The military domination of Pakistan’s body politic and the country’s tortuous, yet close relationship with the United States have been the subjects of many a book, but it is the first time that both have been comprehensively dealt with in one volume. Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is pre-eminently qualified for the task, and he has, for the first time, systematically demonstrated that the roots of the creation of Pakistan are firmly anchored in the last-minute British military’s decision to that effect. As to the haste with which Lord Mountbatten effected partition, in his incisive book Shameful Flight, the Last Years of the British Empire in India (OUP, 2006), Stanley Wolpert blames it for leaving “South Asia vulnerable to hatred and terror, compounded by ignorant fears and ugly rumours, multiplied by hundreds of millions.” “Mountbatten’s hyperactive frenzy” led to a killing frenzy, causing up to a million deaths, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu alike. Ahmed has also shown that the Pakistani leadership started wooing the Americans much before the latter paid any heed. Adlai Stevenson viewed Pakistan as a “tragic outcome of the senseless conflict between blood brothers,” while Chester Bowles referred to it as an unfortunate product of religious fanaticism (quoted in M R Azmi, ed., Pakistan-American Relations: the Recent Past, Royal Book Co, Karachi, 1994). Ahmed notes that the US pre-occupation with Europe and NATO in the context of the perceived Soviet threat ensured that the US paid little heed to South Asia at the time. It is perhaps fair to say that one is a prisoner of one’s background, and this includes all scholars and writers in varying degrees. But Ahmed, who unhesitatingly announces himself to be a proud Punjabi, and a Lahori to boot, is perhaps a noble exception. He takes a totally unbiased and highly critical view of the Punjabi domination in the Pakistani decision-making circles and corridors of power, particularly the army. He does so without mincing words and cites facts and figures to back his argument. I am not sure that the current practice of using the western system of citing Pakistanis by their last names, whether in text or in notes, is the right one. Khan is a case in point. Is it Liaquat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Musa Khan, Akbar Khan, Asghar Khan, Wali Khan, Fazal Muqeem Khan, Gohar Ayub Khan or Imran Khan? In a nation of tens of millions of Khans, the possibilities are immense. Whereas we know who we are talking about when we mention Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon, Kissinger and Carter or Blair, Thatcher or Cameron, which Khan are we referring to when we say just Khan? The same is true of, say, Ali, Ahmed or Chaudhry. There are times when the author could have dispensed with citations for well-known, incontrovertible facts (eg. p. 107). And there are places where a citation would have been useful, for instance, when he writes that “Mirza became suspicious of Ayub” (p. 115) or “Pakistan’s [military] success [in 1965 war] was mentioned in a number of dispatches by western correspondents.” (p. 135) Pakistan’s failure to get a democratic constitution for many years is said to be because “Liaquat Ali Khan evaded elections, primarily because he had no constituency from which to ensure his election” (p 104). This has been taken for granted by every Pakistani author and accepted by all without question. In fact, given the high prestige which Liaquat (or, should I say, Khan) enjoyed by virtue of his contribution to the Pakistan movement, building of the state from scratch and as the Quaid-e-Azam’s long-time deputy, and the goodwill that existed in the early years, he almost certainly would have been guaranteed to win from any constituency in Pakistan, both West and East. Voters in any part of the country would have felt honoured to vote for him as their member of parliament. Even now Pakistani politicians win elections from multiple constituencies (Bhutto of Larkana, Sindh, won from four constituencies in 1970, including Lahore!). And a fact not mentioned anywhere by anyone relates to the Chinese role, or rather the lack of it, in 1971. In September, the Chinese leadership was plunged into a very grave crisis when Mao Zedong’s deputy and designated successor, Defence Minister Lin Biao, along with many military commanders, launched an unsuccessful coup and died in a plane crash on Sept 13, 1971 when trying to flee. The coup originated in February 1971 and the crisis did not fully resolve until Deng Xiao Ping took charge in 1978. As a matter of curiosity, the plane that crashed along with Lin Biao in Mongolian territory for lack of fuel was a Trident that had been sold to China by PIA some years earlier! Throughout the book, Ahmed’s mastery of the subject at hand is manifest. One particular strength of the book is his personal interviews with a very large number of participants and scholars from all sides of the equation, namely, Pakistan, India and US, military as well as civilian. Perhaps Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed has tried to pack too much in one volume. It is perhaps impossible to separate foreign relations from internal socio-economic and political issues, but it may have been a good idea to limit discussions of foreign policy as far as possible. In Pakistan’s case, however, that is easier said than done, given the country’s crucial dependence on foreign economic and military aid and its search for powerful allies against the perceived Indian threat. In the event, the learned professor has done as good a job as anyone could have aspired to. This book is not merely a great resource for scholars interested in Pakistan but also for college and university students. It should be required reading at Pakistani institutions and academies of higher education. The book skillfully relates Pakistan’s evolution as a garrison state to its search for an identity and the welding of religion and state with very unfortunate results. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when President Lyndon B Johnson was told by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that President Ayub Khan was desperately seeking US help to bail him out of the quagmire, LBJ complained that Khan took off without even informing him, but now that he was going to crash-land he wanted him (LBJ) to sit with him in the cockpit! In a twist of irony, the situation has now been reversed and Pakistan probably can have the last laugh. The US got into the Afghan quagmire not only against Pakistan’s wishes but even threatened Pakistan to assist in the venture, but now that it wants a safe and honourable exit from there, it is desperate for Pakistan’s help. The photo of Brig (retd) Yasub Ali Dogar on the same page (opposite p. 116) as Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haque and Pervez Musharraf, all coup makers and generals-turned-president, is sure to please the brigadier, but whether he deserves their company is another matter. But surely it brings into sharp focus the words “Garrison State” in the title of the book, for Brigadier Yasub Ali Dogar has served as a Director of Operations in the ISI during some crucial years. The reviewer is a former academic with a doctorate in modern history. His doctoral dissertation was The US, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, 1947-1965; Problems of Security, Ideology and Geopolitics. He also edited Pakistan American Relations, the Recent Past (Royal Book Co, Karachi, 1994). He can be reached at raziazmi@hotmail.com