Erdogan, indeed, would like to topple the Assad regime and replace it with its own version, but that would seem unlikely with Moscow so committed to Damascus
The Arab Spring, which saw popular uprisings in some Arab countries like, for instance, in Egypt, starting early in the first decade of this century, were crushed and/or petered out to, more or less, restore the old decrepit order it was meant to overthrow. In Egypt, for instance, Hosni Mubarak was eventually replaced by another military dictator, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Only in Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started and successfully overthrew the country’s then dictator, a new political order emerged seeking to make a success of political democracy, which is still fragile.
Syria too was rocked by a popular uprising against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but it degenerated into a prolonged civil war, of sorts, where rebel militant groups of different ideological/religious fervour have, ever since, sought to overthrow the Assad regime. It is worth noting that Assad’s father had also brutally crushed a popular rebellion against his rule. Therefore, the barbarity of the Assad dynasty is nothing new, though its scale and ruthlessness now is much bigger.
Despite that it was not all working to Assad’s plans because this time the forces that arrayed against him seemed more committed and with popular fervour. But though most, if not all the rebel groups, were united on ousting the Assad regime, they weren’t united between themselves. There were al-Qaeda elements and other assorted militant rebel groups keen on creating and holding on to their enclaves, even fighting among themselves.
Syria too was rocked by a popular uprising against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but it degenerated into a prolonged civil war, of sorts, where rebel militant groups of different ideological/religious fervour have, ever since, sought to overthrow the Assad regime
Most of these groups had their foreign backers like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. US supported and backed the supposedly secular elements, aiming for a democratic alternative to the Assad regime, Islamic State forces and anti-regime Turkish-backed rebels.
In other words, varied militant groups and forces surrounded the Assad regime with political and military backing from powerful outside forces. That overstretched the regime’s military power to the point that it started to look very shaky. When the initially scattered elements of the Islamic State (IS) started to fuse together taking the shape of the now defunct Islamic caliphate, the Assad regime increasingly seemed on borrowed time.
The rise of IS tended to focus the US attention and resources much more on dealing with this bigger threat than going after the Assad regime. And to deal with this, the Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG) became the US’ main ally. With US weapons and air support and cover, the IS was defeated, and the Kurds virtually created an autonomous state running alongside the Turkish border.
That infuriated and alarmed Turkey, as Ankara regards the YPG as an extension of their own separatist Kurdish movement, which it regards as terrorists. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to deal with this alleged threat with great urgency.
At about the same time, President Trump seemed keen to withdraw/draw down US troops from Syria after the defeat of the IS, made possible with the ground forces of YPG in Syria. And he did withdraw US forces, though some were redeployed to guard the oil fields.
How far President Erdogan of Turkey managed to lean on Trump to ditch the Kurds is not quite clear, but the fact is that Erdogan regarded it as an important step forwardwhen Ankara was able to create a fairly deep security corridor into Syrian/Kurdish territory along its border. This has enabled Turkey to station Syrian rebels/refugees along the border as an advance force to contain/forestall any plans by Bashar al-Assad regime to recover its Kurdish region.
Having neutralised the US by abandoning the Kurds, Erdogan managed to persuade Russia to, more or less, underwrite the new arrangement by agreeing to joint patrols along the new security corridor, thus conceding control of the border region where Kurds had created an autonomous region.
Having tasted success, Erdogan is now keen to limit Assad regime’s designs to push out rebels from Idlib, some of them sponsored by and under Turkish protection. But Moscow is keen on the Assad regime completing its sway over much of Syria, which includes Idlib. One important reason is that without having effective control over much of Syria, the Assad regime will always be vulnerable to rebel (terrorists in Syrian and Russian terminology) incursions. Therefore, to secure the regime, Idlib would need to be brought under Damascus’ control.
However, Turkey wants to push the Assad regime as far away from Idlib and the surrounding region as is possible. Erdogan, indeed, would like to topple the Assad regime and replace it with its own version, but that would seem unlikely with Moscow so committed to Damascus. In the meantime, Turkey has sent its military and proxies to stop Assad’s regime’s advances.
Considering that Moscow is involved on behalf of Damascus and the Assad regime’s survival has depended on overall Russian support, at times it looks like it is developing into a military and geopolitical confrontation between Moscow and Ankara. Both were trying to limit the other’s ambitions through political dialogue, which is said to be still going on. In the meantime, people of Syria, particularly in Idlib, continue to be killed and sent to seek shelter hither and thither without much success. In other words, Syria is a mess and it doesn’t look like it is getting out of it.
The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia