Perusing the statements of high officials and legislators in the US and Pakistan simultaneously, there is the inescapable feeling of a love affair gone sour. Not so long ago, US officials were carrying out a self-critique of past attitudes towards Pakistan, vowing to move forward from a purely transactional to a strategic relationship promising long term mutual benefits. How quickly things have changed. Starting with the ‘contributions’ of Raymond Davis and perambulating through the fiasco of the May 2 unilateral US raid that killed Osama bin Laden, taking in along the way the embarrassment and humiliation meted out to the military and intelligence services of Pakistan and their ‘infallible’ image in the Mehran base attack and the accusations regarding picking up CIA facilitators in the Osama raid and tipping off terrorist bomb makers, it is easy to conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in trust and confidence between the two sides, always a somewhat precarious and threatened species. While there are increasingly loud calls in the US Congress to cut off or curtail aid to Pakistan (the House of Representatives has just adopted a bill to withhold 75 percent of the $1.1 billion in the pipeline for Pakistan), reinforced by the American media and public opinion, the Obama administration and the Pentagon are still bending their backs to persuade the sceptics that the relationship, albeit difficult, is essential for the interests of both sides. Admiral Mullen is of the view that the Pakistani military (smarting from the recently inflicted wounds and humiliation) needs time and space to go through a period of “introspection”. Outgoing defence secretary Robert Gates too underlines the importance of the relationship with Pakistan, not only in the context of Pakistan’s crucial help during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also in terms of regional stability and Central Asia. What exactly does that mean? In terms of the ‘region’, we can surmise that Mr Gates is talking about the Gulf and peripheral regions. In the 1960s and 70s, Iran’s Shah had been anointed the ‘policeman of the Gulf’ on behalf of US and western interests. When his US-built-up army crumbled along with his regime in the 1979 revolution, the only other candidate available to fill the ensuing void was Pakistan with its half a million-man professional and battle-hardened army. If Saudi Arabia in years past needed this army’s help against its own home-grown religious jihadi extremists, many smaller states of the Gulf could make do with recruiting retied armed forces personnel from Pakistan for their security forces (Oman and recently Bahrain come to mind). A friendly and cooperative Pakistani army is therefore crucial to Washington’s aims to keep the Gulf from tipping over into chaos, thereby threatening the smooth flow of oil from what is still one of the world’s premier oil supplying regions. As far as Central Asia is concerned, it is the rising star of the 21st century’s energy supply scenario. Its vast and relatively untapped reserves of oil and gas could lubricate what will continue to be a fossil fuel based technology economy for the foreseeable future. Here, a contradictory picture emerges. Russia’s traditional hold in the region was weakened after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. After a period of turmoil and hardship in the transition from communism to capitalism, Russia is regaining its economic and military muscle and combining with China and other Central Asian countries in the SCO to ensure two things. One, to stop any further spillover of terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, and two, to pose an alternative to NATO as the security organisation for the Eurasian landmass. To this end, SCO is extending its membership incrementally to include observer countries such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka and even contemplating opening its doors to Ukraine and Belarus. Although SCO denies any ambition to evolve into a military alliance a la NATO, its increasing emphasis on economic and security cooperation amongst its members, present and future, could mean the weakening if not elimination in the future of any thoughts of Pax Americana dominating this vast region stretching from countries west of Russia to the Indian Ocean. Although SCO hopes the expected entry of Pakistan and India will also facilitate their mutual amity, the question of what will remain of the much touted strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan seems moot. Many in Pakistan would say good riddance. If there are alternative friends like China and the SCO available, why linger in the American or even western basket alone? Every state has the right to exercise options in its own best interests. The fly in the ointment though could be the souring relationship between the erstwhile ‘lovers’ provoking a breakdown in the negotiated political settlement in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, leading possibly to another 20-30 year civil war in that benighted country, with its inevitable fallout for neighbouring countries, the region, and the world at large.*