Pakistan has frustrated the US’s
efforts to secure a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Pakistan’s position on fissile material arises out of its concern for Indian fissile material ‘stockpiles’ and credible minimum nuclear deterrence. Credible minimum nuclear deterrence is the stated nuclear policy of India as well as Pakistan — inherently contradictory and ambiguous.
Stalling the FMCT at the CD is a right Pakistan exercises, supported by several states including China. It does not bring the international or regional strategic issues any closer to an honest appraisal. Maybe after our foreign minister’s ‘bombshell’ visit to India, it is time for both states to re-examine these issues.
Both India and Pakistan have not yet completed what might be described as reliable second-strike capabilities, despite wanting to do so. The lack of associated second-strike capabilities undermines the prospect of arms control in South Asia. Moreover, even if second-strike capabilities were in place, there are a number of factors in the Indo-Pakistani context that are likely to prevent any serious arms control talks between the two countries, including six decades of animosity and distrust, existing territorial disputes and India’s standing as an emerging global power.
Stability is at the heart of nuclear deterrence and one of the ways in which this stability can be compromised is by the development of superior capabilities on one side through a process of vertical proliferation. A nuclear balance is achieved when “the attacked side can reply to the aggressor in kind and thus deter the attack from the outset”. The implication is that both sides should have a sound second-strike capability that is apparent and which deters the other from initiating a nuclear strike, thereby creating a stable nuclear deterrence relationship.
The concept of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, which both India and Pakistan have declared to be their optimum nuclear ambition, lacks a clear consensus in terms of both definition and implications even in the literature from the previous nuclear age(s). Buzan defined minimum deterrence as “a secure second-strike force of sufficient size to make threats of assured destruction credible”. Bundy, reflecting on the Cuban missile crisis, made the case that, “even if one Soviet weapon landed on an American target, we would all be losers”. Lebow and Stein argue that, “too much deterrence…can fuel an arms race that makes both sides less rather than more secure and provoke the aggression that it is designed to prevent”. Baylis supports the case for minimum deterrence and argues that such a situation is “finite”. However, along with the Indian government, many Indian analysts such as Thakur dismiss minimum deterrence and argue instead that the history and logic of nuclear weapons shows little respect for minimalists.
Although the South Asian situation is different from the nuclear standoff in the Cold War, there is no consensus within India or Pakistan or between the two countries on what the concept of credible minimum deterrence actually constitutes. Pakistan needs to maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrence against a larger country, India, whose nuclear capabilities are expanding at a much faster rate than its own. For its part, India needs to maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrence against Pakistan and China, and may eventually seek to maintain an arsenal somewhat at par with ‘senior’ nuclear states in tandem with its emerging status as a global power.
While Pakistan does not aim to indulge in a nuclear arms race with India, it cannot be argued that there is no quantitative arms race between the two states because the numbers of warheads and the quantity of fissile material is growing on both sides — in line with their respective calculations vis-à-vis minimum credible nuclear deterrence. The nuclear arms race in South Asia is not purely a quantitative matter; it encompasses a qualitative dimension where the nuclear weapons and delivery systems on both sides are improving in quality as well.
Indeed, the qualitative aspect may arguably be more dangerous for strategic stability. For example, weapons that are particularly suited for second-strike retaliation contribute to stability because they merely contribute to invulnerability through such measures as the hardening of missile sites, the improvement of early warning devices, the development of submarine based systems, and the perfection of solid-fuel to enable rapid missile launch. Of course, the specific context in which technical advancements are made will also contribute to whether stability is strengthened or undermined.
Pakistani analysts have pointed out that to maintain a credible and minimum nuclear deterrent, Islamabad will have to keep pace with technological advances, and “intercepting hostile aircraft and missiles must also be taken into consideration when determining how many weapons could be expected to penetrate the enemy’s air space (and) minimum deterrence, therefore, cannot remain static”.
In January 1999, US Ambassador to India, Richard Celeste asked the Indians, “How many warheads does India need to have a minimum nuclear deterrent?” The next month, in February, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot pointed out to the Indians that “the two adjectives, credible and minimum, need to be reconciled. It needs to be credible in order to deter. But it needs to be minimum in order not to provoke a devastating and expensive arms race”. This was before 9/11.
Along with other major changes, the US has abrogated the ABM treaty and signed nuclear deals with India. It remains to be seen how credible minimum nuclear deterrence will be re-negotiated between India and Pakistan in the new nuclear order. The ‘forum’ of the CD will be an important one, and as the US has seen already, scuttling the main forum for sub-forums to garner support for forcing the FMCT through without addressing key issues will be infested with problems. NPT may have been the last of the nuclear treaties that accepts and acquiesces in nuclear superiority legally.
(To be continued)
The author is a Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She can be reached at [email protected]