In a sensational piece for Foreign Affairs, Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, while underscoring emerging challenges for the United States (US) in the “New Nuclear Age,” dedicate a paragraph to make a striking mention about Pakistan. Citing the “US intelligence agencies”, the authors claim that Pakistan is developing an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that could reach the continental US.
This is not the first time that a claim about Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of ICBM capability has been made. In December 2024, the Biden administration’s Principal Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) Jon Finer made a similar claim by referring to Pakistan’s alleged testing of large-diameter rocket motors. Following Finer’s claim, I penned a piece arguing that “Pakistan has no rationale to develop long-range missiles that might threaten the US”. I outlined the following arguments to substantiate my thesis: Pakistan’s nuclear program remains exclusively and entirely India-centric, and Pakistan’s current missile ranges are sufficient to cover the entire Indian landmass.
India has huge fissile material stockpiles, a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, and above all, declared great power ambitions, which, by fundamental realist logic, make it a potential challenge to the US’s great power status and thus an adversary.
Pakistan’s pursuit of a large-diameter rocket motor is likely aimed at either increasing the payload of the existing missiles or the development of Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) for its space program. Under its policy of re-orientation to geo-economics, Pakistan is seeking more friends and partners, rather than posing a threat to a strong military might like the US, and adding to its adversaries. The US and Pakistan have a multifaceted partnership that spans the economy, military, counter-terrorism, and people-to-people ties, among others. Thus, it makes no sense for Pakistan to threaten and alienate a partner as important as the US. Despite its close ties with China, Pakistan is walking a fine line on the geo-strategic chessboard not to alienate the US, let alone pose a threat to the strongest of the great powers.
While the claim about Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of ICBMs has been addressed above, it is also important to examine the overall formulation presented by Narang and Vaddi. But before that, let’s discuss the background of the two authors, which is of relevance to the discussion. Both authors are accomplished scholars and have served in the Biden administration, which means that they should be well-informed about the debates and discussions in the US government circles. Importantly, both are of Indian descent and have a reputation for having definitive and quite strong (some might term those as “biased”) views about Pakistan, especially Narang. Hence, it might be appropriate to consider their views about Pakistan with a pinch of salt.
The claim by Narang and Vaddi is a restatement of what Finer outlined, but the overall formulation is different on some accounts:
Finer did not delve into the rationales for Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of long-range missiles, but Narang and Vaddi test the limits of conjecturing to speculate that Pakistan might be seeking to deter a “preventive” disarming strike from the US or to deter a US intervention on behalf of India in a future Pakistan-India conflict. Narang and Vaddi set a benchmark that “no country with ICBMs that can target the United States is considered a friend”.
The application of the word “preventive” appears to be paradoxical. The term “preventive” is generally used in scenarios where a state’s nuclear capability is in the development phase. Given that Pakistan has moved far ahead of the development phase, the “prevention” appears to have been erroneously applied here.
One alternative explanation might be that “prevention” applies to Pakistan’s alleged under-development of its ICBM capability. Still, Pakistan remains an established nuclear-armed state, and from the classic deterrence perspective, can the US attempt disarming strikes against another nuclear-armed state? In addition, why would the US attempt to disarm a state that is a long-standing partner in a range of fields, whose nuclear arsenal doesn’t in any way threaten the US, and remains entirely and exclusively focused on India? Most importantly, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been a source of stability in the region and has prevented major wars in South Asia-an obvious US interest in the region.
Furthermore, “prevention” by its very definition nullifies the argument of “seeking to deter”. How can a developing capability credibly deter, and if the capability has been acquired, how could it be eliminated by “preventive” strikes?
Hence, this formulation of rationales appears to be a gigantic stretch of imagination and well divorced from reality. Arguably, it is an endeavour aimed at coaxing the US to artificially develop a threat perception vis-a-vis Pakistan, which in reality has no sound basis—a definitive case of fearmongering!
The second rationale, i.e., the US intervening on behalf of India in an India-Pakistan conflict, is an amusing argument. Are the authors suggesting that in a future conflict, India might be getting thrashed by Pakistan so badly on the battlefield that the US has to intervene to save New Delhi’s skin? One wonders how proponents of “major power India”, “strategic autonomy,” and “self-reliant” in defence in New Delhi-who habitually display a hubris-laden and brazenly dismissive attitude towards Pakistan-would think of this possibility. Arguably, at this time, New Delhi and its “Godi media” mouthpieces are more focused on amplifying fearmongering and don’t grasp the flipside of the formulation.
The flimsy and unsound nature of the rationales for Pakistan’s alleged ICBM pursuit outlined by the two Indian-Americans suggests that even the US policy circles are unable to ascertain any solid and logical rationale for Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of ICBM. But still, there appears to be a conspicuous drive and desire to somehow portray Pakistan’s strategic capability as threatening to the US and thus pitch the two long-standing partners against each other.
Finally, yet importantly, the benchmark set by the authors that no country capable of targeting the US with ICBMs is considered a friend is applied selectively. France and the UK have missiles capable of reaching the US, and India never tried to veil its ICBM ambitions. While France and the UK are the formal allies of the US, India is not.
It is worth underscoring that India just does not have ICBM ambitions. The country has huge fissile material stockpiles, a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, and above all, declared great power ambitions, which, by fundamental realist logic, make it a potential challenge to the US’s great power status and thus an adversary. So, one wonders why the authors overlooked India’s growing capabilities and declared great power ambitions, as posing a nuclear challenge to the US. A paragraph or two on India would have only augmented the inclusivity of the work. The lopsided approach leading to a skewed argument devoid of any compelling evidence, however, might be understood against the backdrop of the descent of the two authors.
The writer is a Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute. He studies Global Affairs with a focus on Great Power Politics, Nuclear Policy, and Emerging Military Technologies.