Fraying India-Pakistan ties threatened to rip apart at the seamson February 27 when Pakistani warplanes shot down an Indian Air Force jet that had crossed the Line of Control (LoC), thede-facto border, into Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
This unprecedented incursion to strike so-called “militant camps” run by Jaish-e-Mohammed, the allegedly Pakistan-based terror group sworn to liberate Kashmir,came days after at least 40 Indian soldiers were killedin a suicide attack in Indian-held Kashmir.
Both sides are claiming victory in the aftermath, but Pakistan clearly holds the higher ground after arresting an Indian pilot and then releasing him as a “peace gesture.”The long-running insurgency in Muslim-majority Kashmir hasturned bloodier after the Indian army killed a popular local militant in 2016.
Moreover, the Pulwama attack is the latest in a string targeting Indian military assets. New Delhi routinely accuses Pakistan of remote-controlling militants in Kashmir. Islamabad, meanwhile, counters India is fomenting unrest on its western border with Afghanistan using “asymmetrical warfare” – military jargon for sabotage, incitement and terrorism.
Barring the self-claimed “surgical strike” across the LoC in 2016, New Delhi has generally shied away from direct military engagements with Pakistan. There are reasons for this “strategic restraint.”
Having grown immensely in political and economic stature over the past decade, New Delhi sees itself as the senior statesman of South Asia, the equal of China, and a regional balancer that acts rationally.
This narrative has been greatly aided by Washington’s hard pivot away from Islamabad starting with the Barack Obama presidencyamid accusations the long-time US ally was double-crossing America in Afghanistan.
Which is why this abrupt break from playing the long-game is curious. It’s hard to see what tangible strategic objectives New Delhi achieved from sending warplanes into Pakistan.
Many political commentators in Pakistan are convinced India’s right-wing government led by hawkish Prime Minister Narendra Modi hatched the air strikesto galvanise hard-line Hindu conservatives for the national polls in May after shock losses in three key state assembly elections last December.
Without the backing of an Afghan nationalist government that historically has butted heads with Pakistan over the Durand Line dispute, New Delhi loses a crucial node in its asymmetrical warfare
Yet the rural voters who cost Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) those states have scant interest in war. They care about employment and economics, and on both counts the BJP-allied state governments have failed to deliver.
There is also the possibility that New Delhi is trying to rally public support for scrapping Article 35A of the constitution that allows the states of Jammu and Kashmir to independently define who constitutes a “permanent resident.”
Ifthe supreme court repeals this article, the government canaddfresh impetus tocalls forre-engineering Kashmir’s demo graphics under the pretence of national security. Ironically, China’s policy in Xinjiang was the source of New Delhi’s inspiration.
Are such periodic flareups par for the course on the subcontinent? Maybe. Hardline conservatives the world overwhip up war hysteria to deflect from their failings at home.
That said, itbehoves us to zoom out and look at the broader geopolitical picture from the lens of India’s foreign policy. And lately it has not been a rosy one.
First, in Afghanistan where India has invested billions in reconstruction and allegedly a sprawling spy network to stir unrest in Pakistan’s western provinces, recent developments point to an impending power-sharing agreement with the Taliban that could end the war in Afghanistan.
Naturally, Pakistan has been instrumentalincompelling the diverse patchwork of splinter groups that comprise the movement to negotiate with US representatives.
This tectonic shift in the status quo will put pro-Pakistan forces back in government, thereby threatening India’s growing political and economic footprint in Afghanistan. India cannot hope to match the deep ethno-linguistic ties Islamabad has with Afghan conservatives and clerics, and therein lies the problem.
Without the backing of anAfghan nationalist governmentthat historically has butted heads with Pakistan over the Durand Line dispute, New Delhi loses a crucial node in its asymmetrical warfare.
Next, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s whirlwind “charm offensive” to the East that began with a rousing welcome in Pakistan has also set India on the back foot.
Facing the wrath of Western governments after Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder in Turkey and the war in Yemen spiralling into a humanitarian catastrophe, the prince decided the kingdom needed to win back old friends and thus mending fences with Pakistan was paramount.
Cue billions of dollars in investment deals and a jump in approval ratings for Pakistan’s cash-strapped new government that was facing a massive liquidity crisis.
A few years ago, New Delhi had dreamed of driving a deep wedge in Pak-Saudi relations after Islamabad refused to contribute troops to the Yemen war. Modi himself toured the Gulf kingdoms to steer them away from the region’s reliance on Pakistani troops, proposing India’s could do a better job and without taking sides.
But perhaps the biggest setback to Modi’s ambitions for “shining” India has been US President Donald Trump’s reluctance to consider military solutions against Pakistan or indeed, China.
The Barack Obama presidency saw New Delhi sign a slew of military partnership and logistics agreements with Washington that angered Moscow, its erstwhile collective security partner.
Now, New Delhi’s dilemma with Washington is two-fold: While Obama saw India as a bulwark against Islamic terrorism and China’s hegemonic designs for Asia, Trump won’t walk the talk.
He does not want to commit troops regionally to counter Pakistan or China, nor will he allow India to act as its punitive proxy while providing cover in the UN Security Council. And with the recent developments in Afghanistan, New Delhi fears it is fast moving to the wrong side of a zero-sum game.
Perhaps the most regrettable outcome of this whole episode is it strengthens the hand of hawks in India and Pakistan.
If “national security” continues to dominate the national narrative on both sides with disputed Kashmir as its lightning rod, there will be no lasting peace between India and Pakistan. The military will always supersede elected prime ministers and the region will permanently stay on edge.There are no winners here.
The writer is an Ipoh-based independent journalist