In the current global environment, the credibility of media platforms has increasingly come under question. An example of this is U.S. President Trump’s remarks labelling CNN coverage as “fake news” of sensitive episodes, such as the B-2 bombing of Iran’s nuclear site. In a world of news, where headlines shape strategic perceptions faster than facts, a recent article raised eyebrows. The authors, once part of the Biden administration’s later phase, theorise that Pakistan is developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), presenting it as a new threat to the U.S. They offered no satellite imagery, no official flight test record, no Pakistani statement, and no credible third-party intelligence. It is therefore a speculative postulate.
According to the world’s leading think tanks, Pakistan’s longest-range missile, Shaheen-III, has a range of approx. 2,750 km. The additional range allows the Shaheen 3 to target the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, which is the sole reason for its development, according to General Khalid Kidwai, the former head of the Strategic Plans Division. There is no evidence that Pakistan has even tested or initiated a program for missiles beyond this range. No movement toward an ICBM-class capability has been observed in any open-source domain.
When strategic narratives are shaped by political motives, they endanger peace and do not preserve it.
Considering the logic that the article offered, “…no country with ICBMs aimed at the U.S. is considered a friend,” let us see what that is supposed to mean for India? India has tested the Agni-V, which ranges around 8,000 km, and is working on Agni-VI, which is designed to hit up to 12,000 km. India’s K-5 submarine-launched missile is also under development with an intercontinental range. So why such silence on India?
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is consistently India-centric. There is no military planning, and no posture toward threatening any other country, especially not the U.S. Pakistan has neither the intent nor the plans for such a project. It is a country deeply focused on regional deterrence for its survival, not for global provocation or prestige.
In the article, the authors’ claim seems more political than analytical. This is not the first time such narratives have been pushed. Jonathan Finer, Deputy National Security Advisor under the Biden administration, echoed the same line. These repeated messages do not come from fresh intelligence; they appear coordinated by a single source, possibly to justify India’s continued strategic exceptionalism. To fit India inside the Indo-Pacific architecture, Pakistan must be framed as the outsider, the instability factor to gain maximum privilege for doing nothing, and to create an illusion by the one “already having ICBMs.”
In contrast, strategies based on misleading information collapse when faced with facts. Pakistan is a major non-NATO Ally of the U.S. It partnered with Washington in Afghanistan for over a decade in the 1980s, and in the global war on terror for two decades since the beginning of the 21st century. The relationship has been tested and proven. Pakistan stood with the U.S. when it needed it most. Can any serious policymaker claim that Islamabad would now take the risk to develop an ICBM to target America? It makes no sense. Some say the U.S. intelligence community concluded this ICBM pursuit, but did not prove it. The claim itself shows how misinformation is being manufactured. If such an article appeared in an Indian outlet, perhaps it would make sense as a misleading strategic message, as India is known for doing it. On the contrary, if published on a platform they call “reputable,” yet offer no evidence, not even one hyperlink to a primary source, then it becomes a case of irresponsibility, not insight.
Furthermore, questions arise on the reasoning in the article, such as, “…Pakistan might be seeking to deter the United States from either trying to eliminate its arsenal in a preventive attack or intervening on India’s behalf in a future Indian-Pakistani conflict.” Why would the U.S. attack Pakistan for baseless claims by India, and to do so for a country (India) outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that refuses to accept universal norms on disarmament and non-proliferation? It is also ironic that India positions itself as the leader of the Global South while consistently contradicting the very democratic principles the U.S. claims to uphold: freedom, pluralism, and the rule of law.
Most importantly, New Delhi has built its nuclear program not for deterrence but for prestige. A strategic culture based on Hindutva that finds prestige in a bomb, i.e. a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). In this instance, Nobel Prize winners would grieve to see humanity reduced to such logic that to gain honour, one must build something capable of mass deaths.
Additionally, here are the real Indian concerns. First, India has missiles with ranges beyond Asia. It wants to hide the debate. Second, it also maintains inadequate safeguards over its nuclear infrastructure. There are documented cases of fissile material theft in India, with black market activities reported multiple times. Such activities are against the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. Thirdly, Pakistan has proved that India’s recent false flag attack in Pahalgam could not be attributed to Pakistan, as there was no evidence in this regard. Fourthly, during Indian aggression towards Pakistan, Pakistan Air Force defended its airspace by taking down half a dozen Indian modern fighter jets (made by Russia and France). To punish and diplomatically isolate Pakistan, India resorted to leveraging forums like the FATF and the SCO. These forums ruled out the Indian accusations. India avails every opportunity to act against Pakistan, but has consistently failed. Fifth, several Indian defence deals and arsenal are based on Russian weaponry, but military cooperation against China and Russia is with the U.S. So, what is the guarantee that the U.S. intel is not shared with Russian partners or Russian armaments are not presented to the U.S. partners for the sake of trust and loyalty. There is an element of doubt in India, not Pakistan. These are the chain of events for which India may be relevant to the U.S. ICBM threat.
It is easy to write essays, but it is harder to write the truth. When strategic narratives are shaped by political motives, they endanger peace and do not preserve it. Pakistan’s doctrine remains restrained, rational, and regionally bound. India’s military posture, in contrast, is expansive with variety of missiles (ICBMs), which are ideologically motivated (i.e. Hindutva), and increasingly unaccountable. Stability in South Asia will not come from rewarding exceptionalism. It will come from recognizing facts, ending double standards, and speaking honestly. Pakistan has nothing to hide. In this regard, false claims attributing to Pakistan’s missile program are not helpful in the achievement of strategic stability in the region.
The writer is a researcher at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad