Our democratically elected prime minister-designate has said there is “no harm in talking to the Taliban”, thereby signalling his intention of initiating a process of dialogue. Imran Khan, whose party the battle-weary people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have elected, has all along been a vociferous proponent of what he calls ‘negotiations’ with the militants and terrorists, although it is not clear exactly what could be negotiated away.
Sheikh Rashid Ahmed of Laal Haveli stated on a recent TV talk show that the issue was not whether to negotiate with the Taliban, that being a given, but the reason why the government wishes to negotiate with them. This could be (a) because the Americans are getting ready to talk to them, (b) because we find we cannot defeat them, or (c) because they are a reality of the situation and, therefore, must be dealt with peaceably. Now, this is clearly an example of loaded logic. We are not bound to talk to this particular enemy of ours because the Americans are doing so, nor have we yet been militarily defeated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As to the third reason, I would suggest to Sheikh Sahib that such entities as scorpions or the smallpox virus are also realities, but one does not ‘negotiate’ with them. One exterminates them as inherently inimical to our species.
The theory that terror campaigns against Pakistan are some kind of retaliation for US drone strikes against the Taliban is dangerously naive. Yes, drone strikes may well be counter-productive and they certainly constitute a violation of our sovereignty. However, what is relevant here is that, barring a few sporadic earlier strikes, the drone campaign only reached a significant level as late as 2007. On the other hand, terrorist atrocities against Pakistan occurred as much as 20 years before this in 1987 when more than 200 people were blown to pieces in Bohri Bazaar. The FIA Centre in Saddar, Karachi, was blasted in 1991 (I happened to be right next door at St Joseph’s Convent School, where my daughter was studying). The US Consulate in Karachi was bombed in February 2002 and the Sheraton Hotel was bombed the following month. Sufi Mohammed began his attacks on Swat as far back as 1994! By 2003, Swat had been occupied by his son-in-law Fazlullah, forcing the army to take action in 2004. But the Taliban came right back in Swat, after one of the many misconceived ‘peace’ deals. This is not to mention the various other ‘peace’ deals that the Musharraf government repeatedly entered into in other places. Mangal Bagh took over Khyber Agency and began the series of attacks on Peshawar in 2004. The litany can go on and on. No, dear reader, the drone theory is a red herring.
What is happening is that, for whatever reason (confusion, disinformation, loss of will, or duplicity), we have grown tired of this war, which has gone on now for over 34 years. So many Pakistani lives have been lost and so much Pakistani treasure expended that we are simply searching for a quick-fix way out. If fighting them has not done it, we say to ourselves, then let’s try the other way. The point being lost is that major insurgencies can be exceedingly stubborn and prolonged. Think, for example, of Northern Ireland, the Tamil Tigers, the Basque separatists, the Palestinians, the Moros, the Nepali Maoists.
While we can take heart from the historic fact that few rebel groups in the last 40 years have actually achieved victory and all insurgencies eventually end, it can take a long time to happen. The insurgents eventually lay down their arms and join the political process out of sheer attrition, or because local police and intelligence agencies have arrested or killed their key leaders. Military force may not be the sole reason for the end of an insurgency. But the use of military force is obviously the first essential step and its continued use the necessary accompaniment of all other steps.
To understand counter-insurgency (COIN), one must understand insurgency. The dynamics of revolutionary warfare stem from the insurgents’ ability to capitalise on societal problems, or gaps. First, and most important, the state must provide security to its citizens, protecting them against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If governments cannot ensure security, armed non-state actors can exploit this ‘security gap’, as in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia. The extraordinary ‘innovation’ in Pakistan — where state functionaries themselves damaged national sovereignty by arming and training terror legions, providing them with recruiting bases and a spurious ideological legitimacy, and even handing them over whole swathes of national territory — belongs in a political theatre of the absurd. But, well, such are the kinds of leaderships we have had!
Next, the state must have the’ capacity’ to provide at least the most basic survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communications and a working economic system. Inability to do so creates a ‘capacity gap’, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and political upheaval.
Underlying both of these is the issue of governmental order. This is particularly significant in the case of Pakistan, where arrogant ‘saviours’ have illegitimately seized power repeatedly at the cost of constitutional rule. Let us understand that a government that exists by the consent of the governed, such as we have acquired only too recently, has inherent advantages in terms of stability and legitimacy. Consider the disintegration of the once all-powerful, but undemocratic, USSR. Contrast this with the vitality of ragged, chaotic, poverty-afflicted India, the world’s largest democracy.
COIN, then, has more than one dimension and must address the closing of all these gaps: security, capacity and legitimacy. The goal of the insurgent is not to defeat the military force; that is almost always an impossible task. Rather, the insurgency seeks, through a constant campaign of sneak attacks and terrorism, to demoralise COIN forces and erode political support for the operations. The military pressure on them must therefore remain constant and unrelenting, side by side with the closing of the three gaps.
A war weary leadership, sucked into meaningless negotiations, would disastrously fail the people who have voted it into power. Moreover, it would be a tragic betrayal of the more than 50,000 families who have lost a loved one to these violent primitives. Or the 5,000 soldiers who have died defending the rest of us against them. Or those who continue to struggle against them. Or such courageous children as Malala Yousufzai, Kainat Riaz and Shazia Ramzan, whose example should put so many of us to shame.
The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet