The history of Punjab has long been imbued with the culture of violence and militarism and this social setting persisted in the 19th century as well. For 800 years from 11th to 18th century, Punjab saw at least 70 invasions and the rise and fall of non-Punjabi rulers which left this frontier society of Indian Subcontinent restless and prone to violence. In wake of weakening of Mughal Empire and its eventual collapse Punjab galvanised into a ‘military fiscal state’ under its Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Ranjit Singh died in 1839 and his death was followed by leadership succession crisis in the Sikh empire which started disintegrating. The military became the major arbiter of Punjab’s politics and within few years, strength of Punjab force rose from 80,000 in 1839 to 123,000 in 1844. Militarisation coupled with internal strife in Punjab prompted British to intervene and after two successive military campaigns in 1845 and 1848, they completely defeated Sikhs and annexed Punjab with the Empire in 1849.British rule over Punjab ushered in the period of Pax-Britannica in which demilitarisation and paternalistic civil administration was supposed to pave the way for rapid and massive economic development in the newly annexed state of Punjab. New colonial masters of Punjab inherited remnants of 60,000 Sikh soldiers and demilitarisation of Punjab was conceived as the need of the hour to curtail chances of revolt against the Raj as memory of recent defeat was fresh in the minds of Sikhs. So the colonial administration backed by coercive force of Bengal Army initiated the process of demilitarisation. A decree was issued which banned possession of arms and gunpowder and violators of decree were threatened with heavy punishments. During the war Punjab was administered by the military bureaucracy and its tentacles reached to lowest levels of society and economy As many as 120,000 weapons were confiscated ranging from daggers to muskets. Around 50,000 soldiers were called in Lahore, paid off and disbanded. All military strongholds and establishment except the ones required to hold Punjab were dismantled. Owing to revolt by the Bengal Army in 1857, the British plan to demilitarise Punjab never really culminated and they had to re-militarise it. On May 10, The 11th and 20th Bengal Native Infantry Regiments and the 3rd Light Cavalry mutinied against Raj, murdered their European officers and moved towards Delhi which was captured by the sepoys of Meerut within 24 hours and Bahadur Shah Zafar II was proclaimed as the Emperor of Hindustan. Unlike Madras and Bombay Army, Bengal Army was very selective in their recruitments. High-caste Hindu Rajputs and Brahmins from northern India had established monopoly in Bengal Army. There were very few European soldiers in India and due to their numbers they were not seen as a viable option to counter revolt where raising regiments from Europe would have taken atleast six months and was not financially feasible. Punjabis didn’t sympathise with the Hindustani mutineers and sided with British during the revolt. Despite the official line, there was no illusion amongst the colonial administrators that Punjabis did this out of loyalty. Revolt paved way for re-enlistment of disbanded Sikh and Muslim Punjabi soldiers who were mainly lured by the opportunity to plunder wealth of Delhi, there was also a hope British will open Punjab as a recruiting ground and they would get a share in the largesse once the revolt was over. In post bellum Bengal Army, Punjabis became a large part. Punjabis and Purbiyas had a natural antagonism towards each other. Recruitment of Punjabis in the Bengal Army provided a convenient counterpoise to the Hindustani element of Bengal Army who before Mutiny of 1857 enjoyed monopoly. Roots of historical hostility were found in difference of religion, race and language and British preserved this antagonism by introducing localised recruitment and services of troops which not only provided physical segregation between classes but something else was on minds of British as well. Russian threat and the Indian Army It was erroneous to claim that the colonial Army was Punjabicised after the revolt, till 1875 out of 44,690 recruits of Bengal Army only 12,558 were Punjabis and only 4,525 Punjabis in Bombay Army (Hardly any Punjabi enlisted in the army of Madras Presidency). There was this uneasiness in the Empire hierarchy regarding the inclusion of Punjabis in the Imperial Army. British believed that just as easily as Punjabis sided with Raj during the revolt, once they form a monopoly within the army they were likely to forge a revolt themselves. So the Punjabi recruits were thus restricted to the limit deemed necessary and practicable by Punjab Committee. Up to 1885, the army was strictly maintained on the principle of internal security and protection of Raj. The views of Punjab Committee dominated the British decision making. However, by early 1880s a series of frontier troubles culminating on the Russian front led to the restructuring of the colonial army. Now it was to be redesigned to counter the internal and external security threats. The ban on recruitment of Punjabis was completely lifted which eventually paved the way for Punjab’s domination of the army. Although, Anglo-Russia Pact in 1907 waived off Russian threat from North Western frontiers of Indian Subcontinent. As a consequence of the pact, Russia accepted Britain’s influence in Afghanistan. It was agreed upon that neither country will interfere in Tibet. The pact further delineated spheres of influence in Persia. World War-I and Indian Army When the war broke out on July 28, 1914, no one speculated that India will be directly involved in what was considered a European war then, as it was physically segregated from the major battlefields. The government of India wrote to the Home Department that in case of war, India will not be able to contribute more than two divisions and any contribution beyond will put India’s internal security at risk. The civil and military administrations (only in Punjab) which at first worked independently were integrated in 1916 to form a formidable war machine aimed to provide gun fodder for the war. Despite censorship locals got to know the real horrors of war in Europe through letters of soldiers which created problems in the process of recruitment. During the final months of war there were isolated incidents of violent resistance against the recruitment. But British through local collaborators-landed gentry tribes, the aristocracy and men with local influence not only managed to persuade locals for recruitment in their respective areas of influence and that too without resistance. Dangling titles, land grants and patronage was what local collaborators got in return if they played their parts well and this was exactly what military administration wasn’t able to pull before the merger to stimulate a response from local population, only civil administration had powers to reward people in such a manner. Although the ‘Sword Arm of Raj’ came out relatively unscathed after the war but its political fabric got destroyed owing to the civil-military integration which persisted beyond the war. During the war Punjab was administered by the military bureaucracy and its tentacles reached to lowest levels of society and economy. Punjab government’s assumption of a military function and its intervention in the society on behalf marked the beginning of quasi-military state in the Punjab. This civil military integration (which became a characteristic of Punjabi society) and the Punjabicisation of the military during the colonial times was inherited by Pakistan in a rather acute form and the rest is history. The writer is a political activist and a researcher based in Lahore Published in Daily Times, November 6th 2017.