All wars, even those lasting decades, eventually end. Although few wars end as decisively as World War II, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers to the Allies was. The Korean War has not technically ended with a peace agreement or treaty.
By mid-1943, the U.S. began planning for the occupation of the enemy powers that ultimately produced the Marshall Plan and the rebuilding of Germany, Japan and Italy. The basis was not solely humanitarian. The Allies recognised that the treatment of Wilhelmine Germany at the Versailles Conference in 1919 had spawned the rise of Hitler and Naziism, and an autocratic and aggressive leadership in Tokyo and could not be left in power.
For a thought experiment, consider how the termination of the wars in Ukraine and Iran and the conflict over Taiwan might affect global politics, stability and the future. Obviously, it is impossible to predict with any certainty who the winners and losers will be. But logically, a conflict has three possible outcomes with various subsets.
The reality in this case, based on the history of how the wars in Vietnam, in Afghanistan against the British, Russians and Soviets and in Iraq’s most recent war against America, outcomes for the external aggressor were not favourable. Does history favour the home team today and tomorrow, as it has for the past 80 years, especially since the superior military power thus far has been unable to use that advantage to win?
Does history favour the home team today and tomorrow, as it has for the past 80 years, especially since the superior military power thus far has been unable to use that advantage to win?
Against that context, the first possible outcome is that one side or the other will emerge, if not the clear victor, the one who prevails. But even then, the result may be a subset in which the subsequent negotiation may or may not reflect that domination.
The second is that neither side is the winner, and an armistice, as in Korea, ends the actual fighting, leaving questions about what’s next. And third, the conflict just halts as both sides regroup and consider options. This very much reflects the current Arab-Israeli-Iranian conflict, which, like an active volcano, periodically erupts.
In Ukraine, both Kyiv and Moscow are taking huge losses in human and infrastructure. While Russian numerical losses have been far greater, it is four times larger than Ukraine in terms of people and size. As the ground war in Ukraine has been far more destructive physically, Ukraine’s drones and missile strikes deep into Russia are taking a toll.
Barring a radical change in leadership on both sides or Russia making good its threat to use nuclear weapons, it is hard to conceive a better outcome than a ceasefire, truce or some form of negotiation that leads to a halt in fighting. That, in turn, will be a situation similar to Korea, in which the West will be inclined to support Ukraine to prevent further Russian aggression.
It’s uncertain whether that will cause Russia to bide its time to rearm or increase its aggressive posture towards the West, but that will likely be the conventional conclusion by most Europeans. Within the Trump administration, America First policies would cause the White House to disengage further from NATO and Europe on the grounds that the European Union must defend itself – a very dangerous outcome.
Iran at this stage is too tough to call. President Trump could go to Tehran or meet with the young ayatollah, as he did with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. It is unlikely that he will persist in the war, given the huge economic winds being generated against him with rising oil, food and other prices. Hence, we could see another Korea-like settlement that would leave open the door for more questions.
Taiwan is the most interesting in one respect. Suppose at some stage the Kuomintang Party comes to power and agrees to some form of integration with China. Since U.S. foreign policy strategies are based on the defence of Taiwan, that would lead to the prospect of a fundamental reorientation. The question is toward what?
Of course, U.S. hardliners could assert, with Taiwan now absorbed, that China will be far more aggressive using its economic and military power to enhance its influence and replace the U.S. as the global leader and holder of the reserve currency. That would mean an even stronger military may be needed. Whether America’s Asian allies will agree is far from certain.
This analysis is imperfect, but the idea is that thinking must start now for what will eventually happen with these conflicts. The worst of all cases will be failing to anticipate those events, regardless of their outcomes.
The writer is a senior advisor at Washington, DC’s Atlantic Council and a published author. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.