Disrespect to culture, denial to right of rule, economic exploitation and a discriminatory development paradigm were the key causes of discontent in the then East Pakistan that eventually culminated in the creation of Bangladesh. The myopic attitude of both the civilian and military leadership grossly underestimated the power keg of East Pakistan that left deep scars of embarrassment on our national history. While language and culture are central to most rights-based movements, economy and politics are the incendiary triggers of perpetuating ghastly disgruntlement.
Undeniably the social fabric and political configuration of East and West Pakistan was poles apart. While West Pakistan was predominantly a feudal-led body of politics and society, East Pakistan had an entirely different socio-political vista. After 1857, Bengal became the first province under the British rule. It was the first regulation province of India under the jurisdiction of a High Court. Society and politics in Bengal was erected on starkly different building blocs not in jibe with the other provinces of Pakistan where British rule was deeply engrained in typical colonial structures and socio-political ambience. The landed aristocracy that shaped today’s Pakistan was annihilated in Bengal in 1950 with the introduction of the East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act. It effectively routed landlordism in Bengal by fixing individual holdings at a mere 3.3 acres per head or 33.3 acres of land per family, whichever is less. The agriculture census of 1963-64 shows that out of 6.2 million farms some six million were of less than 12.5 acres size and 50 percent of them were only 2.5 acres or less. On the contrary, West Pakistan was marked by large land holdings, especially in Punjab and Sindh. For example, 30 percent of the land in Sindh in 1952 was owned by only one percent of the owners and the average holding was above 500 acres. In Punjab, 50 percent of the land was under the control of zamindars (landlords). This sufficiently indicates the distinct social and political milieu of the two wings. Since West Pakistan held hegemony over the decision making process, the Spartan and vibrant middle class-led East Pakistan often confronted the policies drawn and imposed by the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan.
Resource haemorrhage and discrimination in pecuniary matters against East Pakistan was the key cause of conflict. In 1948-50 when East Pakistan had a net balance of payments surplus of Rs 622 million, West Pakistan had a net deficit of Rs 912 million. Similarly the foreign and inter-wing trade balance of the two wings from 1949-50 to 1957-58 shows East Pakistan having a surplus of Rs 3,636 million as balance of trade with foreign countries against the net deficit of Rs 3,047 million of West Pakistan on the same account. The trend remained consistent during the first and second five year plans when East Pakistan had a net surplus and West Pakistan had a net deficit in foreign trade and the surplus of East Pakistan was used to offset the deficit. Probably this prompted Sheikh Mujib to demand two separate currencies for the two wings under his popular six-point formula.
The resource sharing conflict might have been assuaged had some reasonable balance in benefit sharing been maintained. What riled the Bengalis was unremitting discrimination in development opportunities. For example, the GDP growth in East Pakistan during the period was 2.2 percent against the heavily skewed 3.1 percent of West Pakistan. During the same period, per capita income in East Pakistan plummeted to -0.1 percent against +0.8 percent increase in West Pakistan. Likewise, during the five years from 1954-55 to 1959-60, GDP growth in East Pakistan was only 1.6 percent, i.e. half of West Pakistan’s 3.2 percent. Per capita income in East Pakistan nose-dived to -0.7 percent against +1.2 percent in West Pakistan.
East Pakistan having almost 54 percent population was also discriminated against in public sector development. During the first five year plan, the total revenue expenditure in East Pakistan was Rs 2,540 million, which was less than one-third of the Rs 8,980 of West Pakistan. It was marginally ameliorated in the second five year plan from 1960-61 to 1964-65 when East Pakistan received Rs 6,254 million under the public sector development programme against Rs 7,696 million for West Pakistan, yet it was still 19 percent less. Cumulative figures of development expenditure of the two decades from 1950-51 to 1969-70 further explain the economic prejudice. Total development expenditure in East Pakistan remained disproportionately Rs 29,960 million against Rs 61,980 million in West Pakistan. Per capita GDP growth is another relevant indicator, which also depicts the same trend during the last ten years from 1959-60 to 1969-70. Per capita GDP growth in East Pakistan remained 17 percent against 42 percent in West Pakistan.
Not only that East Pakistan was kept economically deprived and politically suppressed, it was also under-represented in the state structure. The share of the Bengalis in senior level civil services was also flagrantly violated. During the first five years of the country, senior cadres of several departments were completely bereft of Bengalis. There were no Bengalis on any senior positions in the Departments of Commerce, Intelligence and Statistics, Supply and Development, Petroleum, Paper and Stationery Wing, Inspection Wing, General Concession Wing, Central Engineering Authority, Coal Commissioner and Textiles.
This sufficiently narrates the sheer discrimination and economic plight of East Pakistan. The chief of the Constitution Committee, Justice Shahabuddin, said in his report that colonial behaviour was adopted towards the Bengalis. Lacking prescience, the political and military leadership rather than opting for introspection embarked upon stereotyped narrations. General Ayub rabidly loathed the Bengalis. He once vented his spleen by saying: “I am surprised by Bengali outlook. They have cut themselves off from Muslim culture through abhorrence of the Urdu language…making themselves vulnerable to Hindu culture.” On September 7, 1967 he wrote: “God has been very unkind to us in giving the sort of neighbours [India] and compatriots [Bengalis]. We could not think of a worst combination. Hindus and Bengalis…If worst comes to the worst, we shall not hesitate to fight a relentless battle against the disruptionists in East Pakistan. Rivers of blood will flow if need be, unhappily. We will arise to save our crores of Muslims from Hindu slavery.” Certainly General Ayub was no exception in his fulmination against the Bengalis.
An assortment of such factors impregnated pernicious consternation among the Bengalis. Persistent political schism morphed into fratricide in 1971 that culminated in dismemberment of Pakistan.
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