General Kapoor’s musings

General Deepak Kapoor, the Indian army chief, is an interesting fellow. Most Indian chiefs of the army are usually professional soldiers, undoubtedly of a very high quality amongst their peers and given to playing their professional role with equanimity, confidence and quiet as per tradition of the Indian military chiefs. General Deepak Kapoor is different. He is very much a Pakistani general — given the fact that Pakistan in its short history of 62 years has had to contend with at least 32 years of military rule — though this is a huge generalisation. Perhaps it is time to bring in such exact differentiation so that the blame for the lost times is correctly placed.
Back to the Pakistani generals who, by design or default, have tended to play some role in the affairs of the government. Pakistani generals have also tended to be vocal unlike their Indian colleagues. This has a lot to do with the nature of the Pakistani state: insecure and apprehensive of a larger neighbour and its declared intent to restore the status quo ante partition, though there has been some respite of late when Mr Vajpayee chose to visit Lahore in 1999 and close the chapter on the pain of separation. Most other machinations continue to drive mutual animosity and a tradition of acrimony. Similarly, the security psychosis continues to dominate the discourse between the two countries, mostly beyond the pale of their real abilities to change the existing status quo. As a result the Pakistani generals need to reassure their countrymen every now and then of their ability, readiness and commitment to defend the country and its people at all cost. It has tended to grant them, the generals, an emphasised and a vocal role in the affairs of the state, to the extent of taking over the reins at various times.
My feeling is, and this of course is based on following General Kapoor closely since he assumed command, had he been a Pakistani army chief, he would have manipulated to foster himself as the head of the country a la General Musharraf. He carries the necessary genes for such proclivity. General Sundarji, the famous Indian army chief of the Brass Tacks fame in the 1980s was another such character. General Sundarji though had sufficient intellectual inclination to renew, refresh and possibly create — something extremely infrequent in most military cultures. But what is common between the two is a huge reservoir of ambition.
General Deepak Kapoor is certainly not media-shy; if that makes him media-savvy, I can’t say. Going by the response from Indian interlocutors at various forums, there certainly is some level of disconcert amongst the Indians as they exhibit a sense of bewildered amazement on hearing the general so frequently indulging in policy pronouncements. One thing is certain: his oft-appearing statements are unrealistic, professionally untenable and do not add to improving relations between the two countries, rather the opposite. General V P Malik, another former Indian army chief shares the fact in his book, titled Kargil, that he was required to explain before Mr Vajpayee, the then Indian premier, on more than one occasion why did the general make a couple of statements to the press without clearance by the government. Such is normally the control that Indian governments tend to retain over their services chiefs. How and why is General Kapoor escaping the dragnet leaves a few things unanswered.
On taking command of the Indian army, the general made himself widely available to the press corps and the electronic media. His initial few interviews were introductory, centring on views and general comments on morale and assessment of the army’s mission. His first real test came though immediately after ‘Mumbai 26/11’ when contemplating punitive surgical strikes against Pakistan it got reported that the army chief, General Kapoor, had hedged his readiness to indulge in any such adventurism. Most felt he was honest enough and realistic enough to render advice as per his professional judgment. He actually identified serious deficiencies of equipment and training that were needed before he could raise the level of war readiness of his force to a satisfactory level. The Indian government escalated the budgetary provisions by a record percentage as a consequence to be able to meet the critical deficiencies. The episode was a chastising experience for the general when scathing criticism amongst his countrymen for stating the obvious was the cost he had to pay. Since then, jingoism has entered his lexicon. More importantly, has there been time enough for him to spend those dollars, as he knows, they flow in slowly and exit even more slowly? Their effect is realised a long while later, perhaps a couple of tenures later. Or, are we playing chicken?
Just a couple of weeks back General Kapoor opined that a ‘limited’ war was possible under a nuclear overhang. The statement got morphed and misrepresented as if he had spoken of a ‘limited nuclear war’. The general knows better; there is no ‘limited’ nuclear war, and he never meant so anyway. But even to talk of a limited conventional war in a nuclear overhang is far beyond the scale of most magnificent hara-kiri in the Japanese tradition. One might just quote Kargil as one such example, but then you are placing a lot more trust in everyone else’s saner sense to stop moving along the escalatory ladder of conflict to stumble willy-nilly into the nuclear hellfire. We were saved in the Kargil episode because God wanted us to survive; next time the Lord may just have a different plan. The Indian strategic community will do well to shed the limited war notion. It is impractical, unsustainable and downright disastrous. Also, you can’t leave your life to the good sense of others.
In a recent statement, again to the press, the general thought it appropriate to share the conclusions of an in-house Indian military seminar where reportedly a new, or is it a revised, doctrine is suggested. Nothing wrong with that, except that the words tend to convey more belligerence than what they really are worth. Let’s put the elements of this revised doctrine into perspective: a capability to fight on two fronts is different than fighting simultaneously on two fronts. India is in a hole with the Chinese asserting themselves in Arunachal Pradesh, and quite obviously there is little that India has as an answer. Moving the troops back to the Chinese front from Kashmir, therefore, becomes essential. Already short on infantry, such large-scale deployment in Arunachal will need revised methodology to project force on the western border. Thus, a south-western command is formed for better articulation, and composite groups take over the responsibility instead of large deployed formations against Pakistan. An offensive orientation through use of air and artillery will hope to keep Pakistan defensively oriented, providing enough space for restructuring force deployments in the north and the north-east. The so called ‘cold start’ bogey begins to show its chinks, especially when there is little change in Pakistani deployments which tend to be located forward enough for an early response to any Indian offensive tact.
The rest, the need for ‘jointness’, technology, and plans against asymmetric and non-conventional warfare are universal truths and are applicable to all force structures. Strategic reach from Malacca to the Arabian Sea is an ambitious undertaking and will justify allocation of any amount of resources to the benefit of both the buyers and the sellers of related equipment.
So, what is new, general? It helps to relate to the basics, and those tell us that two nuclear powers have never gone to war. It greatly helps to avoid one. The second golden rule dictates: discretion is the better part of valour, even if one is under pressure to make amends for the original sin. The general was right in avoiding war post-Mumbai, and he will be always right in keeping away from another. Instincts hardly ever lie.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador