When it seems Pak-US relations cannot get worse, they do. This past week, the New York Times, perhaps coaxed by the White House or CIA, held the Pakistan Army and the ISI responsible for the murder of a journalist and called for the resignation of the ISI Director General (DG). Over the weekend, it followed up with a story of how the US and Pakistan were engaged in mutual retaliation cutting off or limiting military aid, access and support. Unfortunately, the stories reflected growing hostility often called the “trust deficit”, which is now a chasm larger than the US’s Grand Canyon. For the good of both states, these relations must be put back on track. But can they? Or have the political, strategic, cultural, social and psychological differences become so great that the only outcome will be a cooling off period permitting the scar tissue to heal? Tragically, both sides understand the critical importance of maintaining close, amicable and good relations. Yet, that agreed on goal may not be achievable. For Pakistanis, grievances with and against the US are well known. The US’s on again, off again relations hurt. Differences on strategic approaches to Afghanistan and indeed with Pakistan’s existential threats at home have torn the relationship. The Raymond Davis affair at the start of this year created serious new wounds. And the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May in Abbottabad almost in sight of Pakistan’s West Point both angered and hugely embarrassed the army and the public. Meanwhile, drone attacks to hunt down al Qaeda and other enemies inside Pakistan infuriate the public and provide huge propaganda value to anti-American clerics and radicals. Sadly, the US has an equally robust list of grievances against Pakistan. Corruption, incompetence and seeming unwillingness on the part of Pakistan to take on mutual enemies are repeated criticisms coming from Washington. The CIA views the ISI as part competitor and perhaps adversary. And senior American leaders resent being lied to over information that they know is accurate particularly regarding terrorists, including denials by Pakistan officials on intelligence that Americans see as unimpeachable. The net result is a building wave of anti-Pakistani feeling, particularly in Congress where the number of supporters of Pakistan could be as low as single figures. If one could step back and review in giant steps Pakistan’s history, the difficulties and challenges confronting the nation are put in better and far bleaker perspective. In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan’s economy was the model for the region, with impressive annual growth. Pakistan was a largely secular state in which religious radicalism was latent. A series of civilian and military rulers changed that happy picture. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto nationalised the economy, ultimately choking off future prosperity while injecting a larger degree of religious sectarianism. General Ziaul Haq pushed the country towards religious radicalism first by supporting the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan, creating and supporting the Taliban and mujahideen movements. And then by radicalising and expanding the influence of madrassas. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) that were linked to Kashmiri extremists and designed to attack India as an offset to Indian military superiority flourished. After the US abandoned Pakistan following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 and then imposed further sanctions to impede Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, General Pervez Musharraf became swept up in the post-September 11 engagement in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban. Unfortunately, Musharraf could not check the excesses and negative conditions that had developed from past leadership actions. And the US ignored Afghanistan to focus on Iraq and the invasion in March 2003. The result is that the US has become war-weary and drained by a decade of conflict and expense. It is further frustrated by what it seen as an absence of cooperation by Pakistan given the money it has provided and its designation of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. That frustration is turning or has turned to anger and resentment. Pakistan rightly compares the tens of billions it has received over the past decade with the many hundreds of billions if not trillion dollars the US has poured into Iraq and Afghanistan and considers itself a poor cousin. It is distrustful of further, long-term US commitment to the region. And as the US draws down in Afghanistan, further attacks against insurgents inside Pakistan are assumed as certain to increase. And Pakistan’s economy along with 80 million youth with no jobs or future deteriorates. Pakistan is at a decisive and critical juncture. If its leaders cannot respond afresh to the existential political and economic threats it faces, the result will be tragedy for Pakistan and tragedy for the US. For better or worse, the choice is Pakistan’s and no one else’s. The writer is Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business, and Senior Advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council