Is there another as fascinating thing as the spectacular free fall of Pak-US relations? None, I believe. And hence hours upon hours of airwaves are being used, in Pakistan at least, discussing the development. In the US, the print space and some important propositions before various committees of Congress keep the focus pervasive. The expected ‘strategic dialogue’ — a grand confabulation itself — has been postponed ‘indefinitely’, as indeed any hope for reimbursement of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), around $ 2 billion, of which the Pakistan government hoped to see $ 500 million added to the treasury before the end of the fiscal year to mitigate the deficit somewhat. Sadly, there is no such thing as a free lunch. But then these are the wages of misconception. The more voluble part of Congress, the House, is simply unable to comprehend how a nation that had promised to sell its services to the US can now renege on their contract. This is what was told to them of the relationship by their fellow interlocutors. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, are outraged at the transactional nature of the relationship. They are reminded of how an American judge thought that Pakistanis could sell their mothers for favours. They are told by their interlocutors that this time around it was a long-term sustainable strategic relationship where the US wished to reach out to the people of Pakistan and not limit itself to the principals only. Both sides misread the signs or read far too much into them. Both were misplaced in their expectations. I have said so ad nauseam: there cannot be a strategic relationship between two unequal partners, unless one of them happens to be Israel. Pakistan and the US have over the years related only transactionally; in 1954, when it needed Pakistan to act as a bulwark against eastward expansion of communism it filled Pakistan with an expansive Military Assistance Programme (MAP); in 1979 Pakistan was rewarded with the next major tranche of military equipment when the Soviet Union was to be kicked out of Afghanistan; and in 2001, 9/11 heralded a spate of cash inflows to keep Pakistan in good humour, as the most important non-NATO ally, for the services that Pakistan would render in the war against terror. Pakistan, aware of American shenanigans through the history of the relationship, has hedged at moments in favour of its interests, and more recently has refused to be driven by the US’s wish-list. When that happens you earn a superpower’s ire. It also brings to fore the basic fault-lines in a relationship construct, which had, till now, been couched in superficial niceties. Simpler enunciations of the deteriorating tenor of this relationship tend to be riddled with self-flagellating clichés expounding the need to be honest with each other. These incriminate Pakistan for duality rather than realising that at such moments of truth when Pakistan must face up to the endgame in Afghanistan, it is honesty of stated intent and interests that are irritating the US. Consider. The US has decided that for it the war in Afghanistan is over. It has reconfigured its mission to include: elimination of al Qaeda — worryingly reported on the Pakistan side of the Af-Pak theatre — through the use of a drone-CIA combine; training a sizeable Afghan National Army to take over responsibilities from NATO/ISAF; and, a political plank to reconcile and reintegrate the Afghan Taliban back into the political fold. As it leaves, and of that there should be no doubt now, with one third of the total troops back home by the time Obama is up for re-election, leaving very little behind for any sustained offensive action, it must want someone to take the slack in active war-fighting — the real fight. It will do drones and some CIA special ops, but it would like a meaningful ground offensive against its nemesis, the Haqqani network, especially when it claims, for effect more than reality, that the remaining al Qaeda, 50-75, are embedded with the Haqqani forces. That is when it hopes Pakistan would put its hand up. Pakistan, ever reluctant, under the stress of a strained state and a fractious society, considers it an unnecessary stretch, which is ill timed and runs counter to the state of its long-term health. There are, though, elements of convergence in this arrangement. Pakistan should have no trouble seeing-off the al Qaeda remnants — a common enemy — and for that both sides should harness intelligence and quick reaction forces to bring it into effect. If that is achieved, and it will take some doing because locating such a small number over a large spread itself is the main mission, the Haqqani network and other affiliates would be left only with their unadulterated organisational objectives without the overarching al Qaeda influence. If the Haqqanis wish to recover Afghanistan from the American stranglehold, the Americans, by their own design, are letting that happen by moving out. If they wish to seek a voice in running Afghan affairs, they are being permitted the window of negotiated arrangements for that to materialise. For Pakistan what will work best is to see the eviction of all foreign elements, al Qaeda or Afghan Taliban. What it will leave behind is Pakistan’s own genre, and each will need to be handled in what suits best to each, without the popular or opportunist incrimination that Pakistan fights someone else’s war. Let the politico-military combine then decide whether Pakistan’s long-term health and stability is more strategic or the preservation of misplaced assets. I retain a stronger hope in the rationality of such leadership. Why should it be too difficult to explain to the US or for them to understand? The absence of a foreign minister makes the proposition arduous. The CIA-ISI tangle has further complicated perceptions. These can be worked through. What is needed is sustained contact, not standoffish arrogance. We must keep in mind that the US continues to be a factor in the region and for Pakistan, as long as even one soldier remains in Afghanistan. It will also remain the dominant world power for decades even when China overhauls the US economy. The strength of its research, free flow of ideas and spirit of inquiry, and its innovation translated as technology will be enough to offset any design to replace it from its pole position. The world, and Pakistan, will do well to heed. We need to avoid closing our options. Where convergences exist, we must work towards effecting joint attainment. Where divergence is unbridgeable, we can seek a way out by reconstructing the paradigm. As long as we are realistic with our expectations and honest in our efforts, we might just make the landing soft from this free fall. That will give us the opportunity to await the next transaction. The writer is a political and defence analyst