In an increasingly interconnected world, global partnerships and alliances play a pivotal role in shaping geopolitical dynamics. India, often touted as a rising economic power, has been courted by the U.S. as a strategic partner in recent years. However, the question that lingers is whether India can be deemed a reliable partner of the U.S. This opinion piece delves into the complex relationship between India and the U.S., examining various facets that contribute to the conclusion that India is an unreliable partner.
The U.S. believes that its global post-Cold War preeminence is being challenged by the rise of China and the renewed Russian desire to find a greater role in global politics. It also recognises that, unlike in the Cold War when its only major competitor was the former Soviet Union, the current geopolitical environment requires it to counter and deter both China and Russia simultaneously-especially in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war. Therefore, the U.S. is bolstering its nuclear weaponry and strengthening its alliance system worldwide. Among important U.S. allies, India is being considered a net security provider in the region. In 2009, the then U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, argued that the U.S. sees India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond. As a result, the defence and security partnership between the U.S. and India has steadily strengthened.
Despite the U.S. opening its technological gates and military hardware to India, New Delhi is playing a double game.
India was selected as the U.S. Major Defence Partner in 2016 and later, in 2018, was given Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier 1 status. This opened the gates for India to access a wide range of military and dual-use technologies regulated by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Furthermore, the Indo-U.S. security cooperation has resulted in four foundational agreements: the “Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),” the “Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA),” the “Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA),” and the “Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).” These agreements have enhanced India’s military situational awareness, preparedness, and ability to plan precision strikes. In January 2023, both countries inaugurated the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and in June 2023, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the U.S., a $2 million grant program under the U.S.-India Science and Technology Endowment Fund for the joint development and commercialisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies was launched.
Despite the U.S. opening its technological gates and military hardware to India, New Delhi is playing a double game. On one hand, it is gaining favours from the U.S. and other Western countries under the pretence of becoming a net security provider in the region; on the other hand, it is in close partnership with China and Russia, both U.S. opponents. Interestingly, despite portraying China as a threat, the bilateral annual trade between India and China is approximately $135 billion. Similarly, India is acquiring military equipment from Russia. In 2018, India signed a deal to purchase five S-400 air defence systems despite the threat of U.S. sanctions on countries for buying Russian military equipment. Out of the five S-400s, three have been delivered while the remaining two are in the pipeline. Interestingly, while being considered a strategic ally of the U.S. and the West, India has remained silent on the Russia-Ukraine war and avoided criticising Russia. New Delhi has also abstained from successive votes in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council that condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine, and thus far has refused to openly call out Russia as the instigator of the crisis. This Indian position should be considered a disappointment for the U.S. because it signals a sharp divergence between Washington and New Delhi on an issue that the former considers a threat to global order. This should be an eye-opener for the U.S. because India supports the U.S.-only in words-in opposing China’s position in the Asia-Pacific, while at the same time appearing tolerant of Russian moves in Europe. Furthermore, adding to U.S. frustrations, India is purchasing discounted oil from Russia despite U.S. pressure on countries not to do so. Recently, Indian imports of Russian oil have reached 1.8 million barrels per day. Western sanctions on Russia led to discounted oil prices, and in turn, India’s imports of Russian oil saw a dramatic rise, growing from less than 1 per cent of its total crude oil imports before the start of the Ukraine war to a staggering 40 per cent. India’s purchase of Russian oil and armaments helps Russia continue the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, artillery shells sold by India have been diverted by European customers (Italy and the Czech Republic) to Ukraine with the tacit understanding of New Delhi. This indicates that India is shrewdly playing on both sides of the fence, practically fueling the Russia-Ukraine war.
Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar in his book titled, “The Indian Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World” published in 2022, argues that the evolving collision between major powers generates a host of strategic challenges for India, but “developing the mindset to not only respond but actually leverage that [competition] is what could define the new India (Pg. 6). The book further states that, “this is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support” (Pg. 10).
This highlights that India is playing on all sides of the contemporary geostrategic equation and is not at all interested in becoming a U.S. ally in fulfilling the latter’s goals and ambitions. India is also a member of BRICS – which recently condemned U.S./Israeli strikes on Iran and criticized U.S. tariff policies – and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), both of which are viewed with concern by the U.S. Hence, New Delhi is using its relevance to the U.S. as a net security provider to fulfil its ambitions and interests. More threatening from the U.S. perspective is the development of long-range missiles by India, such as Agni V (5,000 – 8,000 km), Agni VI (8,000 – 12,000 km) and Surya (12,000 – 16,000 km) that can hit the U.S. as well. In international relations, capabilities matter because relations can change anytime; therefore, these nuclear missiles could be a threat to U.S. cities, which the U.S. must take into account. The bottom line is that India would be unwilling to jettison its self-interest for the sake of the U.S., as has been visible in its dealings with Russia and China. India knows that for the U.S., it is the only available option with economic and military clout to be a net security provider. India is using this leverage and taking steps that suit it despite knowing that it is contrary to U.S. interests. Therefore, it is in the interest of regional and global peace that the U.S. must realise its faulty strategy before it is too late. The U.S. should work towards creating a conducive environment in different regions of the world that promotes inclusiveness and dispute resolution instead of creating monsters. This will enhance the U.S. standing in different capitals of the world and help it maintain its global respect and influence.
The writer is a freelance columnist.