Released in November, the document called the National Security Strategy of the United States (US) exudes significant aspects.
Regarding foreign, defence and intelligence policies, the document emphasises national interest. The document admits that, during the Cold War era (1946-1991), the past US governments had broadened the scope of national interest, leaving no space unattended and no issue unaddressed. Now onward, the scope of national security divorces the Cold War era and marries to the post-Cold War world, and hence narrows the scope to consider only core national security interests. It simply means that all those countries, including Pakistan, which used to see their relations with the US in the context of the Cold War, would stand disappointed. Pakistan will have to be responsible for its own security.
The document falls back upon the Declaration of Independence, laid down by America’s founders, and underlines the policy of predisposition to non-interventionism in the affairs of other nations. It is acknowledged that although “rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible, yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention,” as an expression of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The preferred policy would be non-intervention but with the possibility for a justified intervention, thereby meaning that the stream of intervention will continue, though at a limited, restricted level. This point indicates the economic strain that the US economy has been facing in running its foreign policy. Certainly, the drain caused by persistent military engagements in foreign lands, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, exhausted the US financially.
Reducing the scope of national security and following a predisposition for non-intervention (or justified intervention), the US foreign policy turns out to be transactional – and not longitudinal. This is bad news for Pakistan, which is a claimant of friendship with the US during the Cold War and which still longs for a long-term relationship with the US. The document makes it clear that the US will opt for transactional relationships, meeting the standards of national interests, which pertain only to core national security.
Reducing the scope of national security and following a predisposition for non-intervention (or justified intervention), the US foreign policy turns out to be transactional – and not longitudinal.
The revival of non-interventionism is bad news for Europe, which is grappling with the onslaught of Russia on Ukraine. Europe’s desire to make Ukraine join NATO stands frustrated. Moreover, the US’s declared strategy of only a justified intervention leaves Europe in the lurch. Instead, it is a signal to Russia and Ukraine that the US intends not to intervene in the affairs of Europe. Hence, Ukraine has come to terms with Russia. Another bad news for Europe is that the document speaks of fairness. The US is wary of its European allies, which spend less on their security, and expect more from the US, which now wants fairness in military alliances. The US wants its allies (European allies) to spend a larger percentage of their Gross Domestic Product on their own defence to “make up for the enormous imbalances accrued over decades of much greater spending by the United States”.
The document shows that the US has learnt from its post-Cold War military adventures, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The policy of regime change has cost the US substantially. The US is now promoting the policy of flexible realism to deal with other nations having histories and traditions different from those of the US. Submitting to the reality, assuming the role of a soft power, flexible realism speaks for not imposing democratic or other social change on the nations which consider these issues alien and external. At this point lies a relief for Afghanistan, which is bereft of a Western-style democracy. It simply means that the US would not impress upon Afghanistan to abide by the Doha accord to resort to elections and practice democracy in the country. Instead, the US preference is to “seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations” with the nations having socio-political trends different from those of the US. The same point also sighs relief to the Arab countries, having governing systems and societies different from those of the US. Instead, the US will focus on finding like-minded friends who uphold shared norms and who further the US interests. This is where the bad news is for those in Pakistan expecting that the Trump administration would interfere in the governance model Pakistan has adopted to deal with certain political parties sitting on the opposition benches. The Trump administration abhors the policy of regime change.
The document addresses China (without naming it) in two ways. First, the US asks for (reciprocal) fairness in trade relations. The US wants to be treated fairly, instead of continuing to sacrifice economically to earn the goodwill of other nations. “We will no longer tolerate, and can no longer afford, free-riding, trade imbalances, predatory economic practices, and other impositions on our nation’s historic goodwill that disadvantage our interests”. This simply means that, for any country, including China, the possibility of dumping its products in the US markets will shrink fast. Second, the US seeks to balance power in both regions and the world. One reason is that the US “rejects the ill-fated concept of global domination for itself”. Another reason is that the US “cannot allow any nation to become so dominant that it could threaten our interests”. The solution is that the US “will work with allies and partners to maintain global and regional balances of power [to secure joint interests] to prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries”. Perhaps, this is where India will find itself relevant.
The document shows the US’s focus on enhancing its intrinsic fortes such as innovating, developing advanced technologies, bolstering society’s cultural health, enhancing the capabilities of the army and having the strongest economy. The US considers that all these factors offer the kind of power (or deterrence) the US wants not only to achieve peace with its competitors but also to establish peace in the regions marred by conflicts.
The writer is a former diplomat and freelance columnist.