“Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to devise a strategy to combat cross-border terrorism in each other’s countries.” While this may be an appropriate thing to say after a meeting between Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir and Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad Umer Daudzai in Islamabad, the ground realities hardly support this aspiration. How can cross-border terrorism come to an end when Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban and provides them shelter on its soil? It is these Afghan networks that have been consistently carrying out attacks against foreign and Afghan troops across the border in Afghanistan from their safe havens in Pakistan. The Afghan security forces, on the other hand, have little or no control over the border areas, which, after the retreat of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops led by the US to well-guarded military bases, have been converted into a virtual no-man’s land, from where attacks are increasingly launched into Pakistan. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has found save havens in these areas, inducing a process of reverse osmosis, i.e. attacking Pakistan that once exported jihadis to all its neighbours. These ground realities make these high-sounding vows sound completely hollow. No measure can prove effective in the obtaining circumstances and end cross-border attacks, which have assumed a disturbingly high frequency in recent weeks. Even as the foreign secretary and Afghan foreign minister were holding talks in Islamabad, mortars were fired from Afghanistan into North Waziristan Agency, which injured four children. In Bajaur Agency, some 300 militants crossing over from Afghanistan attacked a check post, leading to the death of a soldier and injury to another. This was the sixth such attack in a month. On the other hand, the Afghan foreign ministry has alleged that rockets were fired from Pakistan into Afghan province Kunar, which caused deaths and injuries to civilians. This situation is the result of a basic contradiction at the heart of Pakistan’s security policy that purports to support the ‘good’ Taliban and prosecute the ‘bad’ Taliban, disregarding the nexus between the two. Deeply entrenched on both sides of the border, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Taliban protect and support each other. Therefore, not only Afghanistan, but also Pakistan is under massive attack. In this context, it is doubtful if Pakistan will be able to achieve its policy objectives in Afghanistan after the US troops withdrawal for which it has nurtured and protected the jihadi proxies, who are now running amok. These objectives, central being the holy grail of ‘strategic depth’, have become all the more difficult since the US is becoming impatient with Pakistan for fooling it through double games all the years of its presence in Afghanistan. Not only has the US Congress pulled shut the purse strings and stopped a substantial amount of funding to Pakistan, President Obama has vowed to use all resources to eliminate militants in surgical strikes, be it through drones or killing of high profile targets through raids like that carried out in Abbottabad to eliminate Osama bin Laden. The US is shifting from counter-insurgency, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of people in addition to conducting military operations through boots on the ground, to counter-terrorism, eliminating terrorists through sophisticated military technology and means, without committing substantial ground forces. The Americans are also reported to be talking directly to the Taliban, neatly bypassing Pakistan, due to their deep suspicions and mistrust of Pakistan’s intentions, a development that should weigh heavily on the calculations of the architects of our security policy. Pakistan’s dual policy towards the Taliban can unravel the whole game plan for which Pakistan exposed its land and people to grave risks, whose diminishing returns and serious damage are becoming apparent now.*