The ideological foundation for the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group was to be found in non-proliferation of nuclear materials and the prevention of nuclear weapons build up. Unfortunately, the group has become a cartel of major powers. The West is supporting India’s inclusion into the NSG, hoping to benefit from trade with its large market. This raises questions about the credibility of the mechanism in terms of its non-proliferation agenda. The NSG was aimed at controlling the export of materials and technologies that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. The group currently has 48 participating governments. These include the US, Russia, Canada, France, Australia, and Kazakhstan, all major exporters of nuclear materials and technology. They are also India’s primary suppliers. The NSG aims at facilitating the export of nuclear materials and related technologies based on certain principles to ensure they are used for peaceful purposes. Both India and Pakistan have been seeking NSG membership since 2016. The NSG was aimed at controlling the export of materials and technologies that could be used to make nuclear bombs The prospects of their induction have been a major agenda of the recent NSG plenary meeting. It is worth noting here that entry into the NSG carries a certain set of pre-requisites. These include the capacity to supply the goods enumerated in the NSG guidelines; a demonstrated willingness to apply NSG guidelines; the existence and enforcement of a legally binding national export control regime in line with the NSG rules; membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or a similar regional treaty and a willingness to support international efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Certain other factors, including employing best practices related to nuclear safety and security, also play an important role. Based on these prerequisites, the NPT membership is a core requirement of the NSG. The NPT allows peaceful use of nuclear energy by its signatories while forbidding the buildup of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, as well as Israel and North Korea, are non-NPT nuclear weapon states. They are either recognized or widely suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. India is currently receiving support of the US and some other Western states for the NSG membership. China stands in opposition; pointing out that there is no precedent for inclusion of a non-NPT state During the 29th plenary meeting held on June 21 and June 22 in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, the primary agenda of the meeting was discussion on technical, legal and political issues regarding the entry of non-NPT members into the NSG. China has a clear stance on the matter. It says a clear plan should adopted by the NSG in this regard. It is expected it would likely block India’s entry into the NSG as the latter is unwilling to sign the NPT. The meeting failed to reach a consensus on the membership question. India’s membership of the NSG would likely impact the global non-proliferation regimes, which form the very basis of the NPT. The NSG would likely lose its credibility as there has been widespread criticism of it over creating a dichotomy of nuclear haves and have-nots. Pakistan, a non-NPT state, also deserves membership of the NSG based on experience, technical expertise, capability, clear division of civilian and military programmes and its commitment to nuclear safety. For now, the NSG has made no decision on new non-NPT members. As a major non-proliferation group, the NSG has been facing some critical issues. The Indo-US nuclear deal and the NSG’s nuclear exemptions awarded to India have become significant for the NSG itself in terms of its credibility. If India is granted membership of the NSG, it would likely change the nature of the NSG. A non-NPT state would be getting the membership, not based on a known criterion but on lobbying and extraction of favours from other influential members of the NSG including the US and Russia. This would likely pave the way for the NSG to move away from its own provisions. The NSG was established to manage nuclear exports and promote non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If India is made a member bypassing these criteria, the example would, become a test case for NSG governments. It would likely bring into question NSG’s commitment to working towards nuclear non-proliferation. The writer is a research associate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad