Pakistan faced immense challenges related to state formation and, in this respect, the country’s northwestern region, i.e. FATA, proved a herculean task. Indeed, the pro-Bacha Khan Pashtuns and their supporters in Afghanistan disapproved of the idea of a state being governed by the non-Pashtuns, i.e. Mohajirs and Punjabis. Moreover, the Pashtuns, by and large, have constructed a unique sense of racial identity where they tend to privilege themselves over other Pakistan based ethnicities particularly the Punjabis. Here, I would like to mention my years at Quaid-i-Azam University- that hosted students from all major ethnicities- where the Pashtuns, Sindhis, if not the Serakis, proudly not only distinguished themselves from each other but also constructed a ethno-racial discourse to prioritize their ‘self” above those of the Punjabis whom they viewed in antagonistic terms on account of their so-called control of the state. I then and even now argue whether it was the Punjabis who founded the state in 1947? Were Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan Punjabi? Was the first coup maker, General Ayub Khan, a Punjabi? Was General Musa Khan, C-in-C Gul Hasan, General Beg, Kakar, Pervez Musharraf, a Punjabi? Interestingly, General Zia-ul-Haq was a migrant (Punjabi) with a non-Punjab domicile. Moreover, are the Bhuttos and the Sharifs (local) Punjabis? Doesn’t the officer cadre of the Pakistani military have a proportionate number of non-Punjabis especially the Pashtuns? Didn’t the Pashtuns, especially the Afghan refugee, settled in the Punjab and excelled in various businesses? With minor exception, I did not get logical answers but ethnically charged rhetorical assertions couched in the politics of desocialization enacted in the non-Punjab provinces and regions Anyways, Afghanistan was the only state in Pakistan’s neighborhood that did not recognize Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state. Thus, Pakistan’s relations with that country remained tensed. Though the Taliban government was tactically recognized by Pakistan- and it was embraced in letter and spirit by most of the (Deobandi) Pashtuns- the latter failed to fully control it in the wake of the tragic attacks on the US in September 2001. Since then, Pakistan and Afghanistan are engaged in confrontational terms. In the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Pakistan, as a weaker state vis-à-vis the powerful USA, tactically reversed its policy on the Taliban whose split elements considered Pakistan as an enemy to be targeted with (suicide) terrorism In the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Pakistan, as a weaker state vis-à-vis the powerful USA, tactically reversed its policy on the Taliban whose split elements considered Pakistan as an enemy to be targeted with (suicide) terrorism. Thus, from 2003 till now, more than 30000 thousand civilian and security personnel have lost their lives in terrorist attacks. Here, one may sympathize with the view that Pakistan should not have participated in the GWOT and such a policy would have prevented the mentioned loss. Counterfactually, had this been the case, could one have guaranteed the US-led NATO forces wouldn’t attack the FATA, if not KP and Balochistan? Nonetheless, having been pressured by the US, Pakistan launched military operations in Swat and the FATA. Subsequently, the local Pashtun community got displaced. There is no denying the fact that the government failed to rehabilitee the internally displaced. Importantly, the latter could not fathom the unintended consequences of such a large-scale displacement. Contextually, it is the displacement of the local ‘self’ that, psychopolitically, otherized itself vis-à-vis the perceived Punjabi-dominated state. In plain language, the emergent Pashtun (formerly Mahsud) Tahafuz Movement (PTM), through its massive social media campaign and social activism, bracted the state with the Punjabis. For instance, the derogation of the (army) nomenclature was couched in Punjabi language, and culture. The PTM, since 2014, is formally doing agitation politics; its major demand include an end to military measures, i.e. army check posts, mines etc., release of the (Pashtun) ‘missing persons’, arrest and trail of ( a Punjabi) Rao Anwar, objective investigation into the kidnaping and murder of SP Tahir Dawar, a pro-PTM police officer, and the formation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Before the 2018 general election, the PTM staged a sit-in in Islamabad, urging the civil-military leadership to fulfill its ‘constitutional’ demands. However, the PTM could not get into the limelight. Indeed, it was assumed as a non-entity and the militablishment provided it with an enabling electoral environment to make to the parliament. The latter might have thought that, by so doing, the Movement would be tamed. However, after the election, the PTM continued with its maximalist approach whereas the government and the state (institutions) believed in a minimalist approach. Consequently, it led to further misgivings and mistrust between the two sides. The PTM then and now is belligerent in its media campaign and strategic outreach. In fact, it publicly called for regional, i.e./ Afghanistan, and international, i.e. the UN, support vis-à-vis the army. This might have sounded practical for the PTM supporters, but it was assumed in extremely anti-state terms within the state apparatuses. Subsequently, the other day, the DG ISPR in a press conference gave sort of an ultimatum to the PTM to mend its ways. However, any report to military means is most likely to aggravate the situation. The Movement only needs a few drops of the Pashtun blood to violently spread across the Pashtun dominated areas to other ‘aggrieved’ ethnicities such as the nationalist Sindhs. Therefore, to avoid such a scenario, it seems prudent on the part of the military to seek a social solution to its PTM ‘problem’. The former needs to engage with local social structures such as Jirga to reconcile with the PTM leadership. Moreover, there is need to take the Pashtun political parties such as the ANP and PkMAP into confidence to break the deadlock. In addition, Pashtun non-political elite in KP, Karachi and else is to be contacted meaningfully. Importantly, non-Pashtun ethnicities such as the Punjabis need to have a dialogue with the Pashtuns socially and politically. The entire process is time and energy consuming and, any attempt at short cut, will result into chaos. Last but not the least, both the PTM and the military need to tread a ‘middle’ path whereas the former abstains from its belligerent use of speech against the latter; and, the latter needs to establish a cordial communication mechanism with the PTM leadership in order to gradually win over its confidence so as to seek consensual solution to its demands. Any miscalculation on the part of the PTM or the state institutions, would result into immediate mayhem and gradually to a civil war in which the winner would be the one with more resources, better skills, sophisticated technology and the socio-moral support of the populace. The regional data, i.e. India, Sri Lanka, suggests that the nation-states, being an organized and strong entity, have prevailed in such cases. The writer is political and military analyst. He tweets @ejazbhatty