With the unanimous approval of every party involved, the prime minister approved a revived along with re-energized national counterterrorism (CT) work through the official launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, symbolizing the national settlements to eradicate the terrorist activity and extremism from the country. There can be no question that the terrorist danger must be neutralized before it becomes stronger. It is a reality that following all prior military operations, insurgent actors have regrouped. Azm-e-Istehkam’s shortcomings must therefore be carefully examined if it is to be a success. However, the Kabul regime saw them as a comparable entity worthy of dialogue with the Islamabad policy pundits, citing their conversations with the US as a model. Pakistan’s approach towards the TTP or similar militant groups has been consistent, according to the same erroneous premise. The TTP does not fit the conditions for a popular insurgent movement that would warrant political involvement. Conversely, keeping in mind the Kabul assertion, the alleged insurgent, Noor Wali Mehsud, Ameer recently said that their ‘jihad’ against Pakistan had reached a “decisive stage.” He declared his determination to “liberate their lands and uphold the divine laws therein. Mehsud’s renewed confidence stems from the Afghan Taliban régime’s provision of a haven in Afghanistan land, as well as Al Qaeda’s commitment to mentoring the TTP in its terrorist operation in Pakistan. Pakistan must quickly review its strategy for dealing with the lethal it, which is more thorough, devoted, and battle-hardened than ever before. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should receive the highest priority when it comes to resource allocation for both Counter Terrorism and preventing violent extremism since it is the front-line province. Beijing’s concerns about the necessity of security in Pakistan appear to have had some influence on the new operation. But rather than explaining, this begs more questions. Large-scale activities began in 2008, in a different context. At the time, the TTP controlled the area, and operations were started to drive out the extremists and impose the “writ of the state” coupled with widespread population displacement. According to what little has been reported in the media thus far, the TTP has not been occupying areas in the same manner. Renowned Chinese war strategist, Sun Tzu emphasizes attacking the enemy’s strategy as the most important aspect of war preparation. As a result, Pakistan’s priority in beating the TTP is supposed to be to preemptively negate their predicted terrorist tactic. This is best accomplished by focusing our national reaction on the following basic elements: creating a setting in Pakistan helpful to a successful national counterterrorism work; an external dimension aimed at preventing the alleged groups from using Afghanistan as a haven, sustained, and working kinetic measures; and a comprehensive, well-resourced, non-kinetic strategy. It may be common sense to say that a struggling and weak nation will find it hard to counter a severe threat to its security. But unfortunately, that is how Pakistan looks. Social cohesion is at an all-time low, the economy is in terrible shape and only growing worse, and political division is unprecedented. All of this weakens one’s resolve and fighting skills against terrorism. Consequently, Pakistan must first put its own home to combat the deadly binding. This includes resolving political polarization, easing the economic hardships of the average citizen, and working toward the creation of a society with greater unity by establishing a government that the people trust and enhancing accountability, dedication to basic liberties, and the rule of law. Secondly, the exterior component is vital since the TTP and Al Qaeda’s haven in Afghanistan serve as their focal point. To impose restrictions on this haven for terrorist organizations, Islamabad must engage directly with the Kabul regime on a bilateral, regional, and international. A cautious strategy should be implemented on both sides to increase the Taliban’s incentive to limit the two terrorist organizations’ operations within their borders. It is important to emphasize that the terrorists’ resurgence in Afghanistan represents an issue for regional security. Islamabad may utilize the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) forum, which is tasked with implementing counterterrorism through the Region Anti-Terrorist Structure. Pakistan can use various international forums, such as the UN, to inform people throughout the world about the ramifications of Al Qaeda and TTP strongholds in Afghanistan for international security. It is important to note that, although the TTP and Al Qaeda benefit from having a sanctuary in Afghanistan, this is also a constraint because as part of the 2020 Doha Agreement, the Taliban promised not to allow their territory to be utilized for terrorist attacks against any other nation. Thus, one of the two groups’ main objectives would be to seize some land in Pakistan and declare they were not headquartered in Afghanistan. Our top aim should be to stop the TTP from taking over land in Pakistan, especially near the Afghan border, to undermine this tactic. Islamabad must examine why the armed forces efforts in ex-Fata and Swat, which effectively suppressed the TTP between 2014 and 2020, were unable to stop the group’s resurgence starting in 2021. The US pullout from Afghanistan in August 2021 was one of the factors. The other was our failure to recognize that, for military operations to be long-term and effective, they needed to be accompanied by the development of local law enforcement and other civilian departments’ capacity so that, eventually, when the military leaves or becomes less involved, the civilian departments would be prepared to take over. Consequently, increasing societal resilience to counter terrorist attacks is just as vital as strengthening governmental institutions’ capabilities to combat terrorism. Islamabad policymakers must keep in mind, how the Swat population compelled the TTP to retreat into Afghanistan in 2022. It is necessary to build and fortify the people’s resistance to violent extremism. The best way to do it is with non-kinetic methods. The UN has recommended a wide range of non-kinetic measures to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. However, in Pakistan, some extent improving governance, decreasing political marginalization, boosting socioeconomic opportunities, and dismantling social networks that support violent extremism need to be more focused. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should receive the highest priority when it comes to resource allocation for both Counter Terrorism and preventing violent extremism since it is the front-line province. Pakistan can benefit from global efforts such as the Radicalization Awareness Network of the European Union in this area. Islamabad needs to produce a plan that combines military and civilian actions to confront this growing threat. The National Action Plan requires revitalization and redoubled enforcement. Our security personnel must be skilled in asymmetric warfare, which includes gathering intelligence, fighting in urban areas, and identifying and neutralizing IEDs. A comprehensive approach to counterterrorism requires the support of well-trained and well-equipped police forces in addition to the military. Equally important is making sure that there is nowhere for militants and those who support them to hide. This entails close observation of madrassahs, educational institutions, and other locations where radicals might congregate. The writer is a freelance columnist.