman Empire in recent past. Airing of Turkish drama ‘Ertugrul Ghazi’ on the behest of Premier Imran is set to arouse revivalist sentiments under the banner of global Ummah in the age of territorial nation-state. This sentiment is often exploited by global jihadi outfits like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) asking Muslims to rise against the former colonizers and present imperialists by ‘returning to Islam’, the only solution of the Muslim backwardness. Their return to Islam solution often land Muslims into Salafism-return to the ancestors, a rejectionist interpretation of Islam that has brought nothing, but death and destruction.
What Pakistanis need to know is that Erdogan is neither an Ottoman nor an Islamist. His apparent ‘Islamism’ is a modern nationalist project based on Turkish political history than of Islamism with transnational aspirations. It is a contest between ‘conservative Erdoganism versus secularist Kemalism’, however, the superficial conservatism of the former is equally nationalist as the later.
It is good to know, even with distorted versions, the glorious past to give a forward thrust to the collective conscious of the nation. But it should not come against ‘someone’ or ‘other’. I am afraid, Ertugrul would leave us with ‘Khilafat movement disappointment 2.O’, leaving behind an unfulfilled dream of Islamotopia and a society with inflamed anti-Western sentiment, an idea not less than scapegoatism.
The writer is a PhD candidate at National Defence University Islamabad