With the impending of the month of November, the group of haughty countries is once again ready to exert their energies for behaving biasedly. The meeting of special group of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is expected in mid-November, 2018. This is an already scheduled activity of the group members for setting up an agenda and aiding the matters of the June’s NSG Plenary meeting. The induction of non-NPT states would be on the agenda once again. Besides, several other dynamics could be weighed out in this regard including the criteria issue, the evolving global nuclear order, the south Asian strategic stability; the regional strategic environment all would have an impact on the South Asia’s nuclear future mainly. Along with this, the P-5 state’s guarding behavior and the global nonproliferation norms would also be questioned directly. Admittedly, the recent Indian government of Narendra Modi has stepped-up efforts on its diplomatic fronts since the June 2018, NSG plenary meeting in Seoul, South Korea. It is working hard to secure its entry to the cartel of nuclear trade. Several bilateral meetings and interactions at senior level have been reported to be on record in this regard, which includes meetings and interaction with China at senior levels. It has been reported that Indian senior officials tried to convince Chinese officials to revisit their stance on the Indian membership bid. They held threadbare discussions in an attempt to narrow down differences over India’s aspirations to become an NSG member. However, analytically the situation has not changedmuch, as by large the Chinese position over India’s NSG bid is the same; a criteria based approached. On the other hand, Pakistan while submitting its application for the NSG membership outlined its credentials such as harmonisation of its export control lists with those of the international export control regimes, its efforts to ensure nuclear security and safety, and its adherence to NSG guidelines. Likewise, Pakistani Ambassador at Vienna stated that “seeking participation in the export control reflects Pakistan’s strong support for international efforts, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” The nuclear politics of twenty-first century is kept in an ambiguous state, deliberately. The induction of more members, especially the states that are not party to the NPTin to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) realm is believed to be the most notable concern of today. The utmost controversial — but of vital importance — is the membership quest of India and Pakistan in the NSG. It is an open surreptitious that the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, was the cause of the NSG formation. But it would be more surprising to notify here the revised NSG’s guidelines of 2013, hitherto did not mention India directly as its basis. This reveals that the membership goal is more of a political game rather than a need based initiative. The next, special group meeting of the NSG is likely to be held in the coming two days.It is paradoxically narrating the chances of any breakthrough on India’s entry into the elite group as slim. Since the revised NSG’s provisions talk about the criteria-based principles based on the unanimous consensus between the members, in the upcoming meeting, it would be challenging how the NSG could induct non-NPT states particularly possessing nuclear weapons into the NSG. They have never joined the NPT rather these states would like to be recognized; obtaining a formal nuclear legitimacy like the P-5 major nuclear weapons states before they could become part of the NPT There are certain criteria that could be followed, for instance, the NSG could follow its principles and allow only non-NPT states to become part of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) before they join the NSG respectively. However, this strict criterion may not be acceptable to India or Pakistan which are nuclear weapons states. They have never joined the NPT rather these states would like to be recognized; obtaining a formal nuclear legitimacy like the P-5 major nuclear weapons states before they could become part of the NPT. The other option is that NSG could relax the conditions through mutual consensus that are acceptable for both India and Pakistan. It is to be noted here that non-NPT members allowing both India and Pakistan in the NSG, is similar to them agreeing to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the IAEA. The IAEA has comprehensive safeguards without compromising on their nuclear weapons status. Conversely creating an exception for one state and not the other could jeopardise the credibility of the NSG globally, while directly affecting the strategic stability of South Asia in particular. The conclusion of relevant authorities on the matter will by next week, may affect global nuclear politics on a whole. The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute and can be contacted at email@example.com Published in Daily Times, November 13th 2018.