The Kurds have brokered a deal with President Bashar al-Assad’sgovernment. That resulted in the Syrian Arab Army returning for the first time to the areas controlled by the Kurds that they left since the early days of the civil war. Regime forces entered the provinces of Hasakah and Raqqa. Assad’s forces also took over the symbolically important city of Kobane in the remote north-eastern countryside of Aleppo. There is a growing concern among the Kurdish people that Assad’s re-entry into north-eastern Syria signals the beginning of the end of the seven years of Kurdish autonomy in the area. The concern is not totally baseless as in the past Damascus had deprived thousands of Kurds of citizenship rights, banned their language and clamped down on their political activities. But manythings have changed in the Syrian political landscape since the start of the civil war in 2011. Kurds, even after facing immense pressure from Turkey, are now better armed and organised, and the Syrian government is also not that strong what it used to be before the civil war. In the post-war Syria, Assad and Kurds can peacefully coexist as there is much scope for mutual cooperation. Syria’s Baathist state and Kurds have broadly stayed out of each other’s way during the conflict despite occasional clashes. There was always a tacit understanding between President Assad and Kurds with regard to the administration of the region from which the Syrian army withdrew in 2012. For example, the state government employees serving in this region continued to receive salaries from Damascus, and the regime controls the airport in the Kurdish-dominated city of Qamishli and maintains some security centres in the city. This basic understanding can be used for future detailed negotiations. Though Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad has vowed to take back “every inch” of his country, he still lacks the forces to do it,and more than eight years of war has severally damaged the Syrian armed forces. If the battle-hardened Kurdish forces are integrated with the Syrian army it would be a great added advantage to Damascus. The Kurds need help from Assad’s forces to protect them from Turkey’s onslaught, and the Syrian Arab Army would find Kurds essential for ruling north Syria and policing against both rebels and ISIS’ attacks. Moreover, Assad and Kurds have one common enemy: Turkey. Kurds see Ankara as an existential threat, and Assad considers Turkey the biggest supporter of Syria’s armed opposition against him. Assad and Kurds can jointly stop Turkey’s expansionist policies in Northern Syria. A real understanding between the Kurds and the Syrian state would definitely worry Ankara. But to reach a certain understandingboth the parties have to accept the truth. For Kurds it is a hard reality that under the current circumstances they have Turkey standing on their head and they are left alone by their ally. They have to abandonthe demands for extensive autonomy within a decentralised federal state in Syria and the preservation of the Kurdish forces as an independent military force, as these demands will never be accepted by Damascus. On the other hand, President Assad also have to acknowledge that although he emerged as a victor in this conflict but stillhe can’t rule Syria with the authoritative mindset of the pre-war time. Kurds are not unreasonable in their demands. The two million Kurds in Syria, accounting for 10-15 percent of the total population, have only aspired, before the civil war, to nothing more than a degree of autonomy. It is an aspiration always denied to them. Syrian Kurds never thought of breaking away from the country. At least, some of their basic demands-culturalrights and some sort of autonomy for local governance-can be fulfilled by Damascus. Syria is a multiethnic society consisting of Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans, Alwaites and Yazidis. All of them have to realise that they have to rebuild Syria collectively to ensure their own wellbeing. To start with, theSyrian government and Kurds have to come together as the territory held by Assad and the Kurds accounts for most of Syria. It should be noted that in 2000s when President Erdogan of Turkey led his AKP party to victory in the general election and formed his first government, a deal was reached with the outlaw PKK. Some cultural rights were granted to Kurds; the Kurdish language began to be used in broadcasting, education and in print media. In return, the PKK also softened their demands for a separate state for Kurds. If Turkey and Kurds can come to some sort of a deal then why not Assad and Syrian Kurds. Only sincere and honest efforts are required from both sides. The author is a columnist for the Middle East and Af-Pak region and editor of geo-political news agency ViewsAround