After three underground nuclear tests, there is little doubt left in the minds of nuclear scholars that North Korea has become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state. What makes the fact more alarming is that nuclear weapons have turned the country into one of the most vexing problem of the international community in the post-coldwar period. It is also partially true that Pyongyang faced external security threats from South Korea and the US during the cold-war era. However, prominent historians and international relations scholars believe that security threats were not the primary reason behind development of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent. Rather, the quest for regional prestige and bureaucratic politics created the conditions that favoured the nuclear option by encouraging extreme perceptions of national security. It would not be wrong to say that North Korea, a country of almost 25 million people, has emerged as a rogue nuclear state ruled by an insane, ruthless leader. The people of North Korea continue to obey an oppressive regime because they are caught in a web of misinformation and rumour spun by their paranoid leaders. North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong-un, widely known for his periodic madness, is definitely not the right person to have control of nuclear weapons in his hands. One reason the international community has remained unable to prevent North Korea from going down this dangerous path is Beijing’s failure to support the global community against North Korea. North Korea joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, under Soviet pressure, but did not allow safeguard inspections until 1992, raising many questions about its commitment to the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. Even after 1992, North Korea’s leaders were not ready to voluntarily give up their enrichment program because of China’s tacit support. In March 1993, Kim ll-sung, the supreme leader of the country, insinuated his country’s possible withdrawal from the NPT, setting the stage for the first North Korean nuclear crisis. Although, the crisis was resolved temporarily in October 1994 when the country signed an agreement — the Agreed Framework — with the United States, North Korea’s nuclear establishment was not ready to be transparent about its long-term nuclear ambitions. In addition to freezing key parts of North Korea’s nuclear programme, the agreement also permitted comprehensive inspections of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sites. In 2002, a welter of new evidence emerged that North Korea was still working on a secret uranium enrichment programme. In the beginning, North Korean officials resorted to outright denial in the face of compelling evidence but their confrontational posture ultimately led to the breakdown of the Agreed Framework. Despite intense diplomatic pressure, in 2003 North Korea became the first state to withdraw from the NPT and, after few weeks, the government expelled the IAEA inspectors. Increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula resulted in the launch of the Six Party Talks to end the nuclear crisis through negotiations involving China. This process marked a reversal of the Bush administration’s non-engagement policy. Other members were North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia, and Japan. However, Kim Jong-il was not ready to accept any step towards the verifiable denuclearisation of his country. Additionally, the process was hindered many times by North Korea’s repeated missile tests. And the talks reached a stalemate in 2006 when North Korea conducted first underground nuclear test and became the world’s ninth nuclear power. Despite dishonouring many previous commitments to dismantle its nuclear programme, North Korea made another commitment in February 2007 to shut down the key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for an aid package of $400 million and fuel oil shipment. After continued efforts by the international community, North Korea also became part of a formal agreement to disable all nuclear weapons facilities. The talks broke down, once again, in December 2008 following North Korea’s refusal to give IAEA inspectors unlimited access to suspected nuclear sites. In 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test and also began reprocessing spent fuel rods. Although Six Party Talks have not been held after 2009, different countries have held bilateral talks with the North Korean regime from time to time. Violating all international norms on nuclear proliferation, in May 2012, the government of North Korea even changed the constitution of the country to declare itself a “nuclear-armed state.” Furthermore, the country officially declared not to become part of any future dialogue on denuclearisation. In 2013, North Korea conducted its third underground nuclear test. While the country originally pursued a plutonium route to nuclear weapons capability, intelligence reports, over the past several years, indicate that North Korea’s nuclear establishment is using highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons purposes. While the first two tests were plutonium-fuelled, there is no reliable information available about whether plutonium or uranium was used in the 2013 test. In 2010, North Korea showed an unofficial US delegation of experts headed by Dr Siegfried Hecker, former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director, an operating uranium enrichment plant at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. But no one knows the exact number of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s possession. In assessing how many weapons a country can produce, experts generally use the IAEA standards of 25kg of HEU and 8kg of plutonium per weapon. The amount of fissile material required for one nuclear warhead also depends on the design of that particular weapon; and experts seem to have no idea about North Korean nuclear weapon designs. According to a 2007 unclassified intelligence report, prior to the 2006 nuclear test North Korea could have produced up to 50kg of plutonium. Such assessments of plutonium production are based on a number of factors including the power level of the reactors, their days of operation, and how much plutonium is lost in the production process. But questions about how Pyonyang has been able to develop specialised equipment for its uranium enrichment facility and factors shaping the future of nuclear North Korea still remain unanswered. The writer can be reached at rizwanasghar5@unm.edu