Israel’s preemptive and decapitation strikes against Hezbollah, so far, seem a masterful operation. The campaign was initiated by disabling cyber-attacks against pagers and walkie-talkies that disrupted communications among thousands of Hezbollah personnel. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) then killed many of Hezbollah’s top leadership including 64-four-year-old Hassan Nasrallah, who had headed the organisation since 1992 and was responsible for countless deaths including Americans dating back to the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983. Air attacks also destroyed substantial numbers of Hezbollah rockets and weapons. Whether or not ground attacks will follow up remains to be seen. However, Israel cannot forget prior incursions into Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 that did not turn out well for the IDF. But the crucial question is whether Israel can turn this tactical success into a broader strategic and geopolitical victory. Too often initial domination of the battlefield has not had that effect. In Vietnam, it was argued that America never lost a battle. Yet, it lost the war. The initial assaults into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 routed the enemy. But years later, the Taliban still control Afghanistan and the US will soon be withdrawing all its forces from Iraq. Now, Israel must confront the “what next?” question regarding not only Lebanon and Hezbollah but Hamas and Gaza. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s popularity has dramatically risen over Israel’s actions towards Hezbollah. Israel was losing the public relations battle over Hamas and Gaza for one major reason. Not all Palestinians are Hamas and vice versa. Yet, so many Palestinians have become casualties and victims of war to rally support against Israel on humanitarian grounds. Hezbollah is not Hamas and does not exist on Israeli territory. Because Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation with perhaps the most powerful military capability of any non-governmental organisation, the majority of the civilised world opposes it and its actions. Israel is not hindered by these humanitarian considerations. And apparently using 2000 pound Mk-84 US manufactured bombs against underground Hezbollah bunkers had very little collateral damage. While similar precision may have applied to destroying Hamas underground tunnels, the impression of extensive collateral damage was created. What are Israel’s options? In terms of grand strategy, Israel could be pursuing the equivalent of a grand slam in bridge. By depriving Hezbollah of both leadership and military capacity with the threat of destroying more, Hezbollah could be forced to accept a negotiation in which it will withdraw substantially perhaps north of the Litani River but far enough removed so as not being able to target Israeli settlements with short range, anti-tank and other missiles not susceptible to interception. That would neutralise the so-called northern flank and give Israel time and space to consolidate its position. More importantly, Gaza and Hamas could be resolved. Perhaps an Arab or other “peacemaking force” could be brought to bear to control Gaza and limit the role and influence of Hamas. Here, imagination is vital to consider options to end the violence now that Hezbollah has been defanged and partially neutralised. But new opportunities are possible. Of course, this may be a bridge too far. Other players may not be interested in engaging in peacekeeping and the expense of rebuilding Gaza. Hezbollah may not be as badly hurt as it appears. Similarly, Hamas may not have been sufficiently reduced to prevent its recurrence and rejuvenation. Domestically in Israel, right wing extremists may demand further military action to disarm Hezbollah and Hamas that would escalate the role of the IDF turning this into an endless war. The argument would be to complete the job. Yet, completely destroying both terrorist organisations would require destruction of much of Gaza and southern Lebanon. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s popularity has dramatically risen over Israel’s actions towards Hezbollah. Netanyahu will try to use that popularity to cement his prime ministership after the criticism he took over Hamas. How that will affect a grand strategy is unclear. One would have thought that a major settlement that embraces all these parties would be to Netanyahu’s advantage. Whether the influence of the US, UN and other actors will have any impact remains to be seen. But the US should consider how a grand bargain might be put in place to achieve peace or reduce violence and retrieve those prisoners Hamas may still be holding. The opportunities are real. But will Israel exploit this tactical victory and convert it to strategic advantage? To do so, it must answer the “what next” question. The writer is a senior advisor at Washington, DC’s Atlantic Council and a published author.