The word deterrence is derived from the word ‘deter’ which means to stop, discourage someone from doing something by instilling doubt or fear of the consequences. Nuclear weapons are extreme weapons. A single nuclear bomb can destroy cities and bring unbearable loss in both human and financial terms. Nuclear weapons are, therefore, seen as the ultimate deterrence to stop a war, as their use brings unmatched misery not just to the country against which they may be used, but also its fallout can damage the fragile global environment. Atomic capability creates terror; in case of Pakistan and India, both overt nuclear powers have created a near-perfect balance of terror. Before the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, New Delhi was much stronger than Islamabad in terms of sheer national power. The balance of power was in India’s favour; however, Pakistan’s atomic tests tilted this balance, making New Delhi’s advantage irrelevant. It is important to analyse how deterrence is created? Is the mere possession of nuclear bombs enough for creating deterrence or are there other requirements? There are three important prerequisites of nuclear deterrence-and deterrence is not complete without fulfilling these requirements. The first requirement is communication. A state demonstrates to its opposing state that it has nuclear capability and wants the other side to respect its sovereignty and interests. A red line, if you will, which, if crossed by a rival, will bring unbearable retaliation. Atomic capability creates terror; in case of Pakistan and India, both overt nuclear powers have created a near-perfect balance of terror. Before the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, New Delhi was much stronger than Islamabad in terms of sheer national power Instilling fear and respect in the other side through communication is not enough, so the second requirement of deterrence is the display of capability. You have to display your strategic capability through which you want to deter your foe. Early on, the Indian side used to call Pakistan’s capability a “bluff”, especially after New Delhi’s tests of 13 May 1998. Thereafter, the tone of Indian leadership shifted somewhat and the heat was felt across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Pakistani counter tests, however, restrained New Delhi’s ambitions and things started to cool because only power respects power. It is pertinent to mention here that deterrence is not achieved with the first two requirements. A successful deterrence demands credibility. One cannot just blindly drop an atomic bomb on the enemy, as one needs capability to deliver nuclear weapons effectively. In order to give credibility to your capability a nation needs three crucial things. First thing first: strike capability which includes aircraft and bombers capable of delivering a nuclear payload, as well as missiles to hit enemy deep inside its territory to refuse any strategic depth. Second, restrike capability, so that if the enemy takes initiative, you have the capacity and capability to strike back with full force, making sure the enemy doesn’t dare to challenge and cross a red line. This ability comes with submarine-launched missiles and projectiles which are beyond enemy reach and knowledge. The third, and the most important requirement, is the fact that deterrence is not complete if there is no political will to climb the escalation ladder and to give a signal to the opposing side that it will be punished hard if a red line is crossed. In order to further drive home the point, it is important to analyse India’s so-called “surgical strikes” of September 2016 and the Balakot attack-which Indians like to call “surgical Strike II” of 2019. On September 18, 2016 Indian Army position in Uri cantonment was attacked by Kashmiri militants. This attack resulted in the killing of 19 Indian soldiers. The Indian Army’s morale took a hit, and, after Gurdaspur and Pathankot, it was trying to hide its failures by putting the blame on Pakistan. On September 19, Indian Army’s DG MO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh threatened Pakistan that “Indian Army reserved the right to respond at the time and place of our own choosing”. On September 29, Indian forces disclosed they raided an alleged militant launchpad across the LoC. The Indian side called this raid a “surgical strike”. The term surgical strike used for the alleged raid became a new sensation and resulted in a surge of nationalist passions across India-which helped Narendra Modi’s to exploit them in state elections. Indian leadership and armed forces were interpreting this raid as a new normal and Pakistan’s humbling at the hands of New Delhi. On October 2, 2016, DG ISPR Lt. Gen Asim Bajwa took journalists to the site where Indians allegedly raided. He briefed journalists on what had happened. DG ISPR dismissed the Indian claim as “absurd and baseless” and said “no such incident took place nor will we allow any such incident to happen in future.” It was now Pakistan’s turn. ISPR’s invitation to journalists to see the site for themselves made the Indian Army a laughing stock. Within India, people started criticising Modi’s fake surgical strikes. Then, on October 6, 2016, a Pakistani newspaper published a report filed by Cyril Almeida, accusing the security establishment of supporting militancy. The story eventually became known as Dawn leaks. Whether it was a planted story or genuine is another debate, but this story brought the focus of criticism on Pakistan Army and gave relief to the Indian leadership. It enforced New Delhi’s narrative against Islamabad, and damaged Pakistan Army and state’s repute internationally. During this whole fiasco one thing was noticeable. There was no political will to support the armed forces. The government was not supportive of its own forces because it believed the army was behind 2014 anti-government demonstrations spearheaded by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). This lack of political will and distrust between civil and military leadership, on one hand, caused international embarrassment; on the other hand, caused irreparable damage to civil-military relations. Fast-forward to 2019 and the scenario at the time of “surgical strike II” was different. This time there was a complete synchronization between the political and military leadership. That is why Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression of February 26, 2019 was quick and effective. Pakistan struck back within 24 hours after the Indian air strike on Balakot, which resulted in nothing more than eco-terrorism. On February 27, Pakistani planes struck Indian positions across the LoC. This skirmish resulted in an air battle in which the PAF shot down two Indian planes. A MIG-21 was shot down by PAF JF17 Thunder, which fell on the Pakistani side, whereas the other IAF SU 30 fell inside India. The Indian pilot Abhinandan Varthaman was arrested, but after two days returned as a gesture of Pakistan’s goodwill. On February 28, New Delhi again tried to threaten Pakistan. This time Indian Security Advisor Ajit Doval threatened to fire 6 missiles on Pakistani targets. Upon which, Pakistan responded by telling New Delhi that “if you will fire one missile, we will fire three. Whatever India will do, we will respond three times to that.” Pakistani boldness averted the threat of imminent war. It was the synchronization between political, diplomatic and military efforts that enabled Pakistan to achieve desired results. The political will of Imran Khan’s government to go to any extent gave Pakistani deterrence full credibility. Pakistan came out as a mature power in South Asia-a power that prefers peace over war but, if challenged, can go to any extent for its sovereignty and honour. Summing up political will is the most important requirement for completion of credible deterrence. The 2019 episode proves that good civil-military relations and a nationalist government with strong political will to defend a nation guarantees credibility to nuclear capability. If the political will is absent, then deterrence is sure to fail. The writer is a senior researcher at Indus News and holds Master’s degree in Diplomacy and Strategic Studies