Ordinarily the answer to the above question should be obvious enough. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the answer in the case of Pakistan is wrapped in a mystery. Let us first see what appearances tell us. We have a body of men and women called the government. It is supposed to govern us. It is composed of the president, prime minister and his cabinet, the two houses of parliament, secretaries administering its various departments, and the judiciary. Until about a couple of hundred years ago the function of a government was limited to making and enforcing laws, maintaining public tranquillity, and operating a system of adjudication. At the level of municipalities it also had charge of sanitation, maintenance of public buildings and roads in good repair, and water supply. In more recent times it has been made responsible for delivering a variety of services, namely education, healthcare, safety of foods and drugs, regulation of production and marketing of goods and services, and expansion of employment opportunities. It also manages the country’s foreign relations. Governments in Pakistan are expected to perform all of these functions. The central government claims that it undertakes the above tasks, but in actual fact its attitude is one of indifference. Its key members are content with holding their designated offices, drawing salaries and enjoying the perquisites that come with them. But if governance requires working long hours and delivering services to the people, they do not wish to govern. It is not without reason that many observers both at home and abroad say that Pakistan is a country without a government. The 18th Amendment to the constitution transferred many of the central government’s powers and functions to the provinces. But the ones left with the Centre are still vital. They include defence, foreign affairs, regulation of foreign trade, levying and collection of income tax and customs and excise duties, communications, inter-provincial transit systems, water and power. The executive settles the main directions and policy goals in foreign affairs. Functionaries in the Foreign Office and diplomats serving abroad seem to be doing a good job. Some of Pakistan’s ambassadors in Washington during the last 30 years or so — for instance Sultan Mohammad Khan, Begum Abida Hussain, Dr Maleeha Lodhi — did outstanding work during their tenures. The present ambassador, Mr Husain Haqqani, is doing the best he can within the limits of his government’s capabilities. It is generally believed that the military establishment, particularly General Kayani and his corps commanders, more than Prime Minister Gilani’s government, make the country’s policy towards the US, India, and Afghanistan. If that is the case, the results are dubious. Pakistan’s relations with the US have deteriorated to the point where neither side trusts the other, and the great majority of the people on both sides share a mutual dislike. In spite of the cordial environment in which discussions between the two governments have been taking place, including exchanges between the colourful Hina Rabbani Khar and the rather plain-looking but astute Mr S M Krishna, no progress towards resolving the sensitive issues between Pakistan and India has been made. The Pakistan Army is said to be a fine fighting force. This assessment needs to be tempered by the record, which tells us that it has won no decisive victory in any of its wars with India. Consider also that it has fought no full scale war with an external foe during the last 40 years. We hear also that some of the army’s agencies, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have an interventionist role in this country’s domestic governance. This agency was originally intended to keep track of the political, economic and social capabilities and vulnerabilities of other nations, particularly India. It is not known how effectively it performs this mission. Its operatives appear to have concluded that they would be more effective if they focused on domestic politics. They maintain records of the failings of the higher ranking officials in the government of the day as well as those of the opposition politicians. No one should be surprised if it transpired that they had been keeping files on the doings of the president, the prime minister and his associates. The ISI is a huge organisation with inexhaustible funds. It employs several thousand persons with various backgrounds: serving and retired military and police officers who have had experience in espionage, technocrats with various specialisations, lawyers, and writers among others. It is known to have disbursed large sums of money to political parties and individual politicians for the purpose of influencing the outcome of elections. It is expected to report its findings and actions to the prime minister but it may be assumed that it tells him only as much as it considers expedient. It is really an arm of the military. It does make a fuller report to the army chief who has a predominant role in the selection of its director. Considering that its transactions may be kept secret and its revenues and outlays are not subject to audit, it may be said that the ISI is a power unto itself, a state within a state, indeed an empire. But neither this agency nor its parent, the army, is interested in matters other than defence, foreign policy, and selective oversight of the conduct of notable politicians. As noted above, the civilian government does not want to undertake the toil of governance. One may then ask who governs in the domains other than those appropriated by the army. Nobody with regard to matters that fall within the central government’s jurisdiction. Individuals may do whatever they want and get away with it even if it is wrongful. One may conclude that Mr Gilani and his comrades have led Pakistan into a state of lawlessness and chaos. The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics. He can be reached at anwarsyed@cox.net